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1 
1 Introduction 
The conceptual design of tax accounting regulations and the corresponding reporting behavior 
of corporations have been subject to intense discussion during the last decade. In particular, 
there is not yet a clear opinion on the appropriate extent to which book and tax accounts should 
be aligned (degree of book-tax conformity), and on whether a one-book system (strong 
alignment) or a two-book system (far-reaching detachment) better complies with the objectives 
of financial and tax accounting. While a one-book system could potentially limit opportunistic 
reporting behavior (earnings management and tax sheltering), as firms face a trade-off between 
reporting preferably high financial income vs. a low tax base, an alignment could also lead to a 
loss of valuable information because financial and tax accounts serve different objectives and 
are targeted at different recipients. The (empirical) evidence on the true effects (benefits and 
costs) of book-tax conformity is, however, not yet unambiguous. In the US, various reporting 
scandals (such as Enron) have triggered a call for a stronger alignment of both reporting lines. 
Several other countries, such as Germany, by contrast, have recently moved towards a 
separation of financial and tax reporting (e.g. Accounting Law Modernization Act in 2010).  
Besides these unilateral developments and the ongoing unresolved book-tax conformity debate, 
there are several supranational trends and economic influencing factors which might 
prospectively affect tax accounting and tax reporting. The topic of the harmonization of tax 
accounting within the European Union (EU) has, for example, gained increasing attention over 
the last few years. Accordingly, the European Commission has proposed a first draft directive 
for a “Common (Consolidated) Corporate Tax Base” in 2011 (European Commission (2011)). 
This concept would induce a full detachment of the determination of taxable profits from 
financial accounts, and thus imply a transition to a two-book system in all European countries. 
Recently, a staged introduction of a Common (Consolidated) Corporate Tax Base has been put 
on the agenda by the “Action Plan for a Fairer and Efficient Corporate Tax System” (European 
Commission (2015a)) as a measure against profit shifting and is also included in the revised 
proposal for a Council Directive on a Common (Consolidated) Corporate Tax Base, which was 
published in October 2016 (European Commission (2016e, 2016f)). These proposals perfectly 
fit into the general discussion around the fight against Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) 
which has been the predominant tax issue over the last years. The starting points were tax 
planning efforts of highly profitable US multinationals such as Google, Apple or Amazon and 
their extremely low effective tax rates on their non-US profits. As a countermeasure to these 
profit shifting activities, the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development 
(OECD) released a global action plan in 2013 aimed at closing loopholes that facilitate tax 
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avoidance and at finding solutions to today’s tax challenges. Arguing that a lack of transparency 
facilitates profit shifting, the OECD action plan also includes – among other things – specific 
actions aimed at enhancing the quality of tax reporting, such as a proposal for a so-called 
Country-by-Country Reporting, i.e. a country-specific reporting of certain tax information. 
Apart from these initiatives on the EU and OECD level, several general economic influencing 
factors and the market environment might potentially impact on tax accounting. One example 
is the persistent low interest environment prevailing since the financial crisis in 2008. 
Against this background, this dissertation focuses on and aims to add to the outlined multiple 
dimensions of tax accounting and tax reporting. It consists of three main chapters which include 
five self-contained papers: Chapter 2 and chapter 3 contain two separate empirical analyses 
directly contributing to the international book-tax conformity debate. The aim is to provide 
further evidence on the research question of the true effects and characteristics of one-book and 
two-book systems and to derive propositions on the appropriate degree of book-tax conformity. 
Chapter 4, comprising three subchapters, covers and examines the different outlined trends and 
developments in the field of tax accounting and tax reporting in Europe.  
Chapter 21 builds on the fact that a huge body of tax accounting literature has emerged 
especially in the US over the last decade(s) (Hanlon and Heitzman (2010)). In this regard, we 
provide a comprehensive and systematic literature review covering the two identified major 
strands of literature dealing with the association between book-tax conformity (or book-tax 
differences) and opportunistic reporting behavior. Beyond a qualitative literature survey, 
heterogeneity in measures used as well as in reported findings in primary studies induces us to 
use quantitative meta-analysis techniques (i.e. meta regression analysis) to identify the 
determinants of why empirical findings significantly vary and to provide more general 
conclusions based on a quantitative synthesis of prior findings. To this end, we derive a 
consensus estimate in terms of the sign and statistical significance on the association between 
book-tax differences and earnings management/tax sheltering in order to examine whether 
book-tax conformity is indeed effective in reducing aggressive reporting behavior. In addition, 
we derive insights on the direction and significance of major drivers and determinants of book-
tax differences. 
                                                 
1  This is joint work with Maria Theresia Evers and Katharina Nicolay and is forthcoming as ZEW discussion 
paper. The paper is submitted to Review of Accounting Studies. 
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Chapter 32 addresses the fact that empirical evidence on tax accounting in Europe and, in 
particular, in Germany is still rare, even though the topic is, as outlined, of high relevance at 
the European level. In addition, there are only few papers which observe a real change in book-
tax conformity and most existing studies have to rely on proxies for tax variables as they have 
no access to information on true taxable income. In our study, we are able to examine a setting 
in which firms have been subject to a comprehensive change in conformity as a consequence 
of the Accounting Law Modernization Act (Bilanzrechtsmodernisierungsgesetz) in Germany 
in 2010. To that end, we employ a dataset of linked individual financial statements and actual 
tax return data for 150 incorporated firms, thus avoiding problems of approximating taxable 
income. Exploiting this exceptional change in conformity and our unique dataset, we contribute 
to the ongoing debate and the existing literature on the impact of book-tax conformity on 
reporting behavior. We assess whether the new reporting discretion resulting from the decrease 
in book-tax conformity is actually exploited despite additional requirements to document 
deviations between financial and tax accounting. Using individual financial and tax accounts 
allows us to attribute the change in book-tax differences to tax sheltering rather than to financial 
earnings management. Secondly, we examine how the change in book-tax conformity affects 
the persistence of taxable and financial income. This analysis provides an additional test 
demonstrating that the newly introduced scope for opportunistic reporting behavior induces tax 
sheltering rather than earnings management.  
Chapter 4.13 deals with the proposal for a Common (Consolidated) Corporate Tax Base to 
harmonize tax accounting in Europe. Even if the proposed rules for profit determination can, in 
principle, be considered as appropriate to align the tax base, they lack detailed definitions of 
legal terms such that there are numerous regulatory gaps as well as discretion in reporting. 
These cannot be eliminated uniformly by referring to national (civil) laws. Against this 
background, we intend to substantiate the principles for the harmonized determination of 
taxable profits based on a cash flow-oriented taxation/modified net income method. This 
concept would gear profit determination more strongly towards the cash-principle and limit 
accrual accounting and periodical adjustments as far as possible. Thus, it would lead to more 
clarity and uniformity and, at the same time, induce a transition to a two-book system. 
                                                 
2  This is joint work with Maria Theresia Evers and Katharina Nicolay. An earlier version of the paper has been 
circulated as ZEW discussion paper (Evers et al. (2016)) and the paper is submitted to European Accounting 
Review. 
3  This is joint work with Maria Theresia Evers, Melanie Köstler, Katharina Nicolay, Wolfram Scheffler and 
Christoph Spengel. The chapter is based on earlier versions of the paper published by Steuer und Wirtschaft 
(Evers et al. (2015)) and circulated as ZEW discussion paper (Evers et al. (2014a)).  
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Chapter 4.24 aims at analyzing the current proposals of the OECD and the European 
Commission for a comprehensive Country-by-Country Reporting. Our major goal is to evaluate 
whether these initiatives for enhanced transparency in tax reporting are appropriate to prevent 
multinationals from profit shifting. By doing so, we, in particular, assess potential sources for 
providing the relevant information as well as related benefits and costs. Finally, we provide 
potential alternatives for curbing international profit shifting. 
Chapter 4.35 deals with the question on how the persistent low interest environment impacts 
on the various tax (accounting) dimensions in Germany. These include the direct effects of the 
interest expense on taxable profits of corporations, interest and liquidity effects of taxation as 
well as the repercussions caused by the low interest environment on the valuation of provisions 
under financial and tax accounting as well as the resulting book-tax differences. It is therefore 
the aim of this chapter to identify and analyze the respective interdependencies as well as to 
provide possible options for reform. 
Chapter 5 finally closes with a general conclusion summarizing the most important results of 
the separate chapters as well as contextualizing the major findings. 
The papers included in this dissertation have been originally written as submissions for 
publications in taxation and accounting journals. Thereby, the papers are the work of multiple 
authors. Table 1 acknowledges the different co-authors and provides information on the current 
publication status for each paper. In addition, it highlights the key contributions of the author 
to the single papers of this dissertation.  
  
                                                 
4  This is joint work with Maria Theresia Evers and Christoph Spengel. The paper has been awarded by the 
“Stiftung Wissenschaftsform Wirtschaftsprüfung und Recht” with the “Stiftungspreis 2016”. An earlier version 
of the paper has been published by Bulletin for International Taxation (Evers et al. (2014b)).  
5  This is joint work with Christoph Spengel. The chapter is based on a paper published by Finanz-Rundschau 
(Spengel and Meier (2016)). 
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2 Effects and Drivers of Book-Tax Differences: Literature Review 
and Meta-Analysis6 
2.1 Introduction 
The observed increase in differences between book and taxable income (Book-Tax Differences 
(BTD)) as well as various reporting scandals in the US have triggered an intense discussion on 
the appropriate degree of Book-Tax Conformity (BTC), i.e. the degree to which book and tax 
accounting should be aligned. In particular, it is largely unclear to what extent book-tax 
differences relate to deterministic deviations between financial and tax accounting or rather to 
“aggressiveness” in either or both book and tax reporting. At the same time, it also remains 
uncertain whether increased book-tax conformity would actually reduce Earnings Management 
(EM) and/or Tax Sheltering (TS) and whether book-tax differences are really indicative of such 
opportunistic reporting behavior. Moreover, the question arises which and how specific firm 
characteristics drive the book-tax gap.  
Over the last decade, a huge body of tax accounting literature covering a broad range of different 
topics has emerged. These research questions, for instance, refer to the information content of 
BTD with regard to particular earnings features as well as to BTD as an indicator for 
opportunistic reporting behavior. With respect to the latter, we have identified two major 
interrelated strands dealing with the association between BTD/BTC and EM/TS. This topic has 
been continuously and intensely discussed in public and in the literature and therefore lies in 
the focus of our study. The first one examines whether BTD actually are indicative of aggressive 
reporting. In the second strand, BTD are already operationalized as proxies for aggressive 
reporting (EM and/or TS) and it is analyzed which particular drivers impact on BTD (on 
EM/TS, respectively). 
The empirical evidence on these issues is, however, not unambiguous. While recent evidence 
provided by Watrin et al. (2014) and Blaylock et al. (2015) for instance find that book-tax 
conformity is associated with significantly more earnings management, Tang (2015) concludes 
that high book-tax conformity deters overall earnings management and tax avoidance. In 
addition, there is great heterogeneity in the proxies for EM and TS and in the measures used to 
determine BTD and BTC. Measures for EM and TS, for example, include accruals, indicator 
variables for detected or alleged fraud, or tax contingencies. With respect to BTD, the major 
challenge in most studies is that actual tax return data is not available. Hence, most studies have 
                                                 
6 We would like to thank the Stiegler Stiftung for financing a research visit at the University of Chicago Law 
School. 
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to rely on proxies such as the total difference between book and estimated taxable income while 
others use more specific measures targeted at capturing EM/TS more precisely or even refer to 
observed BTD upon tax return data availability.  
Against this background, our analysis pursues multiple objectives: First, we intend to provide 
a comprehensive and systematic literature review covering the two strands outlined above. 
More precisely, we categorize and discuss the various BTD and BTC measures as well as the 
different proxies for EM and TS. Furthermore, we identify and examine the possible factors 
impacting on BTD. Second, beyond this qualitative literature survey, heterogeneity in measures 
used as well as in reported findings induces us to use quantitative review techniques (meta-
analysis) to substantiate our analysis. The major goals of meta-analysis are to identify the 
determinants of why empirical findings on certain questions significantly vary or are even 
contradictory and to provide more general conclusions based on a quantitative synthesis of prior 
findings.  
In relation to the first strand on the association between BTD and EM/TS, we employ meta 
regression analysis (MRA) as an innovative tool in the empirical accounting literature 
(Pomeroy and Thornton (2008)) to derive a consensus estimate in terms of the sign and 
statistical significance level, on the association between BTD/BTC and EM/TS. Our MRA 
additionally serves the purpose of identifying the systematic causes for the substantial 
heterogeneity in the results of primary studies. 
For the second field of literature, we aim at deriving insights on the direction and significance 
of the major drivers of BTD. As we are not interested in one single statistical association, but 
in the impact of various factors, we rely on the Stouffer combined test (Hay et al. (2006)) as 
methodological tool. 
The paper continues as follows: Chapter 2.2 sketches the book-tax conformity discussion and 
explains the various BTD/BTC measures applied in previous studies. A comprehensive 
literature review on the two identified strands is conducted in chapter 2.3. Firstly, we elaborate 
on the association between BTD/BTC and opportunistic reporting in chapter 2.3.2. In particular, 
we discuss the diverse proxies for EM/TS. Secondly, an overview on the most common drivers 
and components of BTD and how these are expected to be associated with EM/TS is provided 
in 2.3.3. Chapter 2.4 then explains the techniques of meta-analysis in general and with particular 
regard to the procedure and methodologies used in our study. Finally, we summarize the results 
of our quantitative analyses in chapter 2.5 and provide a conclusion in chapter 2.6. 
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2.2 Institutional Background: Book-Tax Conformity and Book-Tax Differences 
Book-tax conformity 
There has been a long-standing debate among tax experts and legislators regarding the 
appropriate degree of book-tax conformity, i.e. the extent to which book and tax accounting 
should be aligned. This debate was not only triggered by various reporting scandals such as the 
one involving Enron7, but also by the observation that the book-tax gap in the US has 
considerably widened over the last decades (Desai (2003) and Desai (2005); Mills et al. (2002); 
Plesko (2002); Manzon and Plesko (2002); Hanlon and Shevlin (2005)). Yet, the specific causes 
driving this divergence are largely unknown (Hanlon and Shevlin (2005), p. 106).  
Several arguments have been brought forward by proponents and opponents of increased book-
tax conformity.8 Proponents (Desai (2003) and Desai (2005); Whitaker (2005); Shaviro (2009); 
Yin (2001)) posit that book-tax conformity would constrain managers’ scope and incentives for 
aggressively reporting on both financial and taxable income as a result of the book-tax trade-
off: Overstating financial earnings would entail costs of higher tax payments; understating 
taxable income would come at the cost of having to report lower earnings to shareholders and 
other capital market participants. This is in contrast to managers’ alleged scope for 
simultaneously reporting high earnings to capital markets and low taxable income to tax 
authorities in the framework of low book-tax conformity. Hence, book-tax conformity could 
constitute an incentive not to report opportunistically in either direction, thereby enhancing 
earnings quality, tax compliance and transparency. Furthermore, relying on one instead of two 
sets of accounting rules could potentially reduce compliance and administrative costs.  
Opponents (Hanlon et al. (2005); Hanlon and Shevlin (2005); Hanlon et al. (2008); McClelland 
and Mills (2007)) of increased book-tax conformity, however, emphasize the divergent 
objectives of both reporting lines. Arguing that an alignment of the two reporting systems would 
induce managers to report in such a way that taxes are minimized instead of in a way that as 
much relevant information as possible is conveyed to capital market participants, they claim 
that book-tax conformity would result in a decrease of accounting information available to the 
public and, hence, in a decrease of earnings quality (Hanlon et al. (2005); Ali and Hwang 
(2000); Guenther and Young (2000); Hanlon et al. (2008)). 
                                                 
7 For details on the Enron case, see McGill and Outslay (2002). 
8 For an extensive discussion on the pros and cons of book-tax conformity, see for instance Hanlon and Maydew 
(2009); McClelland and Mills (2007). 
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Sources of book-tax differences 
Generally speaking, differences between book and taxable income (book-tax differences)9 are 
assumed to be determined by two major drivers: First, book income and taxable income are 
both computed on an accrual basis, but are intended to serve different purposes (Hanlon and 
Shevlin (2005); Hanlon and Heitzman (2010)). While financial accounting under the Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) is supposed to provide decision-relevant information, 
e.g. for capital markets, taxable income determination has to be in accordance with tax law, 
which has more political objectives and therefore leads to different rules. These objectives are 
for instance of a fiscal, social or economic nature. As an example, accelerated depreciation 
provided under tax law is intended to alter corporate behavior in a way that investment activity 
is increased (Graham et al. (2012b), p. 24). 
A second, at least suspected, driver of book-tax differences is “aggressive reporting” for either 
or both book and tax reporting purposes (Hanlon and Heitzman (2010), p. 130). Indeed, 
evidence provided so far suggests that large positive book-tax differences are indicative of 
aggressive financial reporting (e.g. Hanlon (2005); Lev and Nissim (2004)). Likewise, Desai 
(2003) argues that the increase in book-tax differences throughout the last decades cannot only 
be explained by traditional drivers of the book-tax gap, but also by increased tax sheltering 
activity.  
Taking a look at book-tax differences resulting from divergent provisions in financial and tax 
accounting, one can first of all distinguish between differences occurring at the pre-tax vs. at 
the after-tax level (Hanlon and Heitzman (2010)). Differences between pre-tax accounting 
earnings and taxable income can be either of permanent or temporary nature. Permanent BTD 
arise when one measure of income requires an item to be included for its computation while the 
other measure does not (Hanlon and Shevlin (2005), p. 105).10 By contrast, temporary BTD 
emerge because of differences in the rules governing the recognition of income and expense 
items, but ultimately reverse such that overall equal amounts are deducted or recognized for 
book and tax purposes.11 In financial accounting, there additionally exist tax-related accounting 
accruals that are not present for tax purposes, thus generating further differences between 
taxable income and after-tax book income (Hanlon and Heitzman (2010), p. 170). These items 
                                                 
9 The following discussion on the sources of book-tax differences focuses on the institutional context of the 
USA, because the vast majority of empirical studies is based on US data. Many findings can, however, be 
transferred to other institutional settings, including the German institutional context. 
10 As an example, municipal bond interest is included in book income, but excluded from taxable income. 
11 Examples for these kinds of BTD include depreciation, warranty and bad debt expenses, and deferred revenue, 
see e.g. Hanlon and Heitzman (2010). 
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are suspected to be used for earnings management (Hanlon and Heitzman (2010), p. 133) as 
their determination requires some managerial judgment. In particular, three major income tax-
related accounting accruals are discussed in the literature:12 the valuation allowance, the 
contingency reserve, and the amount of foreign earnings designated as permanently reinvested. 
The valuation allowance is a contra-asset account to factor in the effect of tax benefits relating 
to deferred tax assets that are not expected to be realized in the future.13 The contingency reserve 
– also called “tax cushion” – is recognized for uncertain tax positions. Specifically, it is a 
liability recognized at the estimated amount of taxes that might be additionally due in the future 
as a result of tax audits.14 Thirdly, US corporations that operate a foreign subsidiary in a 
jurisdiction with a lower income tax rate than the US have the opportunity to designate foreign 
earnings as permanently reinvested, if the firm does not intend to repatriate those subsidiary’s 
earnings in the foreseeable future; thus creating permanent BTD.  
Several provisions in financial accounting and tax law require certain disclosures on book-tax 
differences. For instance, the tax footnotes to the financial statements have to include 
component-based information on material deferred tax accounts and need to provide for a 
reconciliation of the statutory federal tax rate with the effective tax rate (Graham et al. (2012b)). 
Similarly, tax returns entail Schedules M-1 and M-3 for a reconciliation of book and taxable 
income. However, it has been argued that these disclosures on book-tax differences are 
insufficient and inappropriate to enable capital market participants or tax authorities to actually 
draw valid inferences about the size and sources of book-tax differences (e.g. Hanlon (2003); 
Mills and Plesko (2003); Hanlon and Heitzman (2010)). Arguably, this leaves leeway for 
companies to engage in opportunistic financial and/or tax reporting. 
Different types of BTD  
There exist several measures of BTD (see Table 2) that are employed in the empirical tax 
accounting literature. These measures relate to different kinds of BTD and thus also capture 
different things. Some BTD measures are specifically constructed so as to capture or to account 
for aggressiveness in financial and/or tax reporting; other measures are defined more broadly 
and also entail items that are not considered to be used by firms for aggressive reporting. As 
Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) point out, it is, however, “often not clear why a particular measure 
                                                 
12 The following remarks on the three income tax accruals are largely based on Graham et al. (2012a) and Graham 
et al. (2012b). 
13 For instance because no sufficient taxable income is expected.  
14 Since 2007, the financial reporting standard FIN 48 stipulates the disclosure of the tax contingency balance in 
the footnotes to the financial statements. Also see chapter 2.3.2 for more details on the tax contingency. 
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is used for the research question at hand”. In the following, these measures and their rationale 
are examined in more detail.  
Total BTD represent the most comprehensive measure and capture both temporary and 
permanent BTD. Absent tax return data, they are mostly computed from financial statement 
information as the difference between pre-tax book income and estimated taxable income. 
Following Manzon and Plesko (2002), taxable income is mostly approximated by grossing up 
the current tax expense with the statutory tax rate.15 Although the Total BTD measure is 
appealing with regard to its straightforward computation, it has been posited that it is subject to 
substantial measurement error, given various problems associated with estimating taxable 
income from financial statements (Hanlon (2003)). These problems are for instance related to 
different consolidation rules for book and tax purposes, tax credits, foreign operations or loss 
firms.16 Only a few studies are based on actual tax return data, i.e. taxable income does not need 
to be estimated to compute Total BTD in these cases, thus avoiding potential measurement 
error.17 
Apart from this basic BTD measure, the empirical literature has come up with some precise 
BTD proxies that are designed to specifically account for aggressiveness in either or both 
financial and tax reporting. 
 
                                                 
15 A refined approach and more details on the computation are for example provided by Wilson (2009).  
16 For more details, also see Hanlon and Heitzman (2010); Desai and Dharmapala (2006). Moreover, Hanlon and 
Heitzman (2010) posit that Total BTD also include Permanent BTD that are not related to accounting accruals 
as well as items that do not really represent BTD. They therefore conclude that Total BTD may not be 
appropriate to examine “whether information in the tax expense is indicative of earnings management in other 
pre-tax accruals”.  
17 However, using tax return data comes with its own problems, see Hanlon and Heitzman (2010), p. 139. 
12 
Table 2: BTD measures used in the empirical tax accounting literature 
 
13 
Temporary BTD emerge as a result of differences between book and taxable income with 
regard to the timing of accrual income and expense items. They can be measured by grossing 
up the deferred tax expense with the statutory tax rate (e.g. Moore (2012)). Temporary BTD 
are considered to entail information about potential management of non-tax accruals such as 
depreciation (Hanlon and Heitzman (2010), p. 132).18  
Permanent BTD, constituting the conceptual counterpart to temporary BTD, result from 
differences between book and taxable income that do not reverse over time. Permanent BTD 
are usually computed as the difference between estimated Total BTD and Temporary BTD (e.g. 
Wilson (2009); Lisowsky et al. (2013)). In the literature, it has been brought forward that an 
“ideal” tax shelter features such Permanent BTD (Plesko (2004); Frank et al. (2009); Shevlin 
(2002)),19 as they decrease taxable income and effectively reduce effective tax rates (ETR) 
without affecting financial income reported to shareholders. Hence, Permanent BTD could be 
indicative of aggressive tax reporting. Indeed, Wilson (2009) for instance demonstrates that 
most tax shelters generate Permanent BTD. However, Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) claim the 
notion of Permanent BTD being more indicative of tax aggressiveness than Temporary BTD 
overall to be “unsupported” by empirical evidence.  
A frequently used measure is the Discretionary permanent BTD (DTAX) measure developed 
by Frank et al. (2009). Targeted at quantifying “discretionary permanent differences”, it is 
considered as a measure of tax reporting aggressiveness. Frank et al. (2009) base their proxy 
on permanent BTD (rather than total BTD) also arguing that anecdotal evidence suggests 
aggressive tax shelter activity to be rather associated with permanent BTD. In doing so, they 
justify excluding tax planning related to temporary differences.20 Furthermore, they contend 
that permanent BTD “reflect items that are not considered aggressive tax reporting”, such as 
changes in the tax cushion, changes in the valuation allowance, goodwill and other intangible 
assets or tax credits. Therefore, DTAX is estimated by regressing total permanent BTD on these 
non-discretionary items that are known to cause permanent differences as well as on other 
                                                 
18 Other non-tax accruals include e.g. the warranty and bad debt expense.  
19 As an example for the German institutional context, internally generated intangible assets must not be 
recognized in tax balance sheets, but recognition in single financial accounts is optional. Hence, in case these 
assets are recognized in single financial statements, income is increased without raising taxable income, see 
Watrin et al. (2014), p. 66. 
20 Furthermore, Frank et al. (2009) argue that temporary differences also reflect earnings management via pre-
tax accruals (also see Phillips et al. (2003) and Hanlon (2005) on this). As their study also examines how tax 
aggressiveness relates to pre-tax earnings management, they posit that they avoid spurious correlation between 
temporary BTD and pre-tax earnings management (and thus: spurious correlation between earnings 
management and tax aggressiveness) by excluding those temporary BTD from DTAX. Frank et al. contend 
that avoiding this kind of spurious correlation outweighs the costs of excluding tax planning associated with 
temporary BTD.  
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statutory adjustments21 that are likely unrelated to tax aggressiveness. Specifically, 
discretionary permanent differences (DTAX) are the residual from this regression. This residual 
is supposed to capture intentional tax aggressiveness, after determinants that are not related to 
tax aggressiveness have been removed. Conceptually, this discretionary measure intends to 
cover items that decrease the firm’s ETR, i.e. items that reduce taxable income and increase 
accounting earnings (Hanlon and Heitzman (2010), p. 142).22 According to Frank et al. (2009), 
this kind of captured tax planning could or could not be considered fraudulent tax evasion 
(Frank et al. (2009), p. 468). 
Similarly, Desai and Dharmapala’s (2006) Discretionary Total BTD measure constitutes a 
discretionary measure of tax reporting aggressiveness. More precisely, this proxy elicits that 
part of Total BTD which can be attributed to tax avoidance and not earnings management; i.e. 
it determines an abnormal BTD after the impact of total accruals is removed. Specifically, Desai 
and Dharmapala (2006) proceed as follows: First, they estimate Total BTD according to the 
methodology of Manzon and Plesko (2002). Then, Total BTD are regressed on total accruals 
intended to capture earnings management. The residual from this regression, i.e. the component 
of Total BTD that cannot be explained by variations in total accruals, is determined to be a 
measure of tax avoidance activity. The Discretionary Total BTD measure is also widely used 
in the literature.23 
Finally, Wilson (2009) adopts quite a different approach to estimate a BTD with the effect of 
tax sheltering removed. His approach is based on a sample of firms that were accused of 
having engaged in a tax shelter by the Treasury or by the Press. In particular, Wilson deducts 
from the Total BTD the effect, i.e. the tax savings, of tax benefits using information from the 
footnotes to the financial statements. To this end, he grosses up the identified federal tax savings 
by the applicable statutory corporate income tax rate and deducts it from the firms’ Total BTD 
to obtain this revised BTD estimate. Ultimately, his approach aims at comparing BTD of tax 
shelter firms to those of non-shelter firms.24 
                                                 
21 Frank et al. (2009) name state taxes as an example for such statutory adjustments. 
22 Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) argue, however, that Frank et al.’s (2009) terminology for permanent BTD is 
“somewhat unfortunate”, contending that it captures more than permanent BTD.  
23 Based on Desai and Dharmapala’s (2006) approach, Kraft (2015) constructs another measure of Discretionary 
BTD, which is intended to capture both earnings management and tax avoidance. To that end, Kraft partitions 
total accruals into normal accruals and discretionary accruals using the model of Dechow et al. (2003). She 
then regresses Total BTD on normal accruals, arguing that the residual from this regression reflects 
Discretionary BTD that comprise earnings management and tax avoidance. Kraft’s measure has not, however, 
been used in other studies yet. 
24 Indeed, Wilson (2009) finds that BTDs are no longer significantly different from those of the non-shelter 
control firms when tax savings generated by tax shelters are taken into account. 
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BTC measures 
Book-tax conformity pertains to the degree to which book and tax accounting are aligned and 
thus also to the extent to which there is room for book-tax differences to occur. The effects of 
BTC, for instance with regard to earnings management and tax sheltering, have mostly been 
studied by means of cross-country studies aimed at capturing differing levels of BTC across 
various countries. This follows the rationale that the amount of flexibility that firms have to 
report BTD varies across jurisdictions (Atwood et al. (2012), p. 1834). Early studies on book-
tax conformity (Alford et al. (1993); Hung (2001); Ali and Hwang (2000); Guenther and Young 
(2000); Leuz et al. (2003); Burgstahler et al. (2006)) simply categorize the contemplated 
countries as having either high or low conformity. This categorization is derived from law, 
representing the perceived extent to which accounting provisions of the tax law conform to 
financial accounting standards (Watrin et al. (2014), p. 56). Hence, this measure is rather 
subjective and not of an empirical nature (Tang (2015), p. 443).  
In contrast to that, Atwood et al. (2010) develop a comprehensive measure of the required level 
of BTC in a given country. They define BTC as “the flexibility that a firm has to report taxable 
income (TI) that is different from pre-tax book income (PTBI)” and base their measure on the 
conditional variance of current tax expense (CTE) (as of consolidated financial statements) for 
a given level of pre-tax book income.25 In particular, they rely on the root mean-squared error 
(RMSE) from a country-year regression of CTE on PTBI as it provides an unbiased estimate of 
the standard error of the regression. Consequently, countries featuring a lower RMSE are 
assumed to have less flexibility in tax reporting and in employing strategies that generate BTD, 
and thus, face higher BTC. In fact, countries are ranked according to their RMSE such that 
countries with higher rankings in a given year feature a higher BTC.26  
While Atwood et al.’s measure is based on data from consolidated financial statements, Watrin 
et al. (2014) develop a BTC measure that is based on the relation between single financial 
statements and tax accounts. They substantiate their approach arguing that in most European 
high conformity countries taxable income determination is related to single financial 
statements. Watrin et al.’s (2014) measure is based on permanent BTD, computed at the single 
entity level and aggregated at the country level. Specifically, per country and year, they 
compute the mean of all the absolute values of permanent BTD. Thereafter, they assign a rank 
                                                 
25 Given that Atwood et al. (2010) examine the association between CTE and PTBI, their measure is most likely 
closest related to Total BTD. 
26 Atwood et al. (2010) use descending ranks, i.e. the highest RMSE is assigned a value of zero, and the lowest 
RMSE is ranked n-1, with n being the number of countries included in a given year. These rankings are divided 
by n-1 thereafter to scale these to be between zero and one. 
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to each country in each year based on the mean permanent BTD such that countries with higher 
rankings exhibit higher BTC.27 Obviously, the larger the BTD, the lower is the level of book-
tax conformity. 
Finally, another empirical proxy for mandated book-tax conformity was developed by Tang 
(2015). Precisely, Tang (2015) defines required BTC as the amount of variation in temporary 
and permanent BTD “that cannot be explained by opportunistic book and tax reporting for firms 
in a given country and year”. To determine mandated BTD, Tang (2015) first of all aims at 
disentangling BTD relating to legal differences between financial and tax accounting from BTD 
relating to opportunistic book and tax reporting. To that end, she regresses BTD on a proxy for 
earnings management (discretionary accruals) and on a proxy for tax avoidance (the difference 
between the statutory tax rate and the effective tax rate) and their interaction term. Tang (2015) 
then uses the root-mean-squared errors from this regression as a measure of the degree to which 
book and tax income deviate due to rule differences, thus reflecting a country’s level of 
mandatory conformity. 
BTD: Measured vs. approximated 
Computing BTD obviously requires an estimate of taxable income. Taxable income is reported 
on tax returns and financial statements include information on the tax expense as well as on tax 
assets and liabilities, such as deferred taxes. Theoretically, estimates of taxable income could 
therefore be derived from both tax returns and financial statements. However, tax returns are 
usually not publicly accessible and thus only a few empirical investigations are based on such 
actual tax return data.28 In the absence of tax return data, most studies rely on proxies for tax 
positions estimated from financial statements. For instance, as outlined above, a common 
approach to approximate taxable income is to gross up the current tax expense on the income 
statement by the statutory tax rate. However, deriving estimates of taxable income from 
financial statements comes along with various problems. Hanlon (2003) and McGill and 
Outslay (2004) extensively discuss these issues: Essentially, tax disclosures in financial 
statements are insufficient to draw valid conclusions about taxable income and actual taxes paid 
in a given fiscal year (Hanlon and Heitzman (2010), p. 139), i.e. additional disclosures would 
be necessary to enable these computations. At the same time, however, it is also unclear whether 
the availability of tax return data would actually be helpful to overcome all of these 
                                                 
27 Watrin et al. (2014) employ the same descending ranking procedure like Atwood et al. (2010), i.e. they also 
yield BTC ranks that range between zero and one. 
28  Examples include Lisowsky (2009); Mills (1996); Mills and Newberry (2001); Mills et al. (2002) and Plesko 
(2007). 
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measurement errors. In that regard, divergent consolidation rules for book and tax purposes 
constitute a major problem (Hanlon (2003); Mills and Plesko (2003)). As Hanlon and Heitzman 
(2010) argue, it is thus very difficult to match tax returns with the associated financial 
statement(s). Hence, it could often remain unclear how much tax is actually paid on reported 
accounting earnings (Hanlon and Heitzman (2010), p. 139). 
2.3 Overview of previous empirical studies 
2.3.1 Introducing the major strands of literature 
Despite of the various, well-known arguments in the book-tax conformity debate29 and a large 
body of empirical tax accounting literature, there is very heterogeneous and mixed evidence on 
the actual effects of book-tax conformity and book-tax differences. Empirical assessments 
conducted so far cover diverse issues, which can broadly be grouped into the following three 
strands: (1) BTD as a proxy for Tax Sheltering and/or Earnings management; (2) 
Components/Drivers of BTD; (3) Association between BTD and properties of financial 
accounting earnings. 
One of the still unresolved issues is the question whether book-tax conformity leads to more or 
to less opportunistic reporting behavior. While recent evidence provided by Watrin et al. (2014) 
and Blaylock et al. (2015) for instance finds that book-tax conformity is associated with 
significantly more earnings management, Tang (2015) concludes that high book-tax conformity 
deters overall earnings management and tax avoidance. Similarly, there exist studies that 
determine a significant positive association between BTD and opportunistic reporting whereas 
other papers report no significant or even a significant negative relation. As regards the strand 
on the drivers of BTD (EM/TS, respectively), there are, for instance, two competing theories 
on the relationship between firm size and tax planning, and the empirical evidence is mixed as 
well (Armstrong et al. (2012); Moore (2012); Rego and Wilson (2012); Guenther et al. (1997); 
Chan et al. (2013)). 
Therefore, the aim of our analysis is to provide a systematic literature review of the first strand 
(see chapter 2.3.2) as well as to derive more general conclusions on the association between 
BTD/BTC and EM/TS by using quantitative review techniques (see chapter 2.5.1). 
Furthermore, it is our objective to identify main drivers of heterogeneity in results. 
Likewise, as regards the second strand of literature, we intend to contribute by identifying and 
systematizing the drivers and components of BTD examined in prior studies (see chapter 2.3.3), 
                                                 
29 See chapter 2.2. 
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as well as by providing quantitative insights on the overall direction and significance of their 
impact (see chapter 2.5.2).   
The third group of studies deals with the issue of earnings quality, captured for instance by the 
persistence or value relevance of earnings.30 We, however, abstain from further examining these 
studies in our meta-analysis for several reasons: First of all, our analysis is mainly concerned 
with opportunistic reporting, and earnings quality covers this issue only indirectly. 
Furthermore, this body of literature is comparably smaller and conceptually so heterogeneous 
that we concluded that a quantitative analysis would not be meaningful. 
2.3.2 Association between BTD and Proxies for Tax Sheltering and/or Earnings 
Management 
According to Desai and Dharmapala (2009), the measured book-tax gap can – apart from 
deterministic differences between tax and financial accounting – be attributed to either 
downward managing of taxable income (tax sheltering/avoidance) or over-reporting of 
financial income (earnings management).31 There is a great variety of empirical papers which 
examine precisely this relation and test for a potential association between BTD/BTC and 
proxies for TS and/or EM.32 Most of these individual studies estimate models whose 
specifications roughly resemble the following equation: 
𝑌 = 𝑋∅ + 𝛾𝐵𝑇𝐷 + 𝜗 
(1) 
where Y is a measure of EM or TS, X a vector of control variables including a constant, BTD a 
measure of BTD or BTC, and ϑ an error term. 
Table 3 provides an overview of these studies and summarizes the papers with respect to their 
authors, title, year and journal of publication, sample period, country and size as well as, most 
importantly, the utilized EM/TS and BTD/BTC measures. 
 
 
 
                                                 
30 See e.g. Hanlon (2005); Hanlon et al. (2008); Lev and Nissim (2004); Blaylock et al. (2012); Atwood et al. 
(2010); Tang and Firth (2012). For a more extensive discussion, see chapter 3.2.4. 
31 For more information on that see Desai and Dharmapala (2009), p. 540. 
32 There are, however, only very few studies which examine the effects of BTD on the interplay of earnings 
management and tax sheltering. For examples see Tang (2015); Frank et al. (2009). 
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Table 3: Overview of studies with BTD as a proxy for Tax Sheltering and/or Earnings management 
 
20 
 
21 
 
22 
Table 3 sub-groups studies according to their dependent variables, i.e. by whether and how EM 
or TS is measured (see dashed and bold lines). The most common EM and TS variables will be 
discussed in more detail in the next sections. In the second step, papers are clustered by their 
independent variables, i.e. their BTD or BTC measure(s).33 As already pointed out in chapter 
2.2, there is substantial diversity in these proxies. While various studies measure the book-tax 
gap only roughly as Total BTD, others try to capture opportunistic reporting behavior more 
precisely, e.g. by using DTAX.34 In addition, several studies not only examine one single 
measure, but use a set of (BTD) variables (e.g. Wilson (2009); Frank et al. (2009); Cazier et al. 
(2009); Lennox et al. (2013); Lisowsky et al. (2013)). 
Tax Sheltering Measures 
To date, there has been no universally accepted definition of tax avoidance or tax 
aggressiveness (Hanlon and Heitzman (2010), p. 137) and thus no generally valid TS measure. 
According to Dyreng et al. (2008), tax avoidance is broadly defined as (legal and illegal) 
strategies to decrease and minimize taxes. Therefore, tax reporting aggressiveness is supposed 
to reflect a broad range of activities, e.g. transfer pricing arrangements, location of intangible 
property in low tax locations, utilization of flow-through entities in structured transactions, 
synthetic lease arrangements and tax shelter transactions (Frank et al. (2009)). For purposes of 
this study, we determine tax sheltering as any activity, both legal and illegal, aimed at reducing 
the tax liability in the framework of tax accounting/reporting. Hence, this does not include 
multinational profit shifting, i.e. the exploitation of international tax rate differentials. 
In the assessed studies, four different categories of TS measures can be identified: (1) indicator 
variable for firms accused of engaging in a tax shelter; (2) (tax) audit adjustments; (3) tax 
contingencies; (4) reduction in taxes paid. 
The first measure, which captures whether a firm is identified as being currently engaged in tax 
sheltering, is used by six of the papers. This TS proxy is either designed as a binary variable, 
indicating whether a firm is alleged to have tax shelter activity or not, or a probability measure 
specifying the likelihood of being a tax shelter firm. In most cases, the analyses are based on a 
sample constructed by Graham and Tucker (2006) who identified 43 public corporations 
accused of tax sheltering by searching publicly available court records and press articles 
                                                 
33 For more information on the single measures, see chapter 2.2. 
34 The BTD measures are only clustered according to the different categories identified in chapter 2.2, i.e. the 
general constructs they are based on. Special features of the measures, such as ranked tax-to-book- income (see 
Kraft (2015)); a dummy variable to capture firms whose BTD are in the top/bottom 20th percentile (see Ettredge 
et al. (2008)) or an indicator variable for 3-year mean of BTD being positive (see Watrin et al. (2012)) are not 
included in Table 2.  
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between 1975 and 2000. Several papers extend their sample by identifying further tax sheltering 
companies via firms’ disclosures, the press or Internal Revenue Service (IRS) confidential data. 
Wilson (2009), for example, uses the Factiva Database to determine eighteen additional 
corporate tax shelter participants and Gallemore et al. (2014) obtain 61 other observations for 
the COLI (Corporate-owned life insurance) tax shelter.35 Lisowsky (2010) and Lisowksy et al. 
(2013), in contrast, exploit a new expanded data set from the Office of Tax Shelter Analysis 
(OTSA) established by the IRS.36 This data captures several categories of identified illegal 
corporate tax shelters.37 Finally, the identified tax shelter firms are then compared to a sample 
of matched control firms to identify systematic differences.  
A second group of papers (six studies) uses tax audit adjustments, being a rather direct measure 
of a firm’s tax avoidance determined by the tax authorities in the firm’s final tax assessments. 
This TS proxy is based on the discrepancy between the final taxable income ascertained by the 
tax authorities and the taxable income previously reported by the firm in the tax return. Chan et 
al. (2010) additionally distinguish between book-tax conforming audit adjustments, capturing 
corrections of misstatements arising from violations of both financial and tax reporting 
regulations, and book-tax difference audit adjustments, measuring violations of tax rules only. 
Moreover, some papers apply scaled (by beginning total assets (Cho et al. (2006); Mills and 
Sansing (2000)); by sales revenue (Chan et al. (2010)) or logarithmic (Tang (2005))) audit 
adjustment variables. Remarkably, all of the authors using this type of TS measure had access 
to (confidential) data from tax returns and tax audit results received from tax authorities in 
several countries (e.g. Mills (1998) for US; Chen et al. (2013) for Israel; Cho et al. (2006) for 
New Zealand; Tang (2015) and Chan et al. (2010) for China). 
The third subgroup of studies utilizes tax contingencies as a proxy for tax aggressiveness (one 
published and two working papers). To be more specific, two papers (Frischmann et al. (2008) 
and Cazier et al. (2009)) exploit the FIN 48 contingency for unrecognized tax benefits (UTB),38 
whereas Blouin and Tuna (2007) investigate the tax cushion39 representing loss contingencies 
as defined in FAS 5.40 The rationale behind these TS measures is that they constitute uncertain 
                                                 
35 The COLI shelter involved firms taking out life insurance policies on their rank-and-file employees and then 
receiving the death benefits if the employee died. The COLI shelter was the subject of unflattering coverage in 
the media, including the Wall Street Journal, which identified the companies that engaged in COLI alongside 
pictures of their actual deceased employees. COLI shelters are, therefore, an example of a tax avoidance 
strategy that many viewed as particularly aggressive and that resulted in adverse scrutiny for ﬁrms that engaged 
in them, see Gallemore et al. (2014), p. 1106. 
36 The OTSA was established to combat the rise of tax shelters in the late 1990s. 
37 Regulations under IRC §6011 require a firm to attach a form to its tax return for each “reportable transaction”. 
38 For more information on the provisions and procedure of FIN 48, see Frischmann et al. (2008), p. 2 f. 
39 For more information on the measurement of the tax cushion, see Blouin and Tuna (2007), p. 7.  
40 For more information on the differences between FAS 5 and FIN 48, see Lloyd et al. (2009).  
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tax positions, i.e. management believes that these tax positions will be most likely challenged 
if examined by the relevant tax authorities. Therefore, the amount of the tax contingency equals 
the additional tax liability which firms expect to pay in case they are audited. 
The last identified measure of tax avoidance is the reduction in explicit taxes paid (two papers) 
which can be defined as the difference between a firm’s “unmanaged tax amount”, captured by 
e.g. the home-country statutory corporate tax rate times pre-tax earnings, and its “managed tax 
amount”, i.e. its current taxes paid (Atwood et al. (2012)). This difference is intended to reflect 
how aggressively managers pursue strategies to reduce the total amount of taxes of a firm. Tang 
(2015), for example, uses an aggregate of two such proxies based on different definitions of the 
current tax expense variable at country-level.41 
Earnings Management Measures 
Aggressive financial reporting can broadly be defined as upward or downward earnings 
management that may or may not be within the limits of GAAP (Frank et al. (2009)). Four 
different categories of measures, which intend to capture precisely such earnings management 
behavior, have been determined in the outlined papers: (1) meeting earnings forecasts; 
(2) financial statement fraud; (3) EM indicator variable according to Leuz et al. (2003); 
(4) discretionary accruals. 
There are three studies which use variables for meeting analysts’ expectations as EM proxies. 
Kraft (2015), for example, tries to detect earnings management by quantifying the likelihood 
of meeting management earnings forecasts via the odds ratio, i.e. the ratio of the probability of 
meeting management earnings forecasts to the probability of missing these forecasts. Philipps 
et al. (2003, 2004) adopt an even broader approach. Specifically, the authors intend to reveal 
earnings management aimed at meeting three earnings targets: (1) to avoid reporting an 
earnings decline, (2) to avoid reporting a loss, and (3) to avoid failing to meet analysts’ earnings 
forecasts. They employ scaled changes in annual earnings as variable of interest and compare 
firm-years with zero or slightly positive earnings levels to a control sample of firm-years with 
slightly negative earnings. 
A second subgroup of studies makes use of firms identified of having committed financial 
statement fraud (3 studies). This proxy represents an extreme case of earnings management and 
is basically designed as binary variable, capturing whether a firm is engaged in fraudulent 
                                                 
41 She uses the ratio of current tax expense to operating cash flows to capture both non-conforming and 
conforming tax avoidance, whereas she exploits the ratio of current tax expense to pretax income in order to 
identify only non-conforming tax avoidance. 
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overstatement of earnings, or a probability measure indicating the likelihood that a firm carries 
out such extreme EM practices. Thus, it is largely comparable to the first outlined TS measure 
(indicator variable for firms accused of engaging in a tax shelter). Badertscher et al. (2009), for 
example, exploit a sample of firms obtained from the GAO (General Accounting/Government 
Accountability Office) report42 that restated their earnings downward due to accounting 
irregularities and thus can be presumed to have managed earnings upward beforehand.43 
Lennox et al. (2013) and Ettredge et al. (2008), in contrast, examine Accounting and Auditing 
Enforcement Releases (AAERs) which outline the results of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission’s (SEC) investigations of alleged violations of GAAP. Precisely, their samples 
consist of firms being sanctioned for fraud by the SEC in AAERs as well as control groups of 
matched non-fraud firms. 
A third group of studies bases their measures on an EM indicator variable suggested by Leuz 
et al. (2003) (two papers). This measure consists of four different proxies which are aimed at 
capturing a variety of earnings management practices: (1) the tendency of firms to avoid a small 
loss44 (measured as the ratio of small profits to small losses); (2) the magnitude of total 
accruals45 relative to the magnitude of operating cash flows; (3) the smoothness of earnings 
relative to cash flows46 (measured as the ratio of the standard deviation of operating income 
divided by the standard deviation of cash flow from operations) and (4) the correlation of 
accounting accruals and operating cash flows47 (measured as the Spearman correlation between 
changes in total accruals and changes in the cash flow from operations). In order to mitigate 
potential measurement errors in individual scores, these sub-measures are aggregated into one 
single EM variable. 
In the last subgroup of papers, financial reporting aggressiveness is measured via discretionary 
accruals (five studies). Using this proxy follows the rationale that higher discretionary accruals 
                                                 
42 For an example, see GAO (2002). 
43 In addition, they differentiate between book-tax conforming EM (activities that also have current taxable 
consequences) and non-conforming EM (activities that do not affect current taxable income). 
44 Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) and Degeorge et al. (1999) find evidence that U.S firms use accounting 
discretion to avoid reporting small losses. 
45 This measure captures overall financial reporting discretion that firms can make use of to mask their underlying 
economic performance. Earnings are then temporarily inflated due to accrual choices, but cash flows are 
unaffected. 
46 This variable captures the extent to which corporate owners and managers reduce the variability of reported 
earnings. By doing so, they are able to conceal changes in their firm’s economic performance. 
47 The rationale behind this proxy is that firms can use accruals to hide bad or to underreport good current 
performance following shocks to the firm’s economic performance. This induces a negative correlation 
between changes in accruals and shocks to operating cash flows. While a negative correlation is a “natural” 
result of accrual accounting, a larger magnitude indicates smoothing of reported earnings (Burgstahler et al. 
(2006)). 
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indicate higher levels of opportunistic use of leeway in financial accounting, thus capturing 
both upward and downward earnings management. Most of the studies refer to the methodology 
developed by Jones (1991) and modified by Dechow et al. (1995). In doing so, they first of all 
model total accruals as a function of the difference between the change in sales and the change 
in accounts receivable as well as Property Plant and Equipment (non-discretionary accruals).48 
Thereby, total accruals are most commonly measured as the change in current assets plus the 
change in short-term debt less the sum of the change in current liabilities, the changes in cash 
and depreciation and amortization expenses.49 Discretionary accruals are then defined as the 
residual of the outlined model, i.e. the difference between total and non-discretionary accruals. 
Watrin et al. (2012, 2014) use, in addition to the magnitude of discretionary accruals, an 
indicator variable for negative values of discretionary accruals. Moreover, Tang (2015) 
substantiates her analysis by providing two further variations of discretionary accruals, i.e. 
discretionary revenue as well as discretionary current accruals, and also constructs an aggregate 
measure.50 
2.3.3 Components of BTD 
While in the previously presented strand of literature BTD are examined as an independent 
variable to identify a possible association with EM/TS, a multitude of empirical studies use 
BTD measures as a dependent variable, thus exploring the specific drivers and determinants of 
BTD. While some studies are primarily targeted at detecting the factors driving the reporting 
gap51, the majority of studies52 employ BTD as a proxy for either or both tax sheltering and 
earnings management. In doing so, they assess how specific variables of interest as well as 
diverse control variables are associated with BTD as a measure of opportunistic reporting 
behavior. Hence, these analyses usually feature a regression equation of the following kind: 
𝐵𝑇𝐷 = 𝛼 ∗ 𝑚𝑎𝑗𝑜𝑟 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 + 𝛽 ∗ 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜀 
(2) 
The scope of these major variables of interest is quite broad and heterogeneous, i.e. there are 
various different issues these variables are targeted at. Broadly, these issues and their 
                                                 
48 All variables are scaled by total assets. For the exact formula, see Frank et al. (2009), p. 479 f.  
49 For the formula, see Watrin et al. (2012), p. 285. Frank et al. (2009), by contrast, compute total accruals 
differently according to Hribar and Collins (2002), see Frank et al. (2009), p. 479 f.  
50 For more information on these variables, see Tang (2015), p. 449 f.  
51 Out of the 34 studies considered here, 5 studies investigate factors driving book-tax differences.  
52 Out of the 34 studies considered here, 17 studies explore the drivers of tax aggressiveness; 4 studies explore 
the drivers of earnings management; and 13 studies address both tax aggressiveness and earnings management. 
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association with tax aggressiveness and/or earnings management can be categorized as 
follows53:  
- Management incentives; 
- Ownership structure; 
- Auditor characteristics; 
- Association between tax and financial reporting aggressiveness; 
- Others. 
Table 4 provides an overview of the specific variables54 used for each topical category to give 
an impression of the range of research questions covered by this strand of literature.  
  
                                                 
53 This categorization does not include the five studies examining the drivers of BTD without a specific major 
variable of interest. 
54 Some variables are aggregated, i.e. the list of variables is non-exhaustive. 
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Table 4: Categorization of major variables of interest 
Topic  # studies Variables 
Management incentives 3 • Total compensation of CEO/of the Tax Director 
  
 
• Compensation mix of CEO/of the Tax Director 
  
 
• Value of stock option grants to executives as a fraction of 
total compensation (and 4 similar others) 
  
 
• Equity risk incentives 
Ownership structure 9 • Dummy: firm is private equity (PE) backed 
  
 
• Dummy: firm has majority PE ownership 
  
 
• Dummy: firm is owned by a large PE 
  
 
• Dummy: firm is management owned 
  
 
• Ratio of stock owned by executives 
  
 
• Dummy: firm is a family firm 
  
 
• Percentage of firm's stock owned by (long-term/short-
term) institutional shareholders 
  
 
• Difference between voting rights and cash flow rights of a 
firm's insider 
  
 
• Dummy: firm is publicly traded 
Audit characteristics 2 • Measure of auditors' industry expertise 
  
 
• Log of audit fees paid to incumbent auditors 
Association between tax and 8 Earnings management 
financial reporting  
aggressiveness 
 
• Total accruals 
 
 
• Discretionary accruals 
 
 
• Real earnings management 
 
 
• Changes in accounting methods 
  
 
• Dummy: consolidated entity has rights issuing or public 
offering in the next year 
  
 
• Dummy: consolidated entity has loss in current year 
 
  
 
Tax aggressiveness 
   
  
 
• Firm's depreciation 
  
 
• Dummy: firm practices reinvestment of foreign earnings 
  
 
• Effective tax rate (ETR) 
  
 
• Applicable tax rate 
  
 
• Number of different applicable tax rates in a consolidated 
group 
Others 
7 • Unionization rate at firm level 
• Dummy: male to female CFO transition 
• Dummy: firm lobbied Congress for tax purposes 
• Sum of all engagement in CSR activities that negatively 
affect the firm’s stakeholders 
• Dummy: firm engages in high level of irresponsible CSR 
activity 
• Analyst coverage (# analysts following firm) 
   
• Rank "harm to reputation" as important 
• Dummy: firm's tax rate increases in year t+1 
    • Dummy: firm's tax rate decreases in year t+1 
 
However, the focus of this literature review is not on these very specific variables, but instead 
on elaborating on those variables that are most commonly used as control variables in the 
studies.  
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First of all, Table 5 entails the 34 studies assessed in this investigation. For each study, it lists 
author, title, year of publication, journal, sample period and country, the overall topic,55 the 
category of the major variable of interest56 and the different BTD measures included.  
  
                                                 
55 The overall topic can be Earnings Management (EM), Tax sheltering (TS) or both, EM and TS. All 
categorizations are based on our own assessment of the analyzed papers. 
56 This is either one of the categories named in Table 3 or – if there is no specific major variable of interest – the 
drivers of BTD in general.  
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Table 5: Overview of separate studies with BTD measures as dependent variable included in this review 
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32 
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In order to identify the major control variables, we first of all collect all applied variables and 
assign them to specific categories. Overall, we identify 94 different variables relating to 26 
distinct categories. Table 6 gives an overview over all variables and their categorization.  
Table 6: Summary of explanatory variables used in studies with BTD measures as dependent variable 
Category Variable 
Total number of 
analyses 
Expectation:57 
Impact on BTD 
Size Market Capitalization 32 ? 
  Total Assets 37 ? 
  Sales 1   
  # Employees 4   
Growth Change in total assets 4   
  Profit growth 3   
 Investment growth 10 + 
     Change in PPE 2   
     New Investment 3   
     Capital Expenditure 5   
  Sales growth 22 + 
  
Issue dummy (number of shares outstanding 
increases by more than 10 percent) 2   
Liquidity Operating Cash Flow 4   
  Dummy: Operating Cash Flow positive 2   
  Change in Cash Flow 3   
  Liquidity (Current Assets/Current Liabilities) 2   
  Cash holding 9 - 
  Inventory 4   
  Stock turnover 3   
Profitability ROA/RNOA/ROE 52 + 
  Profitability dummy 5   
  ROE within certain range 1   
  standard deviation of ROA 5   
Losses NOL 2   
  Loss Dummy 8 - 
  NOL Dummy 46 - 
  Change in NOL 37 ? 
  Loss intensity 1   
Leverage Leverage 69 - 
Capital intensity Capital intensity 9 + 
PPE  36 + 
Net PPE/Gross PPE 1   
Total assets less PPE and intangibles 1   
Depreciation and Amortization 4   
Intangibles Intangibles 35 + 
  Intangibles less Goodwill 2   
Goodwill Goodwill 2   
  Change in Goodwill 4   
R&D expense R&D expense 18 + 
Advertising Advertising intensity 1   
  Advertising expense 3   
Market 
evaluation 
P/E Ratio 5   
Market-to-Book ratio 35 + 
Book-to-Market value 5   
Tobin's Q 3   
daily average price per year 3   
Analyst coverage 
Analyst coverage dummy 3   
# analysts 3   
                                                 
57 Expectations are derived from the predominant expectations expressed in prior studies. 
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Accruals Abnormal total accruals 19 + 
  Pretax discretionary accruals 8 + 
  Total accruals 4   
  Total accruals dummy 2   
  Lagged BTD 19 + 
  Average BTD 1   
  DTAX 1   
Equity income in 
earnings Equity income in earnings 36 + 
Foreign 
operations 
Foreign Assets 5   
Foreign Income/MNC dummy 13 ? 
Foreign income amount 34 ? 
Foreign tax credit 2   
Complexity Geographic complexity 3   
  Industry complexity 3   
Tax and audit 
characteristics 
Big 4 dummy 8 ? 
Tenure (number of years the current auditor has 
been auditing the company) 2   
Dummy: Audit opinion unqualified 2   
Log of audit fees 2   
Log of non-audit fees 2   
Dummy: Audit by second tier auditor 4   
Audited by Arthur Andersen 1   
Tax fees 3   
Proportion tax fees 3   
Opportunity (market value of client divided by sum 
of all clients in industry) 4   
CEO/CFO 
compensation 
CFO/CEO-Vega (option value) 4   
CEO_Slope (pay-for-performance sensitivity) 3   
CEO Compensation (Level) 3   
CEO compensation mix 3   
CEO bonus mix 3   
CEO/CFO 
characteristics 
Dummy: CEO is also chairman 3   
CEO tenure 3   
Ownership 
characteristics 
Percentage of stock owned by CEO 3   
Institutional ownership (%) 11 ? 
Dummy: Firm is listed 2   
Dummy: Firm is public 2   
Wedge ratio (difference between controlling 
shareholders’ voting rights and cash flow rights) 2   
Dummy: more than 30 per cent of ownership is 
controlled by affiliated firms and controlling 
shareholders 2   
Firm holding period 2   
Interest rate Interest rate (cost of debt) 4   
Distress risk Distress risk (Probability of bankruptcy) 4   
Retirement 
benefits Change in postretirement benefits 2   
CSR CSR indicator (CSR strengths - CSR weaknesses) 2   
  Positive CSR (Sum of positive CSR engagements) 4   
Others Corporate Governance Index 1   
  Age of wasting assets 1   
  Dummy: Post-Sarbanes Oxley 2   
  Inverse Mill ratio 9   
Source: Own representation, based on Hay et al. (2006). 
A given variable is included in our quantitative analysis if it occurs in more than 5 
specifications. These variables are marked in bold print in Table 6. Moreover, for these key 
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variables, we discuss in the following why and how they are expected to affect BTD, or more 
specifically, how they are expected to be associated with aggressive tax and/or financial 
reporting, based on the findings of previous research. 
A very commonly used variable is firm size, most often captured by a firm’s total assets or 
market capitalization. In fact, there are two competing theories on the relationship between firm 
size and tax planning (political power and political cost theory), and the empirical evidence is 
mixed as well (Armstrong et al. (2012); Moore (2012); Rego and Wilson (2012); Guenther et 
al. (1997); Chan et al. (2013)). According to political power theory, larger firms have more 
resources available for manipulating political processes in their favor, dispose of more 
experience and resources to minimize tax liabilities – for instance by investing in plans that 
exploit tax-favored assets (Manzon and Plesko (2001)) – and thus overall pay relatively lower 
taxes than smaller firms (Scholes et al. (1992); Siegfried (1972)). Put differently, larger firms 
enjoy economies of scale in tax planning (Badertscher et al. (2010)), with these impacting on 
the marginal costs of tax avoidance (Badertscher et al. (2013)). Moreover, it could be argued 
that larger firms are better able to mask tax avoidance as a result of firms’ complexity (Francis 
et al. (2014)). According to political cost theory, it could, by contrast, also be contended that 
large firms face higher political costs. In particular, they are subject to greater public and 
regulatory scrutiny and are therefore less willing to engage in tax aggressiveness than smaller 
firms (Manzon and Plesko (2001); Boynton et al. (1992); Watts and Zimmermann (1978); 
Zimmermann (1983)).58   
Firm growth is another factor considered in numerous empirical studies. It is most often 
captured by variables such as investment growth to account for the impact of a firm’s investment 
activity. The rationale behind this is that growing firms may make more investments in 
depreciable, tax-favored assets, leading to larger temporary BTD – in particular in economies 
of high investment (Seidman (2010)) because of differing tax and accounting rules with regard 
to the recognition of income and expenses (Armstrong et al. (2012); McGuire et al. (2014); 
Chen et al. (2010); Seidman (2010); Manzon and Plesko (2001); Badertscher et al. (2010)). 
Apart from accelerated or bonus tax depreciation, investment tax credits may give rise to 
additional BTD. However, as Manzon and Plesko (2002) argue, this effect may be mitigated by 
growth firms’ frequently occurring tax losses, “rendering tax shields from tax-favored 
investments less valuable.” In addition to that, growth, in particular sales growth is regarded as 
                                                 
58 In addition, it has been brought forward that large companies are more likely to operate multinationally and 
therefore to have access to alternative, international tax planning and profit shifting channels. This could induce 
these large companies to focus less on tax sheltering based on discretionary scope in national tax reporting, see 
Davies et al. (2014). 
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a proxy for general business conditions and economic circumstances (Tang and Firth (2011); 
Seidman (2010)). General business conditions in turn influence investment decisions, with the 
impact of investment described above. Overall, BTD are expected to increase during economic 
boom times and to decline in times of economic downturn (Seidman (2010)). Moreover, growth 
opportunities may render firms more complex (Francis et al. (2014)) and volatile (Moore 
(2012)), for instance in relation to profitability and cash flows, which is also expected to yield 
a positive association between growth variables and BTD/opportunistic reporting. 
Next, profitability is considered a major factor impacting on BTD. It can be depicted either by 
performance indicators such as return on assets (ROA) or by variables relating to a firm’s losses, 
such as a loss dummy,59 Net operating loss (NOL) dummy,60 or the change in NOL carry 
forwards. These variables not only proxy for a firm’s current profitability and underlying 
economic activity (Armstrong et al. (2012); Badertscher et al. (2010); Badertscher et al. (2013)), 
but in particular they capture a firm’s need and incentive to engage in tax planning. In that 
regard, profitable firms face larger incentives for tax planning (Badertscher et al. (2010); 
Badertscher et al. (2013); Moore (2012)), whereas loss making firms already pay less or no 
taxes and thus have fewer incentives for tax planning.61 Moore (2012), however, argues that 
well performing profitable firms can be assumed to be less volatile, thus giving rise to a possibly 
negative association between profitability and BTD.  
As regards the presence of NOL carry forwards, two competing theories with regard to the 
impact on BTD can be found in the literature: As they cannot benefit from tax deductions, it 
could hold that firms having NOL carry forwards may even avoid tax-favored positions to defer 
tax deductions to future periods, resulting in a possibly negative relation between BTD and 
NOL carry forwards (Manzon and Plesko (2001)). Manzon and Plesko (2001), however, 
contend that firms having NOL carry forwards may be those that have taken tax-advantaged 
positions. Arguing that such firms with NOL carry forwards based on opportunistic tax 
reporting may find it costly to unwind these positions, a positive association between the 
existence of NOL carry forwards and BTD may emerge. In addition, from an earnings 
management perspective, Manzon and Plesko (2001) argue that firms with NOL carry forwards 
“may find it less expensive to recognize additional (discretionary) income” (Manzon and Plesko 
                                                 
59 Dummy variable indicating the existence of a loss in a particular fiscal year. 
60 Dummy variable indicating the existence of a net operating loss carry forward.  
61 Indeed, prior evidence suggests that profitable firms feature higher levels of BTD, see Khurana and Moser 
(2009). 
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(2001), p. 19), thus increasing the amount of income disclosed to shareholders without 
increasing tax payments and thus further increasing BTD.    
Controlling for changes in NOL carry forwards also follows the rationale that these influence 
BTD by way of their effect on deferred taxes and/or the valuation allowance (Moore (2012); 
Frank et al. (2009)). Indeed, Frank et al. (2009) posit that changes in NOL carry forwards have 
been documented to be “often associated with changes in the valuation allowance, (…) but are 
typically unrelated to tax planning”. Hence, including loss variables also aims at controlling for 
mechanical effects relating to tax loss carry forwards (Tang and Firth (2011)). In addition to 
that, Manzon and Plesko (2001) argue that taxable income is overstated if a NOL carry forward 
arises, as “the current tax benefit generated will not reflect the future tax benefits from the loss 
carryover” (Manzon and Plesko (2001), p. 22). Thus, an increase in loss carry forwards causes 
BTD to be underestimated, i.e. the association between the change in NOL carry forwards and 
BTD would be assumed to be negative. 
In a similar vein, liquidity, often controlled for by firms’ cash holdings (Hoi et al. (2013)), is 
included in studies to take into account firms’ cash needs that may require engagement in 
specific kinds of tax avoidance (McGuire et al. (2012)).62 Specifically, we would rather expect 
low liquidity to induce tax avoidance activities aimed at enhancing liquidity.   
Studies on BTD include leverage to account for the tax benefits, i.e. the tax shields, of debt 
financing. It has been argued that firms with higher leverage have a lower need for incremental 
tax planning, as they already benefit from tax debt shields (Armstrong et al. (2012); Badertscher 
et al. (2010); Badertscher et al. (2013)). Indeed, some prior evidence demonstrates that firms 
with higher debt tax shields feature smaller BTD (Khurana and Moser (2009)) and that firms 
accused of having engaged in tax shelters rely on less leverage (Rego and Wilson (2012); 
Graham and Tucker (2006)). However, the overall evidence on the association between BTD 
and leverage is somewhat mixed (Moore (2012)). One potential explanation for this could be 
that the effect of earnings management might work in the opposite direction. In that regard, it 
has been brought forward that leverage is also intended to capture the effect of default risk on 
the likelihood of earnings management (Choi et al. (2009)), with that probability increasing as 
leverage increases. In particular, such earnings management practices could be targeted at 
avoiding the costly violation of debt covenants, i.e. to loosen their debt constraints, managers 
                                                 
62 McGuire et al. (2012) name deferral strategies as an example of tax avoidance targeted at enhancing firms’ 
liquidity.   
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could decide for income-increasing accounting practices (DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994); Watts 
and Zimmerman (1986); Koubaa and Anis (2015)).  
Controlling for firms’ capital intensity, predominantly proxied by the level of Property, Plant 
and Equipment (PPE) or the level of PPE, inventories and intangible assets combined, strongly 
relates to the previously discussed investment growth variable. Hence, capital intensity is first 
of all intended to control for the influence of differences between financial and tax accounting 
with regard to depreciation, amortization and costs of goods sold (Moore (2012); Mills and 
Newberry (2001); Chen et al. (2010); Khurana and Moser (2009)). Firms with more capital 
assets have more opportunities to use these differences, giving rise to higher non-debt tax 
shields (Khurana and Moser (2009)).63 Therefore, capital intensity not only controls for 
mechanical differences between financial and tax accounting, but it also captures tax 
aggressiveness. Differences relating to depreciation and amortization are particularly 
pronounced at the beginning of an asset’s useful life and reverse over time. Thus, BTD can be 
expected to be positively related to the extent that a firm uses young assets, which as well is 
approximated by PPE in some investigations (Manzon and Plesko (2001)).  
Intangibles are also often considered separately to specifically control for differential book and 
tax treatment relating to goodwill and other intangible assets (Badertscher et al. (2010); Chen 
et al. (2010)). These differences between book and tax not only create temporary BTD, but 
frequently also give rise to permanent BTD (Frank et al. (2009)), thus yielding lower effective 
tax rates (Badertscher et al. (2013)). 
Factoring in Research & Development (R&D) expenses is primarily related to prior studies’ 
finding that corporate tax avoidance is systematically associated with R&D expenditures (Rego 
and Wilson (2012)). R&D expenses may also be considered as a proxy for firm complexity and 
growth opportunities, which have likewise been suggested to be associated with tax planning 
(McGuire et al. (2014); Hill et al. (2013)). 
Market evaluation variables are considered to account for the potential influence of capital 
market participants and their assessment of firm value. Very frequently, the market-to-book 
ratio is included in studies as a control for the market’s evaluation of the firm’s growth prospects 
(Chen et al. (2010); Hill et al. (2013); Choi et al. (2009)). As such, this variable also captures 
                                                 
63 Furthermore, Mills and Newberry (2001) argue that capital intensity also constitutes a partial control for the 
potential influence of the investment opportunity set, thereby referring to Skinner (1993) who finds that firms 
with higher capital intensity have larger incentives to enforce income-increasing accounting procedures. 
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the impact of investment activities relating to differing tax and accounting rules on the 
recognition of income and expenses.64 
Accruals measures are included in numerous studies examining tax aggressiveness to control 
for a potential impact of or an association with earnings management behavior. Controlling for 
earnings quality and earnings management follows the rationale that prior studies find a strong 
positive relation between financial and tax reporting aggressiveness (Frank et al. (2009); 
Badertscher et al. (2010); Hoi et al. (2013)). Both abnormal total accruals as well as 
discretionary accruals65 have been used as proxies for earnings management (Chen et al. 
(2013); Seidman (2008)), which obviously affects BTD by affecting book income (Seidman 
(2010)). In addition, lagged BTD are frequently considered to control for BTD that persist over 
time (Chen et al. (2010); Chyz et al. (2013); Frank et al. (2009)). In particular, this is targeted 
at nondiscretionary permanent BTD (e.g. municipal bond interest) which are not supposed to 
reflect tax aggressiveness (Frank et al. (2009)). 
Another item that often generates differences between book and taxable income is equity 
income in earnings (Badertscher et al. (2010); Badertscher et al. (2013)). Precisely, book and 
tax accounting differ with regard to the treatment of consolidated earnings accounted for using 
the equity method. The equity income in earnings variable is intended to control for this 
differential treatment (Chen et al. (2013); McGuire et al. (2014); Frank et al. (2009)). 
Foreign operations are frequently accounted for in the light of Multinationals’ (MNE/MNC) 
international tax planning efforts. It is mostly measured by either a foreign income MNC dummy 
indicating the existence of a firm’s multinational operations or the foreign income amount. 
Specifically, the purpose of these variables is to control for differences in international tax 
planning opportunities, as multinational firms with foreign operations can potentially engage in 
multijurisdictional income shifting (Armstrong et al. (2012); Badertscher et al. (2010); 
Badertscher et al. (2013)). Indeed, Rego (2003) shows that multinational corporations exhibit 
lower ETRs. In relation to BTD, however, the evidence on the impact of foreign operations is 
mixed (Moore (2012)). Arguably, firms engaging in tax avoidance based on international profit 
shifting may tend to engage less in tax avoidance based on differences between financial and 
tax accounting, and thus, tax avoidance that gives rise to BTD. Technically, BTD relating to 
foreign operations may also emerge due to the possibility of designating foreign earnings as 
permanently reinvested for tax purposes (Mills and Newberry (2001); Manzon and Plesko 
                                                 
64 See discussion on growth variables above. 
65 A more extensive discussion on the diverse measures for earnings management is provided in chapter 2.3.2. 
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(2001)).66 Finally, foreign operations may constitute a proxy for complexity (Moore (2012); 
McGuire et al. (2014); Dhaliwal et al. (2009)) and thus – in line with prior research – be 
associated with higher levels of BTD. 
Another factor suspected to drive BTD is tax and audit firm characteristics. The most 
frequently examined issue is whether or not audit services are provided by a Big 4 firm. Big 4 
auditors are considered to be service providers of higher quality and expertise, and overall 
expertise is generally associated with higher levels of tax avoidance (McGuire et al. (2012); 
Choi et al. (2009)). In particular, Big 4 firms’ expertise in both tax and audit services could lead 
to tax strategies that are beneficial from both a tax and financial reporting perspective. 
Moreover, Big 4 firms may have more resources to justify their tax reports to tax authorities 
(Chen et al. (2013)). However, the impact of audit characteristics on tax avoidance is not 
entirely clear. It could also hold that Big 4 firms restrain from aggressive reporting practices to 
reduce litigation risk and to prevent brand name damage (Chen et al. (2013)). Moreover, the 
impact of audit firm characteristics may also depend on a country’s level of book-tax 
conformity. In that regard, Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2008) demonstrate that differences 
in service quality between Big 4 and non-Big 4 auditors only exist in countries with a high level 
of BTC.  
Finally, specific ownership characteristics are frequently examined as BTD driver. In 
particular, various studies assess firms’ institutional ownership. This variable basically pertains 
to the ability to monitor managers and thus to enforce corporate governance (Desai and 
Dhamarpala (2009); Hill et al. (2013); Hoi et al. (2013)). Institutional owners are considered to 
have a strong incentive and ability to monitor managers (Moore (2012); Khurana and Moser 
(2009, 2012)), and enhanced corporate governance in turn is likely to affect BTD (Moore 
(2012)). More precisely, institutional investors may be able to monitor tax risks of corporations 
and prevent managers from self-serving, opportunistic behavior. Thus, institutional ownership 
could be assumed to have a negative impact on tax avoidance and BTD (Moore (2012)). Yet, 
the empirical evidence on the effectiveness of institutional owners in terms of manager 
monitoring is mixed (Khurana and Moser (2009)). Moreover, accepting the notion that tax 
avoidance increases firm value, institutional investors could also be in favor of tax avoidance 
(Khurana and Moser (2012)). Overall, the effect of institutional ownership on BTD is therefore 
not unambiguous.   
                                                 
66 Also see chapter 2.2. 
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2.4 Meta-Analysis  
2.4.1 Purpose of Meta-Analysis and Meta-Studies in Accounting 
Meta-analysis, in general, refers to a set of statistical techniques and quantitative review 
methods used to standardize and synthesize findings across empirical studies (Greenberg 
(1992)). According to Lipsey and Wilson (2001), a properly executed meta-analysis can make 
significant contributions to practice and policy by developing a general knowledge of the whole 
body of research in a given topic. One major goal of a meta-analysis is to identify the 
determinants due to which empirical findings on certain questions significantly vary or are even 
contradictory. An additional advantage compared to narrative literature reviews is that a meta-
analysis can aggregate data from a large number of coherent studies, thereby increasing sample 
sizes and statistical power and identifying mean relations (with regard to sign and strength) 
among key variables (Pomeroy and Thornton (2008), p. 308). In the case of heterogeneous 
findings, specific moderators might account for the variation in correlations across studies 
(Hunter and Schmidt (2004)).67 In order to detect their impact, effect sizes measuring the 
magnitude of the relationship between the dependent variable and a specific independent 
variable reported in primary literature are, in principle, regressed on a set of moderator variables 
which quantify differences in method, design and data used (Feld et al. (2013)).  
While several meta-studies have emerged in tax research, e.g. on the influence of taxation on 
Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) or capital structure, over the last years,68 meta-studies in 
accounting are still rare.69 In this regard, Pomeroy and Thornton (2008) identified only 33 
existing meta-studies referring to accounting topics or being published in accounting or auditing 
journals (thereof only 3 in the top-tier journals) compared to 105 meta-studies in Marketing and 
233 in Management. That seems to be surprising at first glance as empirical studies in 
accounting partly produce inconsistent or even contradictory results and meta-analysis 
techniques generally offer the ideal tool to detect the causes for such deviations and to derive 
more general conclusions. Furthermore, Greenberg (1992) clearly outlines the advantages of a 
meta-analysis for accounting topics. While heterogeneity in study outcomes, research designs 
and variables motivates meta-study analysis, it constitutes a major methodological challenge at 
the same time. In line with this, severe barriers to meta-studies in accounting and auditing 
                                                 
67 Using meta-analysis techniques, the variance that is due to inherent differences between different correlations 
or moderator variables can be distinguished from the variance that is due to statistical artifacts (sampling or 
measurement error), see Brierly (1999). 
68 For examples, see Feld and Heckemeyer (2011); Feld et al. (2013).  
69 One main focus of the existing meta-studies in accounting lies on the interdependencies between audit 
committee characteristics and reporting quality. 
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appear to exist, mainly due to the fact that only few studies are replicated70 (Borkowski (1996); 
Chewning and Higgs (2000)). Pomeroy and Thornton (2008) provide three potential 
explanations for this phenomenon: First, researchers do not seem to be able to agree on single 
measures, given that these differ from study to study quite substantially. Second, all of these 
measures apparently still contain methodological limitations and construct validity concerns 
continuously creating demand for new measures. Third, researcher incentives also provoke 
diversity and inconsistency in dependent variable selection in order to differentiate their studies 
from the majority (Burgstahler (1987)). Overall, they conclude that “novel studies, using 
original measures, are more likely to survive the peer review process than replication studies 
and studies using the same variables as previous studies” (Pomeroy and Thornton (2008), p. 
318). 
Existing meta-studies in accounting can basically be divided into two subgroups, either 
focusing on the association between two specific variables of interest or examining the 
drivers/determinants of an accounting phenomenon. One example for the first strand of 
literature is Pomeroy and Thornton (2008) who analyze the association between audit 
committee independence and financial reporting quality measures.71 The second group is 
represented by Hay et al. (2006) and Hay (2013) investigating the most commonly used 
independent variables in audit fee research.72 The majority of meta-studies in accounting rely 
on meta-analysis techniques developed by Hunter and Schmidt (2000, 2004) or Lipsey and 
Wilson (2001).73 These are based on the computation of mean (and overall) effect sizes74, i.e. 
the magnitude of the relationship between the dependent variable and a specific independent 
variable of interest, and the conduct of homogeneity analyses (e.g. chi-square tests). In the case 
of heterogeneity between studies, moderators are detected by sub-grouping studies based on a 
                                                 
70 Lindsay (1994) surveying the empirical budgeting and control papers in Accounting, Organizations and 
Society, The Accounting Review and the Journal of Accounting Research from 1970-1987 finds that 84.2% of 
the papers reject a null hypothesis and virtually none are replication studies. This indicates a potential 
publication bias in the accounting literature. 
71 Further examples include Ahmed et al. (2013): association between discretionary accruals /analysts' forecast 
accuracy and IFRS adoption; Derfuss (2009): relationship of budgetary participation/reliance and accounting 
performance measures; Garcia-Meca and Sanchez-Ballesta (2010): association of board 
independence/ownership concentration and voluntary disclosure; Habib (2012): association between non-audit 
service fees and financial reporting quality or Samaha et al. (2015): impact of board and audit committee 
characteristics on voluntary disclosure. 
72 Further examples are Ahmed and Courtis (1999); Khlif and Souissi (2010); Lin and Hwang (2010). 
73 For more information on the procedures see Hunter and Schmidt (2000, 2004) or Lipsey and Wilson (2001). 
74 The procedures and formulae calculate the population correlation coefficients (e.g. Pearson correlation 
coefficient) between two constructs using the sample correlations reported in prior empirical research and 
correct for the statistical artifacts of measurement error and sampling error. For more information on the 
formula see Lipsey and Wilson (2001). 
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hypothesized moderator variable and by repeating the procedure, i.e. testing the homogeneity 
assumption repeatedly. 
2.4.2 Meta-Analysis Procedure and Techniques  
Selection and coding of studies 
As a first step of our meta-analysis on the two identified strands of literature, we conduct a 
comprehensive literature research on the issue of book-tax differences/book-tax conformity in 
common electronic databases and editorial sources (Business Source Premier, IDEAS, 
EconPapers, EconBiz etc.). For this purpose, we use the following keywords: “book-tax 
conformity”, “book-tax differences”, “book-tax gap”, “earnings management”, “tax 
sheltering”, “tax aggressiveness” and “tax avoidance”. In addition to that, we scan relevant 
review papers (e.g. Hanlon and Heitzman (2010); Graham et al. (2012a)), references of 
collected papers, conference databases as well as researcher Curriculum Vitae (CV) to identify 
further empirical studies potentially relevant to our topic. As a starting point, we also take into 
consideration unpublished (working) papers to avoid a possible publication bias.75 In the review 
process of the potential papers, we then screen titles, abstracts and descriptions to search for 
studies that either assess a potential association between BTD and earnings management and/or 
tax sheltering (BTD as independent variable) or examine the determinants/drivers of BTD 
(BTD as dependent variable). This proceeding results in a final sample consisting of 27 relevant 
papers (24 published and 3 un-published, see Table 3) related to the first strand of literature, 
i.e. the relationship between BTD and proxies for EM/TS, and 34 studies (25 published and 9 
unpublished, see Table 5) associated with the second strand of literature, i.e. the 
drivers/components of BTD, between 1997-2015.  
In a second step, these identified papers are coded by two researchers independently. Coding 
of the studies focuses, in particular, on the different measures of BTD (e.g. Total BTD, 
Temporary BTD, DTAX, BTC index, and measured vs. approximated BTD).76 For the first 
meta-analysis strand (BTD as independent variable), differences in the dependent variables, i.e. 
the diverse earnings management and/or tax sheltering measures77, institutional features (e.g. 
degree of book-tax conformity in a respective country vs. cross-country studies; individual vs. 
                                                 
75 Nevertheless, we are aware that this could imply both strength and weaknesses. Pomeroy and Thornton (2008) 
state that, in principle, aggregating both published and unpublished results accounts for potential implications 
of statistically non-significant results, mitigating publication and replication bias. Unpublished studies, 
however, are likely to exhibit inconsistent research quality since they have not fully survived a peer review 
process.  
76 See chapter 2.2 for more information on the different BTD and BTC measures. 
77 See chapter 2.3.2 for more information on the different EM and TS measures. 
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consolidated accounts) and design characteristics (e.g. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) vs. 
Logit/Probit; additional controls for accruals or tax measures) are taken into account as potential 
moderators. Moreover, common key statistics, such as t-values, p-values, sample sizes, standard 
deviations and coefficients are recorded. Regarding the second strand (BTD as dependent 
variable), we code all major control variables78 used in primary studies including their 
respective sign and significance level (t- or p-value). For both meta-analysis strands, multiple 
specifications per paper are only included if they differ with regard to the identified moderators 
and/or the independent variables included. 
Methodology 
Meta-Regression Analysis (1st strand)  
In contrast to the majority of accounting meta-studies which use classical meta-analysis 
techniques (e.g. according to Hunter and Schmidt (2000, 2004) or Lipsey and Wilson (2001))79, 
most modern meta-studies go beyond that and turn to meta-regressions. An important advantage 
of this type of analysis is that moderators are considered simultaneously (hierarchical analysis). 
This is especially important as moderator variables are often correlated and an isolated 
consideration may lead to distortions and errors of interpretation. Therefore, meta-regression 
analysis explicitly introduces relevant explanatory variables concurrently to investigate the 
extent to which these can explain heterogeneity in primary studies (Harbord and Higgins 
(2008)). 
As already discussed, there is substantial diversity with respect to the measurement of 
BTD/BTC as well as with regard to the definition of the proxies for EM and TS in the reviewed 
papers. Therefore, for the first strand of literature we rely on t-values as dependent variable of 
our meta-regression rather than on coefficients.80 The reason for this is that t-values properly 
indicate the sign as well as the significance level of correlations and that they are fully 
comparable across studies which use very different variables (Card et al. (2010)). This allows 
us to draw conclusions across a wide range of diverse studies. Estimated coefficients, on the 
other hand, would not be comparable as the variables in our sample are not dimensionless, i.e. 
the studies employ different units and constructs (Baskaran et al. (2014)). The dependent and 
independent variables used in primary studies are, for example, scaled differently and range 
from dummies and ratios to continuous variables. Therefore, the coefficients differ 
                                                 
78 See Table 5. 
79 For more information on that, see chapter 2.4.1. 
80 For further meta-regression analysis relying on t-values, see Card et al. (2010); Baskaran et al. (2014); Klomp 
and de Haan (2010); Heinemann et al. (2016). 
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systematically and the estimation of a consensus estimate/average effect size81 would not be 
meaningful in our setting. 
Our basic meta-regression equation is presented in the following:82 
?̂?𝑠,𝑖 = 𝑡0 + 𝑋𝑠,𝑖𝛽 + 𝜀𝑠,𝑖 
(3) 
?̂?𝑠,𝑖  specifies the estimated t-value of specification i of primary study s.
83 t0 represents the 
intercept and thereby the defined baseline t-value (see below). As explained, we expect that 
heterogeneity in the estimates of primary studies can be explained by a vector of variables which 
describe study-specific characteristics (X: moderating factors) as well as sampling error (𝜀). 
The definition of a baseline is necessary because of the kind of coding of the moderator 
variables. As these are defined as dummy variables which basically can be sub-grouped to 
identify a particular study feature, they are mostly self-excluding. If all of these dummies would 
then be considered simultaneously in the regression analysis, there would be perfect multi-
collinearity (dummy variable trap). Therefore, we define one particular characteristic as the 
baseline for each subgroup. The intercept then captures all baseline features at the same time 
and the reported coefficients have to be interpreted in relation to this baseline (Heinemann et 
al. (2016), p. 10).84 The results of the MRA will be presented in chapter 2.5.1. 
Stouffer (combined) test (2nd strand)  
For the second strand of literature, we focus on the impact of various factors potentially 
impacting on BTD, rather than on a single statistical association as in the case of the first strand. 
We therefore rely on a different methodological approach here.85 Specifically, in order to 
examine the drivers of BTD, we statistically summarize the effects of various independent 
variables on BTD using a combined significance test. The Stouffer test86 is based, in principle, 
on an overall Z score. As a first step of this approach, all t-values of the estimates of the reported 
independent variables in primary studies have to be converted into their corresponding one-
                                                 
81 In order to obtain this value, individual study results are combined to an overall or consensus estimate with 
respect to the size of effects by assuming between-study homogeneity (see Heinemann et al. (2016), p. 9). 
82 Standard errors are clustered at study level. 
83 Referring to equation (1), ?̂? = 𝛾
𝑠𝑑
̂ . 
84 For more information on the included moderator variables and the baseline, see chapter 2.5.1. 
85 For a comparable approach see Hay et al. (2006). 
86 For more information on the combined significance test, see Wolf (1986). The Stouffer test was also used by 
Kinney and Martin (1994); Hay et al. (2006); Lin and Hwang (2010); and Hay (2013). 
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tailed p-values87 and then to z-statistics as the measure of effect size. The individual z-values 
are then combined using the following formula (Wolf (1986), p. 20): 
𝑍𝑠 =
∑ 𝑍𝑖
𝑘
𝑖=1
√𝑘
 
(4) 
where Zi equals the standard normal deviate and k represents the number of independent tests 
combined. Zs can then be compared to the standard normal distribution as a test of the 
cumulative evidence on the common null hypothesis.88 We apply this procedure and calculate 
the overall Zs values for all independent variables that occurred more than five times as potential 
drivers of BTD in primary studies (k>5) (see chapter 2.5.2). We do so to determine whether, in 
aggregate, there is a significant positive, significant negative or no significant correlation 
between the respective independent variable and BTD. 
One fundamental issue related to meta-analysis is the so-called “file drawer” problem. 
Specifically, it is more likely that empirical studies which report significant results are 
published compared to papers with insignificant findings. This potentially distorts the 
presentation of the “true” economic effects. One potential approach to addressing this problem 
is the “fail-safe N” test which determines the number of studies with an average effect of zero 
that would be necessary in addition so that the overall (Stouffer) test becomes insignificant. For 
a significance level of 5 %, this figure can be calculated according to the following formula 
(Wolf (1986)): 
𝑋 =  (
∑ 𝑍𝑖
𝑘
𝑖=1
1.645
)
2
− 𝑘 
(5)89 
where X equals the looked for number of additional studies with a zero effect. We calculate this 
“fail safe N” for all independent variables (k>5) that show an overall significant correlation 
with BTD in order to determine the robustness of our results. The results of the Stouffer 
(combined) test and the Fail-safe N test will be discussed in chapter 2.5.2. 
                                                 
87 Two-tailed p-values have to be converted into one-tailed p-values as well, see Darlington and Hayes (2000); 
Whitlock (2005). 
88  As Zs goes from negative infinity to infinity, (overall) P will go from 0 to 1, and any value of P will uniquely 
be matched with a value of Z and vice versa. 
89  The following relation applies: ?̅? =
∑ 𝑍𝑖
𝑘
𝑖=1
𝑘+𝑋
 . 
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2.5 Results 
2.5.1 Association between BTD and proxies for TS/EM 
Descriptives 
In the following, we present information on the specific characteristics of our MRA sample. 
For this purpose, Table 7 provides a summary regarding the variables included in the MRA 
with respect to the number of observations and the percentage share in relation to the total 
number of 62 observations, the number of studies employing the respective variable,90 the mean 
t-value as well as the minimum and maximum t-values.91  
Table 7: Summary statistics for the variables included in the MRA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
First of all, it can be noted that on average the 27 studies in our sample report a positive 
association between BTD and TS/EM indicated by a t-value of 1.44 which, however, lacks 
                                                 
90  Because several studies employ more than one dependent and independent variable, the sum of studies exceeds 
the total number of studies. 
91  We abstain from weighting observations, e.g. by the inverse of the share of observations per study in relation 
to the full sample, as the number of observations extracted from primary studies is rather equally distributed 
(1-6 specifications per study).  
92 The remaining 15% of the observations represent cross-country studies. This variable is, however, redundant 
to BTC. 
Variable Obs. 
% 
sample 
# 
studies 
Mean 
t-
value Min. Max. 
Dependent variable      
TS 41 66 17 1.55 -5.34 10.40 
EM 21 34 12 1.21 -5.26 4.42 
Independent variable of interest         
Total BTD 32 52 20 1.85 -4.43 5.80 
Other BTD 21 34 13 1.87 -3.89 10.40 
BTC Index 9 15 5 -1.03 -5.34 2.59 
Approxim. BTD 50 81 23 0.85 -5.34 10.40 
Measured BTD 12 19 6 3.88 1.57 5.80 
Level of BTC92             
Low 43 69 19 1.49 -4.43 6.73 
Medium 6 10 4 4.25 1.57 10.40 
High 4 6 2 2.22 -1.96 4.45 
Financial statements           
Consolidated 58 94 24 1.47 -5.34 10.40 
Individual 4 6 3 0.90 -1.96 1.97 
Methodology             
OLS 30 48 16 1.74 -5.34 10.40 
Logit/Probit 32 52 14 1.15 -4.43 4.45 
Controls (for)             
DA/TA 21 34 13 1.06 -5.25 4.42 
ETR/UTB 10 16 4 -0.13 -4.43 2.47 
Additional BTD 7 11 3 0.79 -0.53 2.47 
Total 62 100 27 1.44 -5.34 10.40 
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statistical significance at conventional levels.93 In addition, there is a great variety in results 
ranging from highly significant negative (t-value of -5.34) to highly significant positive effects 
(t-value of 10.4). 
Table 7 further reports differences regarding the dependent as well as the independent variables 
applied in primary studies. Due to our comparably small sample size (62 obs.), we aggregate 
categories such that we only differentiate between EM and TS proxies in general instead of 
examining all eight categories of dependent variables discussed in chapter 2.3.2 separately; 
otherwise, there would be too few observations per single category. The same applies to the 
measurement of the independent variable of interest. Therefore, we distinguish between Total 
BTD, Other BTD including all measures which try to approximate BTD more precisely 
(including: Temporary BTD, Discretionary BTD, Permanent BTD, DTAX, BTD with the effect 
of tax sheltering removed, Discretionary Total BTD DD) and cross-country studies using a BTC 
index. Concerning the dependent variable, more studies in our sample examine TS (66%) than 
EM (34%). Although the mean t-values of both groups exhibit a positive sign, they lack 
statistical significance. In addition, min and max t-values demonstrate substantial heterogeneity 
in the results of primary studies (ranging from negative significant to positive significant 
findings). With regard to the independent variable of interest, more than half of our sample uses 
Total BTD (52%), whereas only 34 % rely on other, more precise, BTD measures. The mean 
of both BTD groups’ t-values is positive and indicates significance at the 10% level. There is, 
however, again great heterogeneity in results. Studies analyzing a BTC index (15%), by 
contrast, report an overall negative, but insignificant t-value. The negative sign is plausible as 
a large BTC index implies a high degree of conformity in a given country. This in turn is 
expected to go along with lower BTD and therefore less EM and TS (inverse correlation). A 
further important feature of the independent variable is whether BTD are actually measured or 
only approximated from financial statement information. 19% of our sample measure BTD 
based on real tax return data, whereas 81% only estimate the variable using financial statement 
information. Remarkably, the mean t-value of studies measuring BTD is considerably higher 
(3.88) compared to the mean t-value of studies approximating BTD (0.85) and indicates 
statistical significance at the 1% level. Furthermore, there is less variation in t-values, all 
pointing into the same direction (positive association). 
                                                 
93 We refer to a critical t-value of 1.65 at 10 % level significance, 1.96 at 5% level and 2.58 at 1% level 
significance. 
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In addition, the following graphical analysis employing boxplots (Figure 1) serves to illustrate 
the heterogeneity of studies with regard to their dependent and independent variable 
measurement and is intended to provide further insights into the distribution of t-values. 
Figure 1: Boxplot for the classification of the dependent and independent variable 
   
   
The boxes’ margins indicate the 25% and 75% quartiles whereas the vertical line in between 
displays the respective median t-value. The antennas span 1.5 times the interquartile range and 
the single dots represent outliers. The red line marks the 5%-threshold for statistical significance 
(t-value = 1.9694) (Heinemann et al. (2016)) indicating that values on the right hand sight reflect 
a significant positive association. Comparing the boxplots for TS or EM as dependent variable, 
it is obvious that 50% of the EM sample reports statistically significant positive results, whereas 
the median t-value for studies examining TS is slightly below the 5% threshold which implies 
that less than 50% of TS studies find a significant positive relation. Furthermore, papers using 
TS proxies as dependent variable exhibit considerably more variation in results. The lower 
section of Figure 1 compares boxplots for the different measures of the independent variable. 
While almost fifty percent of the studies using Total BTD find a positive and significant 
association, there is extreme scattering in results also covering studies that report a significant 
negative relationship. Papers that exploit Other BTD measures, by contrast, find less significant 
                                                 
94 This corresponds to the critical value of the t-distribution at the 5 % threshold. 
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positive results, but entail, at the same time, lower dispersion (e.g. almost no significant 
negative results). Analyses relying on BTC indices find significant positive results in only 25% 
of cases. In line with the above explained reversed association, most of these papers report 
(significant) negative effects. Finally, it is remarkable that almost all studies employing 
measured BTD consistently report significant positive results, whereas there is great variation 
in findings of studies which only approximate BTD. 
Lastly, Table 7 contains further variables included as controls in the MRA. First, the level of 
book-tax conformity in the respective country, distinguishing between low, high and medium 
BTC, is considered. The majority of studies in our sample (69%) are conducted in a low BTC 
country. This makes sense as most investigations examine the US setting. With regard to the 
type of financial statements, almost all papers use data from consolidated (94%) instead of 
individual accounts for their analysis. From a methodological point of view, approximately half 
of the studies (48%) conduct an OLS regression analysis, whereas the other half (52%) rely on 
Logit/Probit analyses, i.e. on a binary dependent variable. Furthermore, some studies 
additionally control for discretionary (DA) and/or total accruals (TA) (34%), for tax avoidance 
measures such as ETR and/or UTB (16%), or for the fact that more than one BTD measure is 
considered in their regression simultaneously (11%). 
Meta-Regression Analysis Results 
As outlined in chapter 2.4, the definition of a baseline is necessary for the Meta-Regression 
Analysis. To that end, our baseline is specified as an estimation of the association between 
approximated BTD, captured via Other BTD proxies, and TS in a country with a low level of 
BTC using data from consolidated financial accounts and applying an OLS regression analysis. 
The selection of the baseline is primarily based on the most common study features in our 
sample (see Table 7). An important exception represents the BTD proxy. While Total BTD is 
used most frequently, Other BTD measures are expected to capture TS and EM behavior more 
precisely and are therefore included in our baseline. Taken together, all the baseline features 
are contained in the intercept of the MRA. The other reported coefficients have to be interpreted 
relative to this baseline and present the impact of a deviation in this particular feature from the 
baseline (Heinemann et al. (2016)). 
Table 8 summarizes our estimation results.95 Column (1) presents the results of the main 
specification including the study features outlined above. While we report the basic coefficients 
                                                 
95 The Table is divided into subsections by headlines indicating the respective group of study features as well as 
their respective baseline category. The definition of the baseline study is constant throughout all specifications. 
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on the left-hand side, we additionally present the results of the joint F-test in column “Joint 
effect baseline” in order to examine whether our baseline modified by the respective variable 
(specific study feature) exhibits (joint) significance. Furthermore, we extend the main 
specification and vary the sample composition in order to test the robustness of our results. 
First, we include three additional control variables in our MRA, i.e. dummies capturing whether 
studies control for DA/TA, for UTB/ETR and/or for Additional BTD measures (column (2)). 
The second extension relates to the analysis of a potential publication bias. In this regard, we 
exclude unpublished (working) papers (column (3) and (4)) to examine whether our results 
remain unchanged when we only investigate published studies. 
 
                                                 
It uses TS as dependent variable, approximated other BTD measures as independent variable, relies on 
consolidated financial statement data in a low BTC country, and uses OLS as methodological approach. 
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Table 8: Meta-Regression Analysis - Results 
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In the case of the main specification (column (1)), the average consensus t-value for the baseline 
study is equal to 2.16. More precisely, primary studies exhibiting the design features defined 
above are found to report, on average, a positive and statistically significant association between 
BTD and TS at the 5% level. This also applies to the specification including additional control 
variables (column (2)). In addition, coefficients are estimated with statistical precision at the 5 
% level. This holds true for all specifications in Table 8 (except for column (2): at the 10% 
level). The baselines in the specifications considering only published studies (columns (3) and 
(4)) even indicate a positive and statistically significant association at the 1% level. This hints 
at a potential publication bias. Results obtained from (refereed) journal articles seem to be, on 
average, associated with higher levels of statistical significance compared to those obtained 
from working papers.  
Relative to the baseline, variation in the dependent variable, i.e. assessing EM instead of TS, 
basically leads to the same result, i.e. to a positive and statistically significant association with 
BTD. Nevertheless, the average consensus t-value increases (3.57 = 2.16+1.41 = baseline effect 
+ coefficient for EM) indicating a higher level of significance (at the 1% level) compared to the 
baseline. This implies an even stronger association between BTD and EM proxies (in all 
specifications). Coefficients are again estimated with statistical precision (see column “Joint 
effect baseline”). As a first interim conclusion, it can therefore be noted that BTD seem to 
capture opportunistic reporting behavior and serve as a positive indicator for both TS as well 
as EM. However, they seem to be an even better signal for EM.  
Variation in the independent variable, i.e. the BTD/BTC measure, changes results more 
substantially. Using Total BTD instead of Other BTD exerts an inverse influence (coefficient: 
-1.05) leading to an average positive t-value of 1.11 which indicates a significance level above 
the 10 % threshold. Thus, an overall significant association between BTD (measured as Total 
BTD) and TS can no longer be recorded. This implies that the explanatory power of BTD for 
EM and TS strongly depends on how precisely BTD are measured and holds true for the 
specification including additional controls (column (2)) as well. Therefore, Total BTD being 
only a rough estimate of the book-tax gap seem to capture opportunistic reporting behavior 
worse than other BTD measures such as Temporary BTD, Discretionary BTD, Permanent BTD, 
DTAX, BTD with the effect of tax sheltering removed or Discretionary Total BTD according 
to Desai and Dharmapala which are explicitly aimed at approximating EM and TS behavior. 
This can also be interpreted as evidence for the suspected measurement error associated with 
Total BTD (see chapter 2.2). The analysis of the specifications which examine only published 
studies (column (3) and (4)) provides a further hint for a potential publication bias. The overall 
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positive t-values (1.89, 2.43) indicate significance at the 10% (column (3)) and 5% level 
(column (4)) and point to studies published in (refereed) journals being generally more likely 
to report positive and statistically significant effects. Using a BTC Index instead of Other BTD 
exerts an even stronger negative influence (coefficient: -3.99) which results in an overall 
negative t-value of 1.83, implying significance at the 10% level. This is plausible as there is an 
assumed reversed association between BTC and BTD (see discussion above). This effect seems, 
however, not to be stable across the other specifications as the joint overall t-values lie above 
the 10%-threshold of -1.65 (see columns (2) - (4)). 
Varying the kind of measurement of BTD exerts the strongest influence on results. Using 
actually observed instead of approximated BTD implies an average t-value of 4.78 and, thus, a 
statistically significant positive association at the 1% level (for all specifications).96 This 
provides evidence for measured BTD capturing TS and EM behavior more reliably and more 
precisely than only approximated BTD and is in line with the arguments brought forward by 
Hanlon (2003) and McGill and Outslay (2004). In particular, they point at the various problems 
related to the estimation of taxable income from financial accounts as tax disclosures in 
financial statements are insufficient to draw valid conclusions about taxable income and actual 
taxes paid in a given fiscal year (see chapter 2.2). 
To sum up, our MRA results point to an overall statistically significant and positive association 
between BTD and opportunistic reporting behavior. This implies that BTD are indeed indicative 
of both EM and TS, and even better so of EM. The results are, however, weaker for studies that 
only capture BTD roughly based on Total BTD instead of using more precise proxies (such as 
DTAX, Temporary BTD etc.). Moreover, examining actual BTD computed from tax returns 
instead of only approximating them from financial statements strongly increases the effects. 
Even though we cannot draw a definite conclusion with regard to BTC, our results suggest a 
negative association with EM and TS. This is also substantiated by the provided evidence on a 
positive relation between BTD and aggressive reporting, given the inverse correlation between 
BTD and BTC outlined above. Hence, our results support the findings of Tang (2015). 
2.5.2 Components of BTD 
Having examined whether BTD constitute an indicator of aggressive reporting, we analyze in 
a second step which particular factors actually drive BTD. Specifically, the purpose of this 
analysis is to explore whether and how specific determinants discussed in the literature impact 
                                                 
96  Coefficients are estimated with statistical precision at the 1 % level (see column joint effect baseline). 
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on BTD, possibly being a proxy for tax sheltering and/or earnings management, and whether 
the observed effects depend on the kind of BTD measure examined. To this end, we analyze 
those variables that are most frequently assessed as potential drivers of BTD (see chapter 2.3.3). 
For each of these identified variables, Table 9 provides information on the total number of 
observations and reports the number of positive, negative and insignificant results with regard 
to the impact on BTD. It also entails the sign and significance of the Stouffer combined test and 
the related fail safe N (file drawer test). In addition, Table 9 also lists the number of observations 
separated according to the type of BTD. In that regard, we again distinguish Total BTD and 
Other BTD97, which are intended to more precisely measure EM and/or TS. For each of these 
two types of BTD, we also report the sign and significance of the separate Stouffer test. The 
commentary of our results builds on the discussion of the contemplated variables provided in 
chapter 2.3.3. 
  
                                                 
97 We investigate the specific BTD measures (DTAX, Discretionary Total BTD, Permanent BTD, Temporary 
BTD) in a condensed manner as “Other BTD”, as there are too few observations for each BTD type to render 
isolated analyses meaningful.  
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Table 9: Summary of results from meta-analysis of selected independent variables 
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The first major factor is firm size, captured by two different variables, namely market 
capitalization98 as well as total assets. Overall, there are 68 sets of results for these two 
variables. Theory and existing empirical evidence on the association between firm size 
and BTD is mixed.99 Indeed, our results are somewhat mixed as well: Starting with market 
capitalization, overall nearly half of the results report insignificant effects, and there are 
slightly more negative than positive observations. Overall, the combined Stouffer test 
yields a significant negative result. Interestingly, the Stouffer test turns insignificant if 
Total BTD are examined in isolation, whereas it is still highly significant and negative 
for Other BTD. Overall, arguing that specific BTD measures capture earnings 
management and tax sheltering more precisely than Total BTD, the numbers are more in 
line with an alleged negative effect of firm size on BTD, and thus, on opportunistic 
reporting. The picture is, however, somewhat different for total assets. Here, there are 
more positive than negative results and the overall Stouffer test is positive as well. In 
addition, the higher number for the file drawer test (395 vs. 267) points to a more robust 
finding. Yet, this is again challenged by the divergent results for the BTD type analysis: 
While the Stouffer test is positive for Total BTD as well, Other BTD yield a negative 
result. Hence, the overall result could be driven by the (slightly more numerous) 
observations with Total BTD, which are assumed to be a less precise indicator for 
opportunistic reporting. In total, our results do indicate that size is an important factor of 
influence. Moreover, there is some indication that the association between size and 
EM/TS is negative, given that the more specific BTD measures consistently find a 
negative overall result. This would be in line with political cost theory (see chapter 2.3.3). 
Next, we turn to growth. This attribute is also captured by two variables, sales growth 
and investment growth, with sales growth exhibiting more than twice as many 
observations than investment growth. In general, growth is expected to be positively 
associated with BTD, as growing firms carry out more investments, thus giving rise to 
more (temporary) BTD relating, for instance, to depreciation. In addition, growth is 
considered as a proxy for an economic upswing as well as for firm complexity, both of 
which are rather suspected to show a positive association with BTD. As regards the sales 
growth variable, Table 9 reports a positive and significant overall Stouffer test in line with 
previous expectations, but the file drawer test (fail safe N = 24) reveals that this result is 
                                                 
98 Market capitalization refers to the market value of equity. It is commonly computed as the number of 
shares outstanding multiplied by the price per share, see e.g. Armstrong et al. (2012). 
99 See chapter 2.3.3. 
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not overly robust. In line with that, the separate Stouffer test for Other BTD turns out to 
be insignificant. However, if growth rather gives rise to temporary BTD, this finding 
could be due to the impact of BTD measures based on permanent BTD.100 Indeed, the 
Stouffer test for Total BTD, which explicitly includes temporary BTD, still is positive. 
Yet, results are again quite mixed for the investment growth variable. The overall Stouffer 
test is insignificant; however, also here, the test explicitly relating to Total BTD is 
significant and has a positive sign (in line with the notion that investment creates 
temporary BTD, being a part of Total BTD).101 Therefore, in total, we conclude that 
evidence building on Other BTD (which are often restricted to permanent BTD) is not 
clear cut, as growth conceptually rather relates to EM and TS that create temporary BTD. 
Taking this into account, our results tend to be more in favor of a positive impact of 
growth on BTD. 
With regard to liquidity, captured by firms’ cash holdings, the expectation derived from 
existing literature is that EM/TS activity (hence, BTD) is larger if liquidity is low, i.e. if 
there is a need to increase liquidity. The total number of observations for our cash holding 
variable is rather low. We find mostly insignificant results and the overall Stouffer test 
yields an insignificant result as well. But interestingly, the result is negative and 
significant for the separate examination of Other BTD, despite of a fairly low number of 
observations. Again assuming that these BTD are more precise proxies to capture EM 
and TS, we interpret this as a possible hint for lower liquidity indeed increasing EM 
and/or TS.  
The attribute that is most frequently taken account of in empirical investigations is 
profitability. Since profitable firms have a stronger incentive to engage in tax sheltering, 
a positive association with firms’ profitability is expected. In line with that expectation, 
we find very consistent and robust (fail safe N = 42,409) results for our profitability 
variables (ROA/RNOA/ROE) across all BTD types. By contrast, the association of the loss 
dummy variable (indicating the existence of a loss) with BTD was ex-ante assumed to be 
negative. Indeed, the overall Stouffer test is negative and fairly robust given the small 
number of observations (fail safe N = 148). Yet, as we yield an insignificant Stouffer test 
result for Other BTD, we abstain from drawing a definite conclusion for the loss dummy 
                                                 
100 Specifically, Other BTD comprises Temporary BTD and Discretionary Total BTD, but also DTAX and 
Permanent BTD. However, temporary differences would not be reflected in DTAX and Permanent 
BTD, which could be decisive for the overall insignificant result yielded for Other BTD. 
101 The result for Other BTD is negative, but 3 out of 4 BTD measures that are part of this sub-analysis are 
of permanent nature; thus, this result may not be surprising. 
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variable. As regards the NOL dummy, expectations are not clear-cut. However, in line 
with Manzon and Plesko’s (2001) notion that tax-advantaged positions are costly to 
unwind and that firms with NOL carry forwards may engage in income increasing 
earnings management, we find a consistently positive and robust association of the NOL 
Dummy with BTD. Lastly, our results point to a consistently negative, robust association 
for the change in NOL variable, which also is in accordance with prior literature.102   
Prior evidence on the impact of leverage is somewhat mixed. From a tax sheltering 
perspective, a negative association is plausible, whereas from an earnings management 
point of view, the anticipated association is rather positive. In fact, the results in Table 9 
point to a consistent positive impact of leverage on BTD. We therefore contend that the 
assumed positive impact from earnings management outweighs the assumed negative 
influence relating to tax sheltering. Essentially, however, this only constitutes a 
presumption, in particular, since most studies finding a positive coefficient do not further 
comment on this result.103 
We capture capital intensity by two variables; namely by the level of PPE and the level 
of PPE, intangibles and inventories combined (capital intensity). As these two variables 
are conceptually very similar, we additionally condense the two variables into one 
aggregated measure. As discussed in chapter 2.3.3, the expected association is positive 
for all variables. Indeed, we identify a consistently positive impact, even though the 
results for PPE are more robust than for capital intensity (fail safe N 3,304 vs. 18). 
Regarding the aggregated measure, the positive impact also applies to Other BTD, despite 
the fact that there is a large share of permanent BTD measures in this category.104 Overall, 
these findings are in accordance with a strong, positive impact on BTD. 
In a similar vein, we anticipated a positive association between intangibles and BTD. 
However, quite unintuitively, the overall Stouffer test is significant and negative. Yet, 
given the very low fail safe N (10), we have to stress that this finding cannot be considered 
very robust. Moreover, there is a considerable number of insignificant results, and 
                                                 
102 In particular, it has been brought forward that the change in NOL is not related to tax planning, and 
thus, that no positive association with BTD is to be expected. Moreover, according to Manzon and 
Plesko (2001), this finding is consistent with an overestimation of taxable income in periods when losses 
are incurred, see chapter 2.3.3. 
103 Frank et al. (2009) are the only ones to comment that “firms with more aggressive tax reporting are […] 
more highly levered” and that “we find that financial reporting aggressiveness is positively related to 
[…] leverage”. 
104 BTD relating to PPE/capital intensity are primarily driven by depreciation and are thus of a temporary 
nature.   
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analyzing Total BTD alone also yields an insignificant Stouffer test. The negative result 
for Other BTD could indicate that intangibles are not used for EM/TS, but we abstain 
from drawing any definite conclusions for this variable.105    
The consistent, positive and robust (fail safe N = 397) results for R&D expenses are in 
line with empirical evidence previously provided (Rego and Wilson (2012)). Specifically, 
our results are in accordance with the finding that tax aggressiveness is systematically 
associated with R&D expenditures. 
The market-to-book ratio has been widely used as another proxy for a firm’s growth 
prospects. As such, a positive association with BTD was more likely to be expected, given 
the alleged impact of the related issues of depreciation, complexity and volatility. Yet, 
our results point to a consistent and robust negative effect. We find this somewhat 
puzzling, and we did not find any explanations in studies yielding a negative effect 
either.106 As regards the negative effect for Other BTD, however, we refer to our remarks 
on investment growth and the discussed distinction between permanent and temporary 
BTD relating to depreciation. 
Previous research has determined a strong, positive association between earnings 
management and tax sheltering.107 In line with that, we observe a consistently positive, 
robust (fail safe N = 1,084) result for abnormal total accruals, acting as a proxy for 
earnings management activity.108 The overall association for pretax discretionary 
accruals is positive as well, however, this result is rather weak, which is reflected in a 
very low fail safe N and in an insignificant Stouffer test for Other BTD. Yet, it also has 
to be emphasized that there are considerably fewer observations for this variable than for 
abnormal total accruals. Finally, there is also consistent evidence for a positive impact of 
lagged BTD, which is indicative of the discussed persistent effect of BTD.  
Our findings for equity income in earnings are somewhat puzzling. The ex-ante suspicion 
was to find a positive impact on BTD, given deterministic differences in consolidation 
                                                 
105 Here again we have to point out that studies reporting negative coefficients unfortunately do not 
comment on their findings. 
106 Khurana and Moser (2009) only conclude that „we find that […] growth firms […] have fewer 
permanent BTD”, without providing more detailed explanations on that finding. 
107 See for instance Frank et al. (2009).  
108 In investigations controlling for the impact of accruals, BTD are explicitly intended to capture tax 
sheltering. Therefore, we conclude a positive association between earnings management and tax 
sheltering. 
61 
rules. Yet, we observe an overall negative impact, though the Stouffer test turns 
insignificant for Total BTD.  
As regards foreign operations, there was no clear expectation for the impact on BTD in 
the light of mixed prior evidence. In that regard, it could hold that multinational firms 
engage less in tax sheltering provided that they have access to other profit shifting 
strategies. But the impact on BTD (on EM/TS) could also be positive, for instance as a 
result of MNE’s complexity or the possibility to designate earnings as permanently 
reinvested. In fact, for both variables examined (foreign income dummy, foreign income 
amount) we find consistent and robust evidence for a positive association with BTD.  
Likewise, the impact of audit characteristics, specifically of the Big 4 dummy, was not 
unambiguous ex-ante. Here, the overall assessment yields a negative result, but the 
evidence is very weak with the file drawer test only amounting to 4 and with an 
insignificant Stouffer test for Other BTD. Thus, our results cannot provide consistent 
evidence on the impact of a Big 4 audit, in particular with regard to EM/TS. 
Finally, we examine the influence of institutional ownership. Here as well, the expected 
direction of impact was not clear-cut in advance. Overall, we detect a positive association, 
and the file drawer test is fairly stable (N=57), given the rather small total number of 
observations. Considering that the Stouffer test for Other BTD turns insignificant, we 
cannot, however, provide completely unambiguous evidence for an association of 
institutional ownership with EM/TS behavior. 
To sum up, we can first of all conclude that all examined variables – apart from investment 
growth and liquidity– do show a significant overall association with BTD. It is thus 
sensible to consider these variables in investigations studying the factors driving BTD or 
the factors driving EM/TS, respectively. Yet, we cannot draw clear conclusions for all 
variables as regards the sign and significance level of impact, at least not consistently for 
all BTD measures. Moreover, even though the separate analyses of Total BTD versus 
Other BTD are mostly in line109 (11 variables), we also find 3 contradictory results with 
regard to the sign of influence and 8 variables with divergent results as to the significance 
level. Hence, given these divergent results relative to the kind of BTD measure, it can be 
                                                 
109 I.e. the sign and significance of the Stouffer test are corresponding. 
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concluded that the BTD measures partially capture different things110 and that Other BTD 
seem to be a more precise estimate of EM and/or TS.  
Our results do provide clear and consistent evidence – as to the sign and significance level 
– for a positive impact on BTD of profitability, the NOL dummy, leverage, PPE, capital 
intensity, R&D expenses, accruals and foreign operations. Considering that we yield the 
same results with regard to Other BTD for these variables, we assume that they are 
positively related to increased levels of EM/TS. In terms of size, we assume that our 
results are in favor of a negative association with EM/TS, given that we consistently find 
negative results in relation to Other BTD. Similarly, our results provide a hint for lower 
liquidity indeed increasing EM/TS, given a negative and significant result for the separate 
examination of Other BTD. Arguing that book-tax differences relating to firm growth are 
predominantly of a temporary nature, we finally conclude - in view of a consistently 
significant and positive association with Total BTD111 - that our results tend to be more 
in favor of a positive impact of growth on BTD. With regard to intangibles, equity income 
in earnings, the Big 4 dummy, and institutional ownership, our results are, however, not 
entirely unambiguous.  
2.6 Conclusion 
The empirical literature on tax accounting has been growing quickly over the last decade. 
As regards studies on the relation between BTD and opportunistic reporting behavior, we 
have identified two major interrelated strands: The first one analyses the association 
between BTD and EM and/or TS to evaluate whether BTD can indeed serve as an 
indicator for aggressive reporting. The second strand, in turn, takes that association for 
granted and examines which particular factors drive BTD (EM/TS, respectively). 
Heterogeneity in measures used as well as in reported findings induces us to conduct a 
comprehensive and systematic literature review as well as a quantitative meta-analysis.  
The systematic literature review reveals the use of various BTD measures. While the 
majority of studies use Total BTD as a rough estimate of the book-tax gap, other 
investigations exploit more precise proxies, such as Temporary BTD, DTAX or 
                                                 
110 For instance, even though Other BTD are intended (and indeed seem) to be a more precise indicator of 
EM/TS, it has to be kept in mind that not all of the comprised BTD measures capture all kinds of book-
tax differences. Specifically, DTAX and Permanent BTD do not entail temporary book-tax differences, 
and thus no significant association with EM/TS based on temporary book-tax differences can be 
expected for these two BTD measures.  
111 Total BTD entail temporary BTD that may be excluded in the case of the Other BTD measure, see 
above. 
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Discretionary Total BTD. Moreover, only a minority of investigations is based on actual 
tax return data, while most studies have to rely on BTD measures estimated from financial 
accounts. In addition to that, more recent studies also develop particular measures for 
BTC by means of cross-country studies. Similarly, there are numerous variables used to 
capture EM and/or TS. To name just a few, these include binary variables indicating 
whether a firm has been identified as being engaged in tax sheltering or financial 
statement fraud, tax audit adjustments or discretionary accruals.  
Beyond a qualitative review, the literature has reached a critical mass (27 studies) 
rendering MRA feasible and appropriate to summarize the overall evidence on the 
association between BTD/BTC and opportunistic reporting. This constitutes a rather 
innovative approach, given that there are only a few meta-studies in the accounting 
literature so far and that these utilize more basic methodological techniques such as 
simple homogeneity analyses.  
For the first strand of literature, we provide a consensus estimate with respect to the sign 
and the statistical significance level for the association between BTD and proxies for EM 
and TS. Our MRA results point to a statistically significant and positive association 
between BTD and TS as well as between BTD and EM. The obtained results indicate a 
level of significance at the 5% threshold for TS and even at the 1% threshold for EM. 
This indicates that BTD are indeed indicative of both EM and TS, and even more so of 
EM. These results are, however, weaker for studies that only capture BTD roughly based 
on Total BTD instead of using more precise proxies (such as DTAX, Temporary BTD 
etc.). Moreover, examining actual BTD computed from tax returns instead of only 
approximating them from financial statements strongly increases the effects. Hence, 
efforts taken to accurately determine BTD seem to be worthwhile when it comes to the 
explanatory power for opportunistic reporting. Furthermore, our results as well as the 
alleged inverse correlation between BTC and BTD suggest a negative association 
between BTC and EM/TS. Hence, we would conclude that higher conformity is indeed 
effective in reducing aggressive reporting. In addition, our MRA hints at the existence of 
a potential publication bias in the tax accounting literature.  
We also apply quantitative review techniques with regard to studies on the specific drivers 
and determinants of BTD (second strand of literature, 34 studies) and provide evidence 
for a positive impact of profitability, the NOL dummy, leverage, PPE, capital intensity, 
R&D expenses, accruals and foreign operations on BTD by using the Stouffer combined 
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test. Therefore, we conclude that these variables are positively related to increased levels 
of EM and/or TS and should certainly be taken into account in future studies on this topic. 
Our results are not entirely unambiguous, however, with regard to intangibles, equity 
income in earnings, the Big 4 dummy, and institutional ownership. In terms of size and 
liquidity, we conclude that our results are indicative of a negative association with 
EM/TS, given that we consistently find negative results in relation to Other BTD. Hence, 
it can be concluded that it is essential to choose an appropriate BTD measure for the 
respective research question at hand. In that respect, measures other than Total BTD are 
likely a more precise estimate of EM and/or TS. 
Finally, we would like to discuss potential limitations of our study. First of all, as already 
emphasized, there exist no uniform definitions and standards for both BTD/BTC and 
EM/TS, such that primary studies use a variety of different measures.112 This can also be 
traced back to data availability issues, e.g. tax return data or data on actual (tax or 
financial) fraud are mostly not accessible. Therefore, researchers have to rely on diverse 
proxies. As our overall sample size is comparably small, we do not obtain enough 
observations for each single category of BTD/BTC and EM/TS measures. Hence, we have 
to condense those in order to be able to conduct systematic analyses. This, however, 
possibly comes along with measurement imprecisions. Moreover, several moderator 
variables (such as the level of BTC or the type of financial statement) could not be further 
exploited in our MRA because of an unbalanced distribution of sample characteristics.  
                                                 
112 This is a major difference to other meta-studies in the field of taxation, e.g. on the impact of taxes on 
FDI, see Feld and Heckemeyer (2011). 
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3 Book-Tax Conformity and Reporting Behavior– A Quasi-
Experiment113 
3.1 Introduction 
There is an ongoing discussion among policymakers and academics on the costs and 
benefits of book-tax conformity. Particularly in the US, the question as to whether the 
link between financial and tax accounting should be tightened has been debated intensely 
in the past decade (Desai (2003, 2005); Hanlon and Heitzman (2010)). Essentially, 
proponents of an increase in book-tax conformity (e.g. Desai (2005)) argue that a one-
book system would offer less leeway for opportunistic reporting behavior, i.e. earnings 
management and/or tax sheltering, and thus increase the quality of disclosed earnings. 
Opponents of conformity (e.g. Hanlon et al. (2008)), by contrast, whilst invoking the 
divergent objectives and recipients of both financial and tax reporting, argue that an 
alignment of the two sets of accounts would result in the loss of valuable information and 
therefore give rise to a decline in earnings quality.  
The existing empirical evidence on the effects of book-tax conformity with regard to the 
extent of opportunistic reporting behavior and to earnings quality is not entirely 
unambiguous. There is, for example, no unanimity as to whether book-tax conformity 
leads to more or to less earnings management and tax sheltering (Blaylock et al. (2015); 
Tang (2015)). Furthermore, most studies find that the persistence of earnings is better in 
contexts of low conformity. However, at the same time, there is also evidence that large 
book-tax differences, which by intuition are rather to be expected in systems of low book-
tax conformity, are indicative of earnings that are less persistent (Hanlon (2005)). 
With respect to the measurement of book-tax differences/book-tax conformity and the 
empirical assessment of their influence, the majority of studies have in common that they 
(i) use a proxy for taxable income and (ii) derive the impact from cross-country variation, 
cross-firm variation or within-firm variation over time without an exogenous change of 
book-tax conformity legislation to identify its impact. In our study, we use a setting in 
                                                 
113 We gratefully acknowledge the considerable support of Martina Ortmann-Babel and Ute Benzel (both 
Ernst & Young GmbH, Germany). We are indebted to Ernst & Young GmbH, Germany for facilitating 
this research and providing access to anonymous corporate tax return data. Moreover, we owe thanks 
to the Mannheim Taxation Science Campus (MaTax) for funding this research. We also thank Martin 
Jacob, Johannes Voget, Christoph Spengel and participants of the 78th Annual Conference of the VHB 
in Munich, the 39th Annual Congress of the European Accounting Association in Maastricht, the 5th 
Workshop on Current Research in Taxation in Prague and the MaTax Campus Meetings in Mannheim 
for helpful comments. Finally, we would like to thank the Stiegler Stiftung for financing conference 
participations. Any remaining errors are, of course, our own. 
66 
which firms have been subject to a comprehensive change in conformity as a consequence 
of the Accounting Law Modernization Act (Bilanzrechtsmodernisierungsgesetz 
(BilMoG)) in Germany. In addition, we employ a dataset of linked individual financial 
statements and actual tax return data, thus avoiding problems of approximating taxable 
income (Hanlon (2003)).  
The BilMoG reform entered into force in 2010 and constituted a considerable change with 
regard to the traditionally close relationship between financial and tax accounting in 
Germany. In particular, it enables firms to exercise tax accounting options independently 
from financial accounting. This allows companies to decrease their taxable income 
without simultaneously decreasing their financial income and therefore creates incentives 
for tax sheltering.  
Papers on a change in conformity are rare. Examples for partial modifications in the US 
setting include Dhaliwal and Wang (1992), Guenther et al. (1997) and Hanlon et al. 
(2008). More recently, Chan et al. (2010) and Chan et al. (2013) address a comprehensive 
change in conformity in China. We are, however, to the best of our knowledge, the first 
to exploit the transition from a one-book towards a two-book oriented system in a 
European country with a long-standing accounting tradition. In addition, and in contrast 
to most other studies using proxies for tax variables, we are able to observe the true 
taxable income in our data.  
We contribute to the existing literature on the impact of a change in book-tax conformity 
on reporting behavior. Firstly, we assess whether new reporting discretion resulting from 
the decrease in book-tax conformity is actually exploited despite additional requirements 
to document deviations between financial and tax accounting. Using individual financial 
and tax accounts allows us to attribute a change in book-tax differences to tax sheltering 
rather than to financial earnings management, as there tends to be no capital market 
relevance of individual accounts. Secondly, we examine how the change in book-tax 
conformity affects the persistence of taxable and financial income. This analysis provides 
an additional test that the newly introduced scope for opportunistic reporting behavior 
induces tax sheltering rather than earnings management. Moreover, we are thereby able 
to illustrate the interaction between book-tax conformity, book-tax differences and 
earnings quality.  
Graphical analysis illustrates that the total book-tax income difference becomes positive 
(i.e. financial income exceeds taxable income) in the fiscal year 2010 which indicates 
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opportunistic tax reporting behavior. The same applies to income differences relating to 
Property, Plant and Equipment (PPE). We interpret this as an indication that companies 
make beneficial use of deprecation options in order to decrease taxable income.  
In the empirical analysis, we directly exploit the 2010 reform in a difference-in-
differences regression approach. Our results suggest that companies do indeed use the 
newly introduced discretionary reporting scope. More precisely, we find that profitable 
companies which face a clear tax sheltering incentive exhibit comparably higher book-
tax differences subsequent to the decrease in conformity. We particularly trace this effect 
back to book-tax differences relating to PPE and thus to companies making use of 
favorable tax depreciation rules. Furthermore, we find that small firms featuring less 
complex and predominantly national group structures are more likely to engage in 
opportunistic tax reporting behavior.  
With respect to the persistence of taxable and financial income, our results suggest that a 
decrease in book-tax conformity leads to a decline in the persistence of taxable income 
which we attribute to the distortive impact of the newly arisen tax sheltering options. In 
contrast to that, we observe an increase in the persistence of financial accounting earnings. 
This supports our hypothesis that the detected increase in book-tax differences (BTD) is 
driven by downward management of taxable income and not by upward managing of 
financial income. 
In terms of policy contribution, our results inform the debate on the effects of book-tax 
conformity with valuable findings from a quasi-experimental setting. In particular, we 
show that a switch from high to low conformity creates discretion for opportunistic 
reporting which is exploited for tax sheltering despite higher documentation costs. This 
finding speaks against a shift towards a two-book system. At the same time, we show that 
detaching financial and taxable income increases the persistence of financial income, thus 
suggesting an increased information content of financial earnings in a two-book system. 
This is reasonable, since financial reporting numbers are no longer influenced by tax 
reporting objectives and there are no incentives for earnings management in individual 
financial statements. Essentially, the reduced persistence of post-reform taxable income, 
however, indicates that earnings quality will deteriorate in a two-book system if 
incentives for opportunistic behavior are present. Hence, we conclude that a switch from 
high to low conformity increases opportunistic reporting behavior while not improving 
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the information content with regard to those reported income numbers for which 
incentives for opportunistic behavior are present. 
The paper continues as follows: Chapter 3.2 discusses the related studies on the effects of 
book-tax conformity and outlines how our study contributes to this strand of literature. 
Chapter 3.3 provides an overview of the German institutional setting and of the change 
in book-tax conformity induced by the BilMoG-Reform Act. We describe our dataset in 
chapter 3.4. Chapter 3.5 presents the descriptive and graphical analysis of book-tax 
income differences. Chapter 3.6 describes the empirical approach including hypothesis 
development and discusses the results. Subchapter 3.6.1 refers to the analysis of a change 
in book-tax conformity on the book-tax income gap and tax sheltering whereas in 
Subchapter 3.6.2 we investigate the relationship between book-tax conformity and the 
persistence of taxable and financial income. Finally, chapter 3.7 concludes. 
3.2 Related Literature 
3.2.1 Pros and cons of book-tax conformity 
In the last decade, the divergence of book and tax income in the US (Desai (2003, 2005); 
Mills et al. (2002); Plesko (2002); Manzon and Plesko (2002); Hanlon and Shevlin 
(2005)) and corporate reporting scandals such as the one concerning Enron, have led to 
an intense and ongoing debate as to whether or not financial accounting income and 
taxable income should be more strongly aligned. At the same time, however, several 
countries, including Germany, which traditionally have had a much higher degree of 
book-tax conformity than the US (Harris et al. (1994)), have recently moved towards a 
separation of financial and tax reporting. In Germany, this movement is aimed at 
achieving greater convergence with the International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS) and at enhancing financial statement comparability (Deutscher Bundestag 
(2008)). Moreover, given the traditionally close link between financial and tax reporting 
in Germany, it seems reasonable to assume that delinking the two reporting lines is further 
motivated by the German legislator’s aim to avoid the influence of an external standard 
setting board on tax law. 
Proponents114 (Desai (2003, 2005); Whitaker (2005); Shaviro (2009)) of increased book-
tax conformity in particular point to managers’ reduced scope for aggressively reporting 
on both financial profits and taxable income. On the one hand, inflating earnings would 
                                                 
114 For extensive discussions on the pros and cons of increased book-tax conformity, see Hanlon and 
Shevlin (2005); McClelland and Mills (2007); Hanlon and Maydew (2009). 
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entail an increase in tax payments; on the other hand, understating taxable income would 
imply reporting lower profits to shareholders and other capital market participants. 
Hence, book-tax conformity would constitute an incentive not to report opportunistically 
in either direction, but instead encourage firms to disclose an unbiased earnings number 
more closely approximating their “true economic income”. Thus, the quality of reported 
earnings would be enhanced and the firms’ overall economic performance would become 
more transparent. Furthermore, the provision of one single set of rules could potentially 
lead to a reduction in compliance and administrative costs.  
Opponents (Hanlon et al. (2005); Hanlon and Shevlin (2005); Hanlon et al. (2008); 
McClelland and Mills (2007)) of an increase in book-tax conformity, however, refer to 
the divergent objectives of both reporting lines (Hanlon and Heitzman (2010)) and invoke 
one major disadvantage of conforming book and taxable income: a loss of information 
contained in earnings in particular for capital markets and therefore a decrease of earnings 
quality (also see subchapter 3.2.4). That argument is based on the notion that accounting 
earnings are intended to inform about firm performance, whereas tax law is driven by 
governments’ budgetary needs and other objectives. Moreover, Hanlon and Shevlin 
(2005) question the claim that conformity will actually reduce tax sheltering, reasoning 
that book income would most likely be conformed to tax income, thus creating strong 
incentives for tax competition.115 
Empirically, due to the lack of fundamental reforms of book-tax conformity, there is little 
direct evidence of the impact of changes in conformity on reporting behavior. As Hanlon 
and Heitzman (2010) point out, in “examining what would happen here in the U.S. if 
book-tax conformity were adopted, the ideal research design cannot be employed since 
the U.S. has not switched from a full book-tax conformity system to a non-conformed 
system (or vice versa)”. They, therefore, underline the potential of using systematic 
changes in book-tax conformity for further investigating reporting behavior before and 
after a change. The few existing papers based on US data address contexts in which book-
tax conformity changed partially.  
                                                 
115 Hanlon and Shevlin’s argument goes as follows: If book and tax income were to be conformed, it would 
be more likely that financial accounting income is conformed to taxable income, as Congress would 
probably not be willing to leave tax revenue determination to the Financial Accounting Standards 
Boards. If that held true, market participants would know that the reported earnings are those on which 
tax is computed and would no longer rely on it as strongly as a source of information about firm 
performance. Hence, if it was clear that capital market participants do not any longer interpret earnings 
as performance measure anyway, firms would face an incentive to understate earnings in order to keep 
taxes low.   
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One example is Dhaliwal and Wang (1992) who examine whether the book income 
adjustment, which became part of the annual minimum tax (AMT) system in 1987, alters 
financial reporting behavior. They find that the book income adjustment, according to 
which half of the difference between book and taxable income has to be included in the 
AMT tax base, prompts firms that are likely to be affected by the adjustment to shift 
income across years in order to reduce the AMT burden. In addition, Guenther et al. 
(1997) examine the financial reporting behavior of large, publicly traded firms that, 
following the enactment of the 1986 Tax Reform Act in the US, became subject to an 
increase in book-tax conformity due to a switch from the cash method to the accrual 
accounting method for tax purposes. They conclude that a stronger alignment of financial 
and tax reporting induced affected firms to defer financial accounting income.116  
In contrast to this setting of increasing conformity, Chan et al. (2010) examine the case 
of a decrease in book-tax conformity in China. More specifically, Chan et al. (2010) 
assess whether a change of the financial reporting system from tax-based financial 
accounting towards the IFRS affects the informativeness of book-tax differences for tax 
non-compliance, i.e. the violation of tax rules. Indeed, they find that a decrease in 
conformity increases fraudulent tax reporting. In a further study exploiting the decrease 
in conformity in China, Chan et al. (2013) conclude that when book-tax conformity is 
reduced, larger firms pay proportionately less tax than smaller firms, i.e. they have greater 
ability to exploit the scope in independent tax reporting and thus save on tax payments.  
Apart from the paucity of exploitable institutional changes, only few papers are based on 
actual tax return data which is usually not available to the public. Examples of such 
studies building on tax return data include Lisowsky (2009), Mills (1996), Mills and 
Newberry (2001), Mills et al. (2002), Plesko (2007) and Chan et al. (2010). However, the 
majority of empirical investigations rely on proxies for tax positions estimated from 
financial statements. For instance, in order to estimate taxable income, the current tax 
expense on the income statement is commonly grossed-up by the statutory tax rate. As 
Hanlon (2003) points out, this approach may, however, be subject to several estimation 
problems, as current tax expense and actual tax liability on the tax return usually do not 
correspond. Hanlon argues that additional disclosures would be necessary to more 
accurately determine taxable income from financial statements.  
                                                 
116 Hanlon et al. (2008) build on this natural experiment as well. For more details, see 2.4. 
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3.2.2 Impact of book-tax conformity and book-tax differences on tax 
sheltering and earnings management 
Book-tax differences relate to deterministic, legal differences between accounting 
standards and tax law and/or to discretionary differences attributable to incentives 
inherent in financial and tax reporting (Mills et al. (2002)). Various studies assess how 
(estimated) book-tax differences relate to aggressive tax reporting (e.g. Mills (1996, 
1998); Manzon and Plesko (2002); Desai (2003); Desai and Dharmapala (2006)), whereas 
other papers (e.g. Philips et al. (2003); Lev and Nissim (2004); Hanlon et al. (2009)) 
attribute large book-tax differences to earnings management.117 Still other studies aim to 
consider both, earnings management and tax sheltering (Ayers et al. (2009); Blaylock et 
al. (2012); Seidman (2010)). In that regard, Badertscher et al. (2009) and Frank et al. 
(2009) find that some firms indeed report high book income to investors and low taxable 
income to tax authorities if both lines of reporting are not conformed. The question as to 
whether book-tax conformity leads to more or to less opportunistic reporting behavior 
remains, however, somewhat unclarified: Watrin, et al. (2014) construct an index to 
capture international differences in book-tax conformity and conclude that firms 
operating in one-book systems (less scope for discretionary book-tax differences) conduct 
significantly more (upward) earnings management in their consolidated financial 
statements than firms which operate in an environment of low book-tax conformity. In 
line with these findings, Blaylock et al. (2015) conclude that book-tax conformity is 
associated with significantly more, not less, earnings management. By contrast, recent 
evidence by Tang (2015) suggests that high book-tax conformity deters overall earnings 
management and tax avoidance. This fits in with Coppens and Peek (2005) who establish 
that private firms in high conformity countries are less likely to engage in earnings 
management. Likewise, Salbador and Vendrzyk (2012) identify periods with differing 
levels of conformity across the years 1956 to 2010 and demonstrate that earnings 
management is more prevalent in low conformity periods.  
3.2.3 Firm level determinants on book-tax differences  
Additional studies investigate the extent to which book-tax differences and/or 
opportunistic reporting activities can be explained on the basis of particular company 
characteristics. Mills and Newberry (2001) find that public firms tend to exhibit larger 
book-tax differences than private firms and that these differences tend to be more positive 
                                                 
117 See Dechow et al. (2010) for a broad review of the earnings management literature. 
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for firms with larger profitability and more negative for unprofitable firms. Similarly, 
Mills et al. (2002) conclude that profitable firms and firms with multinational operations 
exhibit larger book-tax income differences. They also find that the most significant 
increase in the gap between book and taxable income has occurred in the financial 
industry. This is in line with Plesko’s (2002) finding that book-tax differences are greater 
in the financial and information industries. In addition, Manzon and Plesko (2002) 
demonstrate that book-tax differences can be determined by the change in firm sales and 
the level of PPE. 
Finally, on the basis of confidential tax return data sourced from the Internal Revenue 
Service, Lisowsky (2010) develops a model to infer the likelihood that a firm engages in 
tax sheltering. Amongst other things, his results indicate that this likelihood positively 
correlates with firm profitability and size, but shows negative correlation with leverage. 
3.2.4 The impact of book-tax conformity or book-tax differences on earnings 
quality  
Related to the issue of opportunistic reporting, a further strand of literature examines the 
association between book-tax conformity, book-tax differences and particular properties 
of (financial accounting) earnings quality, such as the persistence or value relevance of 
earnings. Studying earnings persistence as a feature of earnings quality builds on the 
notion that – if not reported opportunistically and thus truthfully reflecting the companies’ 
economic condition – earnings should have explanatory power with regard to future 
profits. Similarly, value relevance refers to the ability of disclosed earnings to capture 
firm value as reflected in stock market returns.  
Hanlon (2005) posits that large book-tax differences, as opposed to small book-tax 
differences, are indicative of less persistent earnings. More specifically, Blaylock et al. 
(2012) show that firms with large positive book-tax differences, which can be attributed 
to upward earnings management, have lower earnings persistence than other firms with 
large positive book-tax differences. 
In addition, Hanlon et al. (2008), building on the natural experiment first exploited by 
Guenther et al. (1997) (see chapter 3.2.1), find that an increase in conformity causes 
earnings to be less informative compared to earnings of firms that were not subject to the 
change in conformity. The authors argue that increased conformity deters earnings quality 
because rather than reflecting economically valuable information, earnings are reported 
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in a way that minimizes taxes. This is in contrast to Desai’s (2005) suggestion that 
increased conformity can improve earnings quality by limiting earnings management. 
Atwood et al. (2010) study the relationship between book-tax conformity and earnings 
persistence based on an index capturing the degree of book-tax conformity in various 
countries. Their evidence also suggests that earnings are less persistent in countries with 
high book-tax conformity. However, unlike these papers, Hung (2001) and Leuz et al. 
(2003) do not find any effect of book-tax conformity with regards to differences in the 
properties of earnings in their cross-country studies. In particular, this is somewhat 
confusing with regard to evidence building on indices for book-tax conformity such as 
the one by Atwood et al. (2010)118, Watrin et al. (2014) and Tang (2015) which are based 
(directly or indirectly) on book-tax differences.   
To sum up, existing empirical studies entail two major shortcomings: First, most papers 
- in absence of tax return data - use proxies for tax positions from financial statements 
which may be subject to several estimation problems. Second, only few studies observe 
an institutional change and can therefore demonstrate possible behavioral responses to 
changes in conformity. Essentially, we are able to overcome these concerns in our study. 
With regard to the research questions addressed, we shed new light on the impact of a 
change in book-tax conformity on reporting behavior in terms of tax sheltering. 
Moreover, we illustrate the interaction between book-tax conformity, book-tax 
differences and earnings quality.  
3.3 Institutional Background 
3.3.1 Changes in the level of book-tax conformity in Germany 
The Accounting Law Modernization Act (Bilanzrechtsmodernisierungsgesetz (BilMoG)), 
which entered into force in 2010, weakened the strong linkage between financial and tax 
accounts in Germany. It can thus be considered as having induced a transition from a 
rather strict one-book system to a more two-book oriented system. 
Germany has traditionally been a high book-tax conformity country with one of the 
closest relationships between financial and tax accounting worldwide (Schön (2005b); 
Lamb et al. (1998)). In this regard, the authoritative principle (Maßgeblichkeitsprinzip 
                                                 
118 Atwood et al. (2010) argue that book-tax differences are greater for firms that operate in countries with 
lower book-tax conformity. They suggest that those larger book-tax differences result in more 
unexplained cross-sectional variation in current tax expense. Therefore, they infer the degree of required 
conformity in a particular country from the amount of observed variation in current tax expense that 
cannot be explained by the variation in pre-tax earnings. 
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Sec. 5 (1) s. 1 EStG) has been one of the major reasons for the strong linkage between the 
determination of financial and taxable income. This principle implies that the recognition 
and measurement policies applied in individual financial accounting basically have to be 
incorporated into tax accounting. The reverse authoritative principle (umgekehrte 
Maßgeblichkeit (Sec. 5 (1) s. 2 EStG old version)) additionally stipulated that tax 
accounting options had to be exercised in accordance with financial accounting, i.e. if a 
firm made use of tax accounting advantages, the same values had to be recognized in 
financial accounts. If specific compulsory tax regulations superseded financial 
accounting, e.g. due to the different objectives of financial and tax accounts, it was, 
however, possible for deviations between financial and tax accounts to occur. Table A- 2 
in the Appendix provides an overview of the authoritative principle and such possible 
deviations in the Pre-BilMoG era.   
Since the enactment of the reform, which abolished the reverse authoritative principle, it 
has been possible to exercise tax accounting options independently from the accounting 
treatment in individual financial statements. The changes in the authoritative principle 
induced by the BilMoG-Act are also listed in Table A- 2 (column “Post-BilMoG”, marked 
in green). 
The possibility of exercising tax accounting options independently comes along, 
however, with additional documentation requirements; namely the obligation to keep 
ongoing registers (Sec. 5 (1) s. 2 EStG) detailing the deviations between financial and tax 
accounts.  
Overall, the adjustment of the authoritative principle by the BilMoG-Act has led to greater 
leeway for companies’ decision-making when it comes to using tax accounting options 
advantageously without recognizing the same values in financial accounts. It is expected 
that this greater flexibility will lead to increased book-tax differences in Germany. 
3.3.2 Book-tax differences before and after the BilMoG-Act 
Balance sheet adjustments can generally be divided into deterministic and discretionary 
book-tax differences. While the former arise from different mandatory regulations under 
tax and financial accounts, the latter are not compulsory but may result from an 
independent use of tax and/or financial accounting options. Such differences may 
therefore reflect opportunistic reporting behavior, namely earnings management or tax 
sheltering. Table A- 3 in the Appendix provides an overview of accounting items with 
book-tax differences before and after the implementation of the BilMoG-Act under 
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German law. Prior to the implementation of the BilMoG-Act, the majority of book-tax 
differences were deterministic or discretionary due to financial accounting options. 
Subsequent to the introduction of the BilMoG-Act, however, tax accounting options can 
now be exercised independently and therefore opportunistically, thus creating more 
leeway for discretionary book-tax differences in terms of tax sheltering. New potential 
powers of discretion (see Table A- 3, marked in green) have emerged especially with 
respect to low-value assets, the valuation of inventories, the special item with reserve 
component119 and most importantly depreciation rules (regular and exceptional). As tax 
accounting options can be used independently regarding these reporting items, taxable 
income can be managed downward without simultaneously decreasing financial income 
(Frank et al. (2009)). If managers make use of this new tax planning scope, it is expected 
that book-tax income differences will increase after the BilMoG-Act. Since the balance 
sheet adjustments described above are predominantly temporary in that they result from 
differences in the timing of income and expenses recognized under both accounting 
systems and should reverse at some point, the tax sheltering impact should be most 
prevalent directly after the introduction of the BilMoG-Act (2010) and diminish over 
time. 120 
In addition to these balance sheet adjustments, German tax law also enforces a number of 
permanent, mandatory off-balance sheet adjustments. These differences arise when a 
particular income or expense is accrued under tax accounting, but will never be 
recognized under financial accounting or vice versa. Examples are tax exempt dividend 
income according to Sec. 8b Corporate Income Tax Act (KStG), non-deductible expenses 
(Sec. 10 KStG) or investment allowances. The BilMoG-Act did not, however, change any 
regulations relevant to off-balance sheet adjustments, and therefore these are not a focus 
of our analysis. 
3.4 Data and Sample Characteristics 
We use a unique, anonymized linked sample of financial statements and tax return data 
for the years 2008 to 2012. Data was provided by Ernst & Young GmbH, Germany (EY). 
This is exceptional to the extent that tax return data is, in general, not publicly available 
                                                 
119 German tax law grants, for example, a rollover relief for buildings (Sec. 6b EStG) or a replacement 
reserve under certain conditions (Sec. 6.6 EStR). 
120 In the US setting, there are more specific, permanent tax sheltering instruments (e.g. the valuation 
allowance, the tax contingency reserve, and the amount of foreign earnings designated as permanently 
reinvested) for which, however, no German equivalent exists. For more details see Hanlon and 
Heitzman (2010); Graham et al. (2012a). 
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in Germany. Although the Corporate income tax statistics contains micro level tax return 
data, this information is not published as a panel on a yearly basis and it is not possible 
to merge this tax data with financial statements or other firm characteristics. Our dataset, 
by contrast, comprises individual financial statements prepared under German Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles (balance sheet, profit and loss statement) as well as tax 
balance sheets, tax reconciliations and tax declarations from tax returns. In addition, we 
requested that EY collect information regarding various firm characteristics, e.g. the 
firms’ industry affiliation or previous reorganizations. As the sample entails the years 
2008 to 2012, our panel covers both pre- and post-reform years.  
Using tax return data linked with financial data enables us to compute actual book-tax 
balance sheet and book-tax income differences, rather than estimating these items on the 
basis of publicly available financial accounts. We can, therefore, overcome the discussed 
estimation problems and measurement errors and as such increase the power of statistical 
tests. 
Unlike the majority of other studies, in particular those based on US data, which examine 
consolidated financial statements, we use single financial statements. We consider this 
approach appropriate for several reasons: First, taxable income is derived from individual 
accounts and the tax figure reported in consolidated accounts is aggregated from 
individual statements. It is thus straightforward to determine opportunistic tax reporting 
in individual accounts (Watrin et al. (2014)). Second, we can thus more clearly attribute 
changes in reporting behavior to tax sheltering, since earnings management that plays a 
role for listed firms and is more relevant for consolidated accounts should be less present 
in individual accounts due to lower capital market pressure. To further rule out that our 
conclusions on BTD are confounded by earnings management, we investigate the reform 
impact on the persistence of taxable and financial earnings. In short, we asked EY to 
select incorporated firms covering six different industries, three different size classes (the 
definition of size classes follows Sec. 267 of the German Commercial Code) and different 
postal code areas. Due to divergent reporting requirements, we excluded banks, 
insurances and other financial institutions. Table 10 provides an overview of the 
distribution of the sample with regard to these parameters. The comparison with the entire 
population of German corporations in the German Corporate Income Tax statistics shows 
that our sample is biased towards large firms and that the Manufacturing sector is 
overrepresented, whereas our sample comprises fewer firms from the Construction and 
Services industries. This distortion can also be found in large commercial datasets such 
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as Amadeus provided by Bureau van Dijk and is not unique to our sample of EY clients. 
It is most likely due to publication requirements. Furthermore, we cross-check our data 
by reference to the work of Watrin et al. (2014), who use a much broader dataset of 
European firms from the Amadeus database with a huge subset of German firms. They 
put forward a mean absolute value of approximated permanent book-tax differences of 
0.0924 for Germany. If we replicate the construction of this proxy with our data, we 
obtain a similar value of 0.0859. This leaves us confident that the results of our study are 
not more systematically biased than studies based on broader commercial data sets.  
Table 10: Sample distribution 
Industry  
Sample Population Size Sample  Population 
Financial Ratios 
Sample  Population 
Frequency 
(Sec. 267 
HGB) 
Frequency Frequency 
Manufacturing 30.46% 10.60% Small 9.46% 51.80% Tangibles to Assets 14.3% 22.6% 
Construction 1.39% 9.40% Medium 44.78% 33.39% Debt to Assets 45.2% 45.4% 
Trade 13.35% 16.70% Large 45.76% 14.82% EBIT to Assets 6.6% 3.8% 
Service and 
others121 
54.8% 63.30%  
 
   
  
Total 100% 100% Total 100% 100% Total 100% 100% 
Note: This table characterizes the data sample and compares the relative coverage of size classes and industries to the 
population of German corporations (Corporate income tax statistics (2010), Corporate financial statement statistics 
(2009)). 
The initial sample consists of approximately 150 unique incorporated firms. The number 
of observations per year varies slightly as we do not have data covering the entire sample 
period (five years: 2008-2012) for all firms (unbalanced panel). In total, our sample 
consists of 725 firm-year observations. 
Our dataset enables us to identify deviations between financial and tax reporting at the 
level of single balance sheet items, both with respect to book-tax balance sheet and book-
tax income differences. Book-tax balance sheet differences entail cumulative effects 
relating to accrual accounting decisions made in previous reporting periods. They do not, 
however, necessarily provide information on income differences relating to the current 
period. We therefore do not further analyze these positions. Book-tax income differences, 
by contrast, capture annual effects and can therefore be considered as a more suitable 
indicator for opportunistic reporting than balance sheet differences. In particular, they 
reflect how book income is adjusted in order to determine tax balance sheet income. 
Given that we are interested in differences between book and taxable income which relate 
                                                 
121 From the six industry categories covered in our sample, this category also comprises firms from the 
Energy and IT sector. We condense industries this way to attain comparability with the Corporate 
income tax statistics.  
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to book-tax balance sheet differences, we do not, however, examine total book-tax income 
differences including off-balance sheet adjustments. As described in chapter 3.3, off-
balance sheet adjustments are, in principle, deterministic and are not related to accrual 
accounting. We therefore consider them to be irrelevant for our analysis of opportunistic 
tax reporting. Any following uses of the term “taxable income” actually refer to tax 
balance sheet income before off-balance sheet adjustments. 
3.5 Descriptive Evidence: Book-Tax Differences Pre- and Post-Reform 
In Figure 2, we plot the total book-tax income difference scaled by total assets for the 
years 2008-2012. The solid black line represents the sample mean, the dashed black line 
depicts the average for profitable firms, and the dashed grey line the average for 
unprofitable firms. The book-tax difference turns positive if taxable income falls below 
financial income, thus potentially indicating aggressive tax reporting behavior. A 
negative book-tax difference, in turn, results if taxable income exceeds financial income. 
Figure 2: Total book-tax income difference, scaled by total assets 
 
Note: This figure shows the mean total book-tax difference (scaled by total assets) over the sample period. The solid 
black line represents the sample mean, the dashed black line depicts the average for profitable firms and the dashed 
grey line the average for unprofitable firms.   
In the years 2008 and 2009, we observe negative book-tax differences. Strikingly, the 
overall book-tax difference becomes positive in the year 2010 when the implemented 
Reform Act introduced new reporting discretion. This suggests that the tax sheltering 
scope (i.e. to manage taxable income downward without simultaneously decreasing 
financial accounting) is in fact exploited. Since the newly introduced tax reporting 
discretion results in earlier recognition of tax expenses, the resulting timing effect 
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reverses over time. In line with this, we observe that, from 2011 onwards, total book-tax 
differences once again become negative.  
Mills and Newberry (2001) posit that the incentive to decrease taxable income relative to 
book income depends on a firm’s profitability. In fact, firms accruing losses are unable 
to benefit from (further) negative earnings adjustments. By contrast, they may report in a 
way that delays advantageous tax accounting to profitable periods. Accordingly, we 
partition our sample into profitable and loss-making firms in order to assess differences 
in reporting behavior.  
As Figure 2 reveals, we indeed find quite opposite effects for the two types of firms. 
While profitable firms on average exhibit a positive book-tax difference in 2010 (book 
income exceeds tax income), loss-making firms accrue the largest negative difference in 
that year. In the subsequent years, the overall book-tax differences of profitable and 
unprofitable firms converge again.  
To gain insights into the drivers of the observed effect, Table 11 displays book-tax income 
differences for single balance sheet positions separately. We again compare mean scaled 
book-tax differences over the pre-reform years to those of the post-reform years in order 
to disclose the changes induced by the change in conformity. For each balance sheet item, 
we additionally report the number of observations with non-zero values and whether the 
change of the book-tax differences is significantly different from zero (Table 11).  
Table 11: Mean book-tax income differences, scaled by total assets, pre- and post-reform 
    Pre-reform   Post-reform 
p- value   # 
Mean 
(%) 
Standard 
deviation # 
Mean 
(%) 
Standard 
deviation 
Fixed assets               
Intangible assets 45 0.08 0.0174 72 0.03 0.0148 0.7041 
PPE 74 -0.21 0.0280 137 0.15 0.0256 0.1089 
Financial assets 83 0.93 0.0658 148 -0.37 0.0526 0.0089 
Current assets               
Inventories 27 0.03 0.0087 40 0.03 0.0081 0.9464 
Receivables and other 
assets 124 0.18 0.0259 217 0.00 0.0240 0.3752 
Securities 5 -0.01 0.0011 7 0.00 0.0006 0.1352 
Special item 7 0. 005 0.0005 15 0.012 0.0018 0.5985 
Provisions 181 -0.42 0.0290 302 0.03 0.0287 0.07 
Liabilities 75 -0.43 0.0385 155 0.24 0.0486 0.0804 
Total number of observations: 580 (pre-reform: 225; post-reform: 355)   
Note: This table contains the number of observations with non-zero values, mean book-tax income differences and 
standard deviations for single balance sheet positions, separated for the pre- and post-reform period. In the last column, 
it is reported whether the change of the book-tax differences is significantly different from zero.  
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Most importantly, we find a negative mean income difference for PPE pre-reform, which 
becomes positive post-reform. The change in the book-tax income difference is almost 
significant at the 10% level.122 An (untabulated) assessment of the development of PPE-
related book-tax income differences over the sample period reveals that the observed total 
effect is mainly driven by a comparably large positive book-tax difference in 2010 which 
becomes slightly negative in 2011 before once again turning positive in 2012. 
Importantly, it should be noted that favorable declining balance tax depreciation was only 
available until 2010 in Germany. Hence, it seems reasonable to assume that the effect in 
2011 would have been less negative if declining balance depreciation had still been 
available in that year. Overall, our findings for PPE suggest that companies do 
opportunistically make use of tax depreciation rules. 
Turning to inventories as a further balance sheet item offering new reporting discretion, 
we find a positive average income difference both pre- and post-reform (Table 11). We 
do not, however, observe a significant change in the two values. Likewise, there is only 
a minor change observable for the special item with reserve component. We therefore 
abstract from these two balance sheet items in our further analysis. 
The remaining balance sheet positions are predominantly driven by deterministic 
deviations. We find the largest mean scaled book-tax differences (both pre- and post-
reform) for financial assets. More specifically, the difference pre-reform is positive, post-
reform it is negative; the change in the difference is significant. We attribute this change 
to impairments, which are regulated more restrictively in tax accounting, i.e. non-
permanent impairments may be recognized in financial accounting, whereas their 
recognition is forbidden in tax accounting. We observe a strongly negative pre-reform 
book-tax difference for provisions, which becomes positive and smaller in absolute terms 
post-reform. The same development is observed for liabilities. We find rather minor and 
insignificant effects for intangibles, receivables and securities. 
To conclude, our descriptive analysis provides initial evidence that the discretionary 
scope in tax reporting, which arises from the decrease in book-tax conformity, is 
exercised. Furthermore, it suggests that deterministic differences are still material. Last, 
we acknowledge the fact that our sample period covers the financial crisis initiated in 
                                                 
122 At this point, we again point to the relatively small sample size. Moreover, it must be kept in mind that 
the reporting scope is solely related to new investments. As we would expect a comparably low level 
of investments in 2010 as a result of the financial crisis, we believe that the observed effect would have 
be even more pronounced if 2010 had been a year of economic expansion. 
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2008. As Graham et al. (2012a) note, the nature of findings pertaining to the direction of 
the book-tax income gap greatly depends on whether a study is carried out for a period of 
economic expansion or contraction. As we would expect fewer companies to be profitable 
and to carry out new investments, thus facing the possibility and incentive to engage in 
opportunistic tax reporting, in the years subsequent to the crisis, we argue that our results 
tend to be conservative. In other words, we believe that our results would have been even 
more pronounced if the sample period had consistently been a period of economic 
expansion.  
3.6 Empirical Analysis 
3.6.1 Change of book-tax conformity, the book-tax income gap, and tax 
sheltering 
The descriptive evidence indicates that companies seem to make use of the newly 
introduced discretionary reporting scope. The following empirical analysis exploits the 
reform scenario econometrically in a difference-in-differences setting to substantiate the 
analysis.  
Hypothesis Development and Research Design 
While the BilMoG-Act basically serves as a natural experiment in our research design, 
the reform, in general, affected all German corporations. Accordingly, we do not observe 
a natural control group (which is not affected by the reform at all) in our setting. The 
implied tax reporting leeway is, however, most probably only exercised by companies 
that have a clear incentive for tax sheltering (Chan et al. (2013), p. 7). Hence, profitable 
companies which can make efficient use of tax deductions are more likely to take 
advantage of opportunistic reporting opportunities (Manzon and Plesko (2002), p. 194; 
Wilson (2009), p. 985-987; Frank et al. (2009), p. 475). Loss-making companies, 
however, are expected not to face tax-related reporting incentives (Chan et al. (2010); 
Mills and Newberry (2001); Manzon and Plesko (2002)), as these companies do not pay 
any taxes in the current period. Furthermore, the tax benefits resulting from loss carry-
forwards in future years are less certain (Mills and Newberry (2001), p. 4 f.). We therefore 
hypothesize the following: 
H 1: Book-tax income differences will increase for companies with incentives to use 
the new reporting discretion (profitable companies) compared to companies with 
no/less incentives (loss companies) subsequent to the implementation of the 
BilMoG-Act. 
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In order to test our hypothesis and to examine the effect of a decrease in book-tax 
conformity on reporting behavior, we essentially use a difference-in-differences 
methodology. In the basic regression equation, we estimate 
𝐵𝑇𝐷𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼0 +  𝛼1𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑡 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
(6) 
where i indexes firms and t indexes time. The dependent variable BTDi,t is defined as total 
book-tax income difference (balance-sheet differences) scaled by total assets. We 
compare outcomes before and after the reform for a group affected by the policy change 
(treatment) to a group not affected by the change (control). As only profitable companies 
have a clear incentive to use (and are therefore affected by) the new discretionary 
reporting scope, we take Profitablei,t, a dummy variable which equals one for profitable 
firm-year observations (annual net income >= 0) and zero for firm-year observations with 
a loss (annual net income < 0), as treatment variable. Profitable firms accordingly serve 
as treatment group; loss firms as control group in our analysis. As long as treatment and 
control groups are affected by time-varying confounding variables in a similar way, the 
difference in the two estimates will reflect the effect of the BilMoG-Act. In this regard, 
untabulated t-test results reveal that the change in the book-tax differences from year 2008 
to 2009 is not significantly different for profitable and loss-making companies, which 
points to a similar development of book-tax differences in the pre-reform period. 
Furthermore, as BTD do not impact on our measure of (financial income) profitability, 
we are confident not to face a reverse causality issue. As the profitability of companies 
and therefore the incentive for tax sheltering might change from year to year, we basically 
consider a mover panel.123 We further include a dummy variable Reformt which equals 
zero for years before the BilMoG-Act (2008-2009) and one for years after the introduction 
of the BilMoG-Act (2010-2012). To ensure a comparable number of observations in the 
pre- and post-period, we restrict our main analysis to the years 2008-2011. The key 
interaction term of interest, Profitablei,t*Reformt, equals one for profitable firm-year 
observations starting in 2010, and zero otherwise. The coefficient 𝛼3 represents the 
difference-in-differences estimator of introducing tax sheltering opportunities. Given that 
only companies with incentives are expected to make use of the new discretionary 
                                                 
123 For a detailed description of difference-in-differences analysis for cross-sections, mover and no-mover 
panels see Lee and Kang (2006). Moreover, the number of loss-firms per year is rather constant over 
the sample period and seems, therefore, not to be systematically influenced by the financial crisis. 
83 
reporting scope, book-tax differences should comparatively increase in the treatment 
group subsequent to the implementation of the BilMoG-Act. We therefore expect 𝛼3 to 
be positive (𝛼3 > 0). 
In addition, we include several firm-level control variables (𝑋𝑖,𝑡) which possibly 
influence the reporting gap. First, we add those balance sheet items for which new 
discretionary leeway is expected following the introduction of the BilMoG-Act: PPEi,t 
(PPE reported in financial statements scaled by total assets) and Inventoriesi,t (inventories 
reported in financial statements scaled by total assets).124 In addition, we include variables 
for which general substantive (mainly deterministic) differences between tax and 
financial accounting regulations in Germany exist. Following the descriptive analysis, 
and in view of previous research findings,125 we include Financialsi,t (financial assets 
reported in financial statements scaled by total assets), Provisionsi,t (provisions reported 
in financial statements scaled by total assets) as well as Leveragei,t126 (ratio of debt to 
equity capital). Furthermore, we add the dummy variable Reorganizationi,t which equals 
one if the firm has been reorganized within the last five years and zero otherwise. The 
rationale behind this is that, according to the German Tax Reorganization Act 
(UmwStG)127, book-tax conformity is not required in privileged reorganizations, which 
may further increase the book-tax income gap. Finally, we include two firm characteristic 
variables. These are Sizei,t (natural logarithm of total assets reported in financial 
statements) and Liquidityi,t (ratio of current assets to accounts payable). The mentioned 
variables, in particular Liquidity and Leverage, are also intended to control for factors that 
potentially determine participation, i.e. the probability of a company being profitable or 
not in a given year, and shall therefore alleviate concerns about sample selection.  
Table A- 4 in the Appendix provides descriptive statistics for our regression variables on 
a pooled basis as well as separated into data relating to the pre- and post-reform periods. 
The correlations among the explanatory variables (see correlation matrix in Table A- 5 in 
                                                 
124 We ignore the special item with reserve component in our empirical analysis due to materiality reasons; 
the descriptive analysis has shown that only approx. 4% of firms in our sample recognize this balance 
sheet item. Furthermore, following the introduction of the BilMoG-Act, recognition is prohibited in 
financial accounts. 
125 See Zinn and Spengel (2012); Evers et al. (2014c). 
126 Leverage also constitutes a proxy for a firm’s general capital structure (Chan et al. (2013)). 
127 For more details see Zinn and Spengel (2012), p. 17.  
84 
the Appendix) do not provide any indication of an unacceptable level of multicollinearity 
in the data.128 
Results 
Table 12 presents the results for regression equation (6).  
Table 12: Regression results 
  
Dependent Variable: Book-
tax income difference  
Variable Coefficient t-
statistic  
Difference in Difference Design 
Reform -0.052 -1.61  
  (0.032)    
Profitable 0.017 1.88 * 
  (0.009)    
Profitable*Reform 0.063 1.94  * 
  (0.032)    
Control Variables 
Variables for different tax and accounting rules 
PPE -0.012 -0.63  
  (0.019)   
Inventories 0.018 0.35   
  (0.053)    
Financials -0.000 -0.02  
  (0.017)   
Provisions -0.015 -1.18  
  (0.013)   
Leverage -0.000 -1.40  
 (0.000)   
Reorganization -0.010 -0.90  
 (0.012)   
Variables for additional economic factors 
Size -0.002 -0.55  
  (0.004)   
Liquidity -0.000 -0.52  
 (0.000)    
Intercept 0.020 0.34   
  (0.059)    
Observations n=436 
R2 0.08 
Note: This table presents the regression results using OLS. The dependent variable is BTD (income) scaled by total 
assets. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses below coefficients. *,**,*** represent significance levels at 
10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
                                                 
128 According to Farrar and Glauber (1967) harmful levels of multicollinearity are not present until 
bivariate correlations exceed 0.8. 
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We obtain a positive and statistically significant coefficient estimate (𝛼3) for the 
interaction term (Profitable*Reform) in line with Hypothesis 1. This implies that the 
opening of new tax reporting scope significantly increased book-tax income differences 
for those companies that have a clear incentive for tax sheltering (profitable firms), 
relative to those companies without incentive (loss firms). They indeed seem to exploit 
the new discretionary reporting leeway to manage taxable income downward without 
simultaneously decreasing financial income. This finding is basically in line with Tang 
(2015), who also finds that high book-tax conformity generally deters tax sheltering. 
To assess the robustness of this finding, we examine further specifications and conduct 
additional tests (Table 13). First, we run our Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression 
with clustered standard errors at firm level (column (1)) instead of heteroscedasticity-
robust standard errors to control for a potential correlation of outcomes within the 
unit/firms.129 To ensure that our results are not driven by differences between industries,130 
we include industry fixed effects in column (2). The basic result (𝛼3) remains unchanged 
in the specifications. The untabulated industry dummies are not significant. While we 
consider only financial income profitability as treatment criteria in our main specification, 
we use a different definition including off-balance sheet adjustments in column (3). The 
intuition behind this is the following: Off-balance sheet adjustments can mainly be seen 
as a fixed, non-manipulated component which has to be added to financial income 
anyway in order to end up at the taxable income. Therefore, a company is only facing a 
clear balance sheet-based tax sheltering incentive if its financial income plus off-balance 
sheet adjustments is positive. If, however, off-balance sheet adjustments already fully eat 
up financial profits, there might be no clear incentive to further reduce taxable income 
even if a company is considered profitable according to its profit and loss statement. The 
basic result (𝛼3 positive and statistically significant) again holds for the alternative 
treatment definition. In column (4), we expand our basic sample by adding fiscal year 
2012, thus accepting that there is no more symmetry in the number of pre- and post-
reform observations. Whereas the difference-in-differences coefficient (𝛼3) is still 
statistically significant and positive, its magnitude decreases. This is in line with the 
assumption that the tax sheltering impact should be most prevalent directly after the 
introduction of the BilMoG-Act (fiscal year 2010) and should diminish and level out over 
                                                 
129 OLS standard errors might understate the standard deviation of the DiD estimator (Bertrand et al. 
(2004)). 
130 Mills et al. (2002) and Plesko (2002) find, for example, that book-tax differences are greater in the 
financial and information industries. 
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time due to the reversal effect of temporary book-tax differences. In line with this 
argumentation, we include the lagged dependent variable (BTDt-1) as additional control 
in column (5) to test for a potential reversal effect.131 In this case as well, the main result 
(𝛼3) remains basically unchanged. Finally, we conduct additional placebo difference-in-
differences tests. In order to do so, we, first of all, define 2009 (the year previous to the 
introduction of the BilMoG-Act) as placebo reform year and run our basic regression (6) 
for the pre-reform period (years 2008-2009). Second, we use book-tax differences 
relating to provisions and liabilities as alternative outcome variables. These should not be 
affected by the intervention as related deviations are of deterministic nature and there has 
been no new reporting leeway with regard to these balance sheet items subsequent to the 
introduction of the BilMoG-Act. As expected, we do not determine a significant reform 
effect, i.e. an increase in book-tax differences for profitable companies in columns (6), 
(7) and (8) (𝛼3 not statistically and economically significant). This further demonstrates 
the validity of our findings. Moreover, the placebo reform year test (column (6)) further 
supports our common trend assumption. 
                                                 
131 See Manzon and Plesko (2002), p. 198. Our panel is, therefore, restricted to the years 2009 to 2011 in 
this specification. 
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Table 13: Robustness tests 
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Property, Plant and Equipment 
As shown before, PPE is the most relevant balance sheet item with new discretionary 
reporting leeway subsequent to the introduction of the BilMoG-Act in Germany.132 As 
depreciation schemes are generally recognized as one of the major instruments used for 
the management of taxable and book income in different directions and the descriptive 
analysis provides first evidence pointing into this direction as well, we rerun regression 
(6) with explicit focus on PPE. To that end, we use book-tax differences relating to PPE 
as alternative dependent variable and examine whether our finding also holds at single 
balance sheet level. We still control for the general level of PPE (PPEt,i) in the regression 
and additionally include the dummy variable PPE_Growtht,i which equals one if there has 
been a growth in the level of PPE (PPEt,i– PPEt-1,i >= 0) and zero otherwise. Given that 
the reporting and depreciation options can basically only be applied to new investments, 
this variable is intended to capture the actual tax sheltering possibilities of a company. 
Finally, we once again include the general economic controls described above: 
Leveraget,i, Sizet,i and Liquidityt,i. 
  
                                                 
132 For more details see chapter 3.3. 
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Table 14: Regression results - PPE 
 
Dependent Variable: 
Book-tax income 
difference (PPE) 
Variable Coefficient t-
statistic  
Difference in Difference Design 
Reform -0.003 -1.17  
 (0.003)   
Profitable -0.006 -1.06  
 (0.006)   
Profitable*Reform 0.013 1.82 * 
 (0.007)   
Control Variables 
Variables for different tax and accounting rules 
PPE -0.000 -0.00  
 (0.008)   
PPE_Growth 0.006 1.54  
 (0.004)   
Leverage -0.000 -0.59  
 (0.000)   
Variables for additional economic factors 
Size -0.001 -0.92  
 (0.001)   
Liquidity 0.000 0.21  
 (0.000)   
Intercept 0.008 0.68  
 (0.012)   
Observations 331 
R2 0.02 
Note: This table presents the regression results using OLS. The dependent variable is BTD (income) relating to PPE 
scaled by total assets. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses below coefficients. *,**,*** represent 
significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
In this case as well, we obtain a positive and statistically significant difference-in-
differences estimate (𝛼3,Table 14). This makes us confident that our findings are 
especially attributable to companies opportunistically making use of tax depreciation 
rules.  
Heterogeneous Reform Responses 
The ability and incentive to report opportunistically may be heterogeneous across firms 
and depend on particular company characteristics.  
First of all, the size of a company might be decisive. When it comes to the general 
association between firm size and tax sheltering or tax avoidance, the extant evidence is 
conflicting (Guenther et al. (1997), p. 242; Chan et al. (2013), p. 7). On the one hand, 
political power theory suggests that larger firms, because they have more resources 
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available for manipulating political processes in their favor, develop expertise and 
experience in tax planning and structure complex transactions to minimize tax liabilities, 
pay proportionally lower income taxes than smaller firms (Scholes et al. (1992); Siegfried 
(1972)). More precisely, given that the BilMoG-Act resulted in the implementation of 
new documentation requirements with respect to the independent exercise of tax 
accounting options, and these additional costs are expected to decrease with the size of 
the company (fixed-cost component to keep ongoing registers), larger companies may 
have relatively lower tax sheltering costs. As a result of this, these firms could be more 
likely to be able to make use of the increased scope for discretionary reporting. On the 
other hand, political cost theory posits that larger firms are subject to higher political 
costs; they face greater public and regulatory scrutiny and are therefore less tax aggressive 
than smaller firms (Boynton et al. (1992); Watts and Zimmermann (1978); Zimmermann 
(1983)). Furthermore, large companies are more likely to operate multinationally and 
therefore to have access to alternative, international tax planning and profit shifting 
channels. This could induce these large companies to focus less on tax sheltering based 
on discretionary scope in national tax reporting (Davies et al. (2014)). Considering these 
conflicting theories, we hypothesize the following:  
H2: The new reporting discretion will be used differently by companies depending on 
their size. Book-tax differences of small companies will therefore develop 
significantly different compared to book-tax differences of large companies 
subsequent to the implementation of the BilMoG-Act. 
In order to test this hypothesis, we run our basic regression equation (6) only for 
companies generally facing a tax sheltering incentive, i.e. profitable companies, and with 
different treatment groups: 
𝐵𝑇𝐷𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼0 +  𝛼1𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 + 𝛼2𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑡 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
(7) 
First of all, we conduct a median split and take Sizei, a dummy variable which equals one 
if the size of a company lies below the median (total assets reported on financial 
statements as of 2009) and zero otherwise, as alternative treatment. Small firms 
accordingly serve as treatment group and large firms as control group in this specification. 
Given that small and large companies are expected to react differently to the new 
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reporting incentives, book-tax differences should develop systematically different in the 
treatment group subsequent to the implementation of the BilMoG-Act. We therefore 
expect 𝛼3 to be significant, but are agnostic as to whether its sign is positive or negative 
(𝛼3 >< 0). The control variables basically remain the same. Table 15 presents the results 
for regression equation (7). 
Table 15: Regression results – Heterogeneous reform response 
Dependent Variable: Book-tax income difference  
(1) 
Size 
 
(2) 
Subsidiaries 
 
(3)  
Direct parent 
company 
(4) 
Group parent 
company 
Reform 0.000 -0.005 0.001 0.005 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) 
Treatment -0.010 -0.026*** -0.005 -0.017 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.011) 
Treatment*Reform 0.030 * 0.036** 0.020 0.028 
 (0.015) (0.014) (0.012) (0.018) 
PPE -0.007 0.009 0.000 0.006 
 (0.015) (0.013) (0.018) (0.019) 
Inventories 0.029 0.036 0.033 0.039 
 (0.056) (0.056) (0.058) (0.061) 
Financials -0.006 0.007 0.005 0.005 
 (0.012) (0.017) (0.019) (0.019) 
Provisions -0.020 -0.015 -0.009 -0.012 
 (0.015) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) 
Leverage -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Reorganization 0.013 0.017** 0.018* 0.021** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) 
Size  -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Liquidity -0.000 -0.000 -0.000* -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Intercept -0.008 0.067 0.057 0.053 
 (0.013) (0.067) (0.068) (0.066) 
Observations n=353 n=345 n=322 n=304 
R2 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.04 
Note: This table presents the regression results using OLS. The dependent variable is BTD (income) scaled by total 
assets. Treatment variables are defined as dummies capturing the size (1), existence of subsidiaries (2) or nationality 
of the direct (3) or group parent company (4) respectively. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses below 
coefficients. *,**,*** represent significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
We obtain a positive and statistically significant coefficient estimate (𝛼3) for the 
interaction term (Size*Reform) in column (1) in line with Hypothesis 2, which we 
interpret as evidence for small companies exhibiting a systematic increase in book-tax 
differences compared to large companies subsequent to the reform. This implies that the 
new discretionary reporting scope has mainly been exploited by smaller companies. This 
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seems to be contrary to the findings of Lisowsky (2010) and Chan et al. (2013), indicating 
that large companies are more likely to engage in tax sheltering. 
To further validate our conjecture that large companies focus less on tax sheltering based 
on national tax reporting because they operate multinationally and have access to other 
tax planning (profit shifting) channels, we examine three additional specifications (Table 
15). In order to do so, we use alternative treatment variables acting as proxy for the 
complexity and internationality of a company. In specification (2), we take a dummy 
variable which equals one if a company owns no subsidiaries and zero otherwise (one or 
more subsidiaries) as treatment. In specifications (3) and (4), we define the treatment 
dummy as one if the direct parent or group parent company is domestic and as zero if it 
is foreign. All of these specifications aim at identifying significant differences with regard 
to tax sheltering behavior depending on a company’s group structure. We indeed find a 
positive and statistically significant coefficient (𝛼3) in column (2), implying that the 
reform systematically increased book-tax differences for those companies without 
subsidiaries (less complex firms) relative to those with subsidiaries (more complex firms). 
Even if we do not obtain statistically significant positive difference-in-differences 
coefficients in columns (3) and (4), the p-values of 0.109 and 0.119 are still remarkable, 
indicating that companies with domestic parent companies (national groups) tend to 
engage more in tax sheltering than companies with foreign parents (multinational groups). 
All of these findings corroborate the conjecture that complex and multinational 
corporations are less likely to engage in tax sheltering based on discretionary scope in 
national tax reporting. 
In conclusion, we provide evidence that companies with definite tax sheltering incentives 
(profitable companies) indeed exploit the new reporting discretion following the decrease 
in book-tax conformity. More precisely, our results show that companies are 
opportunistically making use of tax depreciation rules. Hence, in that regard, our results 
support the position of proponents of increased book-tax conformity. Additionally, we 
find that smaller companies featuring less complex and predominantly national group 
structures have a greater tendency to engage in opportunistic tax reporting behavior.  
3.6.2 Change of book-tax conformity and the persistence of taxable and 
financial income  
Using individual financial and tax statements instead of consolidated accounts, it is most 
likely that the identified change in book-tax differences (chapter 3.6.1) can be attributed 
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to tax sheltering and not earnings management, which rather occurs in consolidated 
accounts reported to the financial markets. To further rule out the influence of earnings 
management on the detected change in book-tax differences, we investigate whether the 
information content of reported taxable and financial income differs pre- and post-reform. 
The reasoning behind this is that increased tax sheltering is expected to deter the quality 
of reported taxable income while increased financial earnings management would deter 
the quality of reported financial income.  
The persistence of earnings, i.e. the potential of predicting future earnings from current 
earnings, has been widely acknowledged in the literature as an appropriate measure of 
earnings quality (see chapter 3.2.4). We therefore proceed along the lines of these studies 
(e.g. Hanlon (2005)) to oppose financial and taxable income persistence pre- and post-
reform.  
Specifically, we are interested in the effect of the possibility to independently exercise 
tax accounting options on earnings quality (persistence of taxable income), given that 
there was virtually no possibility for tax sheltering before the BilMoG-Act. In a second 
step, we also consider the impact of changed conformity on financial accounting earnings 
persistence. Comparing the two outcomes provides further insights whether tax or 
financial accounts are managed opportunistically and thus are responsible for the 
observed increase in book-tax differences (see chapter 3.6.1).  
In addition to that, we provide evidence on the interplay between book-tax conformity, 
book-tax differences and earnings persistence. To the best of our knowledge, we are the 
first to do so.  
As regards the persistence of taxable income, we ex ante expect that the newly emerged 
possibility for tax sheltering deters the information content of current taxable profits for 
one year ahead taxable profits. By contrast, given that earnings management is considered 
to be irrelevant in individual financial accounts and in light of the fact that financial 
accounting is less influenced by tax law subsequent to the BilMoG-Act, we expect no 
change or even an increase in the persistence of financial income as a consequence of the 
change in conformity. We therefore frame our third hypothesis as follows: 
H 3:  The decrease in book-tax conformity arising from the implementation of the 
BilMoG-Act in Germany causes a decrease in the persistence of taxable income 
as a result of increased tax sheltering activity. By contrast, the persistence of 
financial accounting earnings remains unchanged or even improves.  
95 
Research design 
We separately test for changes in the persistence of taxable income and financial 
accounting earnings. In doing so, we build on Hanlon (2005) and estimate for each 
income type the following OLS regression model for all firm-year observations: 
𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑡+1 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽2𝐵𝑇𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐵𝑇𝐷 𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽4𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
(8) 
𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑡  denotes either taxable income or financial accounting earnings. Essentially, 
equation (8) estimates one-year ahead earnings (scaled by total assets), 𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑡+1 as a 
function of current period’s earnings (scaled by total assets) 𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑡 in order to assess 
the general level of earnings persistence.133 In addition, we include 𝐵𝑇𝐷𝑖,𝑡, which is the 
absolute amount of the total book-tax income difference. Both variables are centered, i.e. 
the mean is subtracted from the predictors before fitting the regression model in order to 
increase interpretability. Additionally, we add the interaction of 𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐵𝑇𝐷 𝑖,𝑡 in 
order to allow persistence to vary across different levels of book-tax differences. In this 
regard, a negative and significant coefficient of the interaction term would, for example, 
suggest that earnings persistence is lower where total book-tax differences are larger. We 
also incorporate 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡, a dummy variable indicating whether annual net income 
is positive (1) or not (0) as well as the interaction term 𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 in order 
to account for the possibility that – in line with our analysis in 3.6.1 – incentives and 
observed effects may be different for profitable and loss firms.134 Finally, we include 
year-fixed effects. 
We conduct a sample split to run estimation (8) for pre- and post-reform years separately. 
The idea is to compare the sign, size and significance levels, particularly of our major 
variables of interest. These are 𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑡, used to determine whether the general level of 
persistence is altered by a change in book-tax conformity, and 𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐵𝑇𝐷 𝑖,𝑡, used to 
provide answers to the question as to whether, depending on the degree of conformity, 
higher absolute book-tax differences are associated with a comparatively increased or 
decreased persistence.  
                                                 
133 Therefore, our panel is restricted to the years 2008 to 2011 in this model. 
134 For a similar approach see Atwood et al. (2010). 
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Results  
Table 16 presents the regression results of equation (8) for the persistence of taxable 
income.  
Table 16: Regression results: Change of book-tax conformity and taxable income persistence 
  Pre-reform (2008-2009) Post-reform (2010-2011) 
Variable Coefficient t-
statistic  
Coefficient t-
statistic 
  
EARNi,t 0.710 13.70 *** 0.501 4.02 *** 
  (0.052)   (0.125)   
BTD i,t -0.221 -2.83 *** 0.032 0.47  
  (0.078)   (0.068)   
EARNi,t * BTD i,t -0.532 -1.31  -1.127 -2.73 *** 
  (0.404)   (0.413)   
Profitablei,t   0 .003 0.21  0.025 1.45  
  (0.016)     (0.018)   
EARNi,t *  Profitablei,t -0.660 -6.90 *** -0.036 -0.28  
  (0.096)   (0.131)   
Intercept 0.021 1.36  -0.013 -0.75  
  (0.015)   (0.017)   
Observations n=273 n=271 
R2 0.4948 0.1872 
Note:  This table presents OLS regression results for the analysis of taxable income persistence. The dependent variable 
is one-year ahead taxable income scaled by total assets. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses below 
coefficients. *,**,*** represent significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
We find a positive and significant coefficient for 𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑡 both pre- and post-reform, 
which can be interpreted as the general persistence level of a company with average BTD. 
However, the coefficient and the significance level decrease, accordingly pointing to a 
decline in tax persistence induced by the decrease in book-tax conformity. We interpret 
this as an additional hint for companies engaging in tax sheltering, which biases earnings 
and thus decreases their quality in terms of persistence. Beyond this, our data also allows 
more specific conclusions to be drawn regarding the impact of book-tax differences on 
persistence. In that regard, we observe a significant and negative coefficient of the 
interaction term (β3), yet solely in the post-reform period.
135 We interpret this such that 
higher book-tax differences induce a further reduction in taxable income persistence 
when book-tax conformity is low.  
                                                 
135 We do not find a direct impact of book-tax differences (𝛽2) in the post-reform period. 
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Figure 3: Marginsplot analysis for the 50th and 99th percentile of BTD, pre-vs. post-reform, Taxable 
income 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: This figure shows graphical results (marginsplots) for the margins analysis of the interaction term EARNi,t * 
BTD i,t for the 50th and 99th percentile of BTD, separated for the pre- and post-reform period, with regard to taxable 
income. The dashed grey 45°-line serves as a reference indicating perfect persistence 
Indeed, graphical margins analysis of the interaction term (see Figure 3) for selected 
percentile values of BTD shows that the association between current period’s earnings 
and one-period ahead earnings decreases if one compares the pre- to the post-reform 
period. For very large BTD (99th percentile) this relationship even turns negative in the 
post-reform era. 
We conduct the same analysis for the persistence of financial accounting earnings and 
present results in Table 17.  
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Table 17: Regression results: Change of book-tax conformity and financial income persistence 
  Pre-reform (2008-2009) Post-reform (2010-2011) 
Variable Coefficient t-
statistic  
Coefficient t-
statistic 
  
EARNi,t 0.391 2.28 ** 0.780 3.01 *** 
  (0.172)   (0.259)   
BTD i,t -0.211 -0.90  -0.126 -0.93  
  (0.234)   (0.136)   
EARNi,t * BTD i,t -0.695 -2.28 ** -1.446 -7.48 *** 
  (0.305)   (0.193)   
Profitablei,t 0.003 0.07  0.015 0.41  
  (0.040)   (0.037)   
EARNi,t * Profitablei,t -0.078 -0.43  -0.118 -0.45  
  (0.183)   (0.263)   
Intercept 0.066 1.67 * 0.028 0.76  
  (0.039)   (0.037)   
Observations n=247 n=247 
R2 0.1297 0.5241 
Note: This table presents OLS regression results for the analysis of financial accounting earnings persistence. The 
dependent variable is one-year ahead financial income scaled by total assets. Robust standard errors are shown in 
parentheses below coefficients. *,**,*** represent significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
Again, we find a positive and significant coefficient for 𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑡 both pre- and post-
reform. Unlike for taxable income, however, the magnitude of  𝛽1 rises subsequent to the 
introduction of the BilMoG-Act. In principle, this insight indicates an increase in earnings 
persistence induced by a decrease in book-tax conformity which is in line with empirical 
evidence previously provided (Hanlon et al. (2008); Atwood et al. (2010)). Specifically 
for our setting, this observation makes us confident that the observed book-tax differences 
in 2010 indeed relate to tax sheltering, rather than to distortive earnings management 
which expectedly would negatively impact on earnings quality. We therefore conclude 
that the BilMoG-Act did not induce earnings management in single financial accounts. 
Moreover, the evidence of increased financial accounting quality is in line with book-tax 
conformity opponents’ claim that the two reporting lines serve different information 
needs and that earnings quality is superior when the determination of earnings is not 
influenced by tax law. Indeed, before the enactment of the BilMoG-Act, the reverse 
authoritative principle caused such an impact of tax reporting on financial accounts (see 
chapter 3.3). 
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Figure 4: Marginsplot analysis for the 50th and 99th percentile of BTD, pre-vs. post-reform, Financial 
income 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: This figure shows graphical results (marginsplots) for the margins analysis of the interaction term EARNi,t * 
BTD i,t for the 50th and 99th percentile of BTD, separated for the pre- and post-reform period, with regard to financial 
accounting earnings. The dashed grey 45°-line serves as a reference indicating perfect persistence. 
As regards the general impact of book-tax differences, we do not find a direct impact of 
book-tax differences (𝛽2) on one-year ahead earnings, whereas we do observe a 
significant and negative coefficient of the interaction term (𝛽3). Once again we conclude 
that higher book-tax differences induce a reduction in earnings persistence. This is in line 
with Hanlon’s (2005) finding and generally holds true for both pre- and post-BilMoG 
periods. This finding is also illustrated in the margins plot (Figure 4) which shows that - 
unlike in the case of taxable income – the general association between current and one-
period ahead earnings improves pre- vs. post-reform. For the case of very large BTD (99th 
percentile) the association between current and one-period ahead earnings remains almost 
unaffected. 
To sum up, we observe a general decline in the persistence of taxable income as a 
consequence of the change in conformity. We attribute this decline in the quality of 
taxable income as an alternative earnings and performance figure to the distortive impact 
of the newly arisen scope for tax sheltering. As such, this finding supports the position of 
proponents of increased book-tax conformity. By contrast, our evidence suggests that the 
decrease in book-tax conformity induces a general increase in the persistence of financial 
accounting earnings. We take this as an indication that there is no earnings management 
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in individual accounts and thus conclude that that the general quality (informativeness) 
of financial accounting earnings has increased.  
3.7 Conclusion 
Exploiting a quasi-natural experiment (the BilMoG-Act) in Germany and using a sample 
of linked individual financial statements and actual tax return data, we explicitly examine 
the effects of a change in book-tax conformity on reporting behavior.  
We show that the new reporting leeway resulting from a transition from a one-book to a 
more two-book-oriented accounting system indeed seems to be used. In our descriptive 
analysis, this is reflected in a positive total book-tax difference and a positive book-tax 
difference relating to PPE, constituting the balance sheet item with the largest scope for 
tax sheltering, in year 2010. Based on a difference-in-differences design, we demonstrate 
that profitable companies - facing a clear tax sheltering incentive - exhibit comparably 
higher book-tax differences subsequent to the decrease in conformity. This can 
particularly be traced back to book-tax differences relating to PPE and thus to companies 
making use of favorable tax depreciation rules. Furthermore, we find that small firms 
featuring less complex and predominantly national group structures are more likely to 
engage in opportunistic tax reporting behavior. Overall, these results support the position 
of proponents of increased book-tax conformity. 
We also examine how the change in book-tax conformity affects the persistence of taxable 
and financial income. Our results suggest that a decrease in book-tax conformity induces 
a decline in the persistence of taxable income which we attribute to the distortive impact 
of the newly arisen tax sheltering options. In contrast to this, we observe a higher 
persistence of financial accounting earnings, thus corroborating our finding that earnings 
management is not driving our results. This finding is also in line with the arguments put 
forward by the opponents of increased conformity, who maintain that both accounting 
lines provide divergent information content parts of which are lost in case of an alignment. 
Moreover, our results suggest that large book-tax differences have a negative impact on 
one-year-ahead (taxable and financial) income. This effect is, however, more pronounced 
in a context of decreased conformity and therefore yet another argument in favor of high 
conformity. 
To sum up, we show that a switch from high to low book-tax conformity going along with 
accounting options creates room for opportunistic reporting which is indeed exploited for 
tax sheltering, despite higher documentation costs. This finding speaks against such a 
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shift towards a two-book system. At the same time, we show that detaching financial and 
taxable income increases the persistence of financial income, thus suggesting an increased 
information content of financial earnings in a two-book system. Essentially, the reduced 
persistence of taxable income post-reform, however, indicates that earnings quality 
deteriorates in a two-book system if incentives for opportunistic behavior are present. 
Hence, we conclude that a switch from high to low book-tax conformity increases 
opportunistic reporting behavior while not improving the information content with regard 
to those reported income numbers for which opportunistic reporting incentives are 
present. 
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4 Current Trends in Tax Accounting and Tax Reporting in 
Europe 
4.1 Common Corporate Tax Base in the European Union: Concretization of 
the Principles for the Determination of Taxable Profit  
4.1.1 Introduction 
On 16 March 2011, the European Commission proposed a first draft directive (hereafter: 
DD) for a “Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB)” (European 
Commission (2011)). This CCCTB Directive implies a three-step approach to harmonize 
corporate taxation in the European Union (EU). Firstly, the taxable income of every 
corporation is determined based on a harmonised set of rules. Secondly, taxable profits 
are consolidated at EU level. Afterwards, in a third step, the consolidated tax base is 
allocated to the group members located within the EU according to a predefined formula. 
The member states then apply their national tax rates to the profits assigned to them. 
In the literature (Herzig and Kuhr (2011a), p. 2053; Kußmaul and Niehren (2011), p. 349; 
Spengel and Zöllkau (2012), p. 2; Hey (2012), p. 999; Kahle and Schulz (2013), p. 50) 
and in the political debate (BT-Drucks. 17/5606 of 28 April 2011; BT-Drucks. 17/5748 
of 5 May 2011), the second and the third step of a CCCTB, consolidation and 
apportionment, are subject to controversial discussion. Therefore, the focus currently is 
on the first step, namely an EU-wide harmonisation of the tax base (Common Corporate 
Tax Base (CCTB)). In line with this, the Action Plan for a “Fairer and Efficient Corporate 
Tax System”, published by the European Commission on 17 June 2015, envisaged a 
staged introduction of the CCCTB (European Commission (2015a)). On 25 October 
2016, the European Commission also released a revised DD (hereafter: new DD) for a 
CC(C)TB, which explicitly includes a two-step procedure (European Commission 
(2016e, 2016f)). More precisely, they contemplate the first step consisting of a CCTB 
with cross-border loss offset while consolidation and formula apportionment are 
postponed to a later stage. Likewise, the Federal Ministry of Finance has lately estimated 
the impact of a CCTB on tax revenues in Germany. In this context, they also considered 
applying the harmonised profit determination provisions not only to corporations, but also 
to partnerships (Common Company Tax Base) (Oestreicher et al. (2014), p. 326 ff.). 
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A CCTB might certainly relate to the corresponding proposed regulations of the CCCTB 
Directive.136 However, due to the frequent use of undefined legal terms, numerous 
regulatory gaps and room for interpretation still exist. One example is the recognition of 
provisions which is based on the criterion of the probability of a legal obligation; this 
legal term is, however, not explicitly defined in the CCCTB Directive. These 
uncertainties cannot be resolved by simply referring to national civil laws of the EU 
member states as they differ substantially and, thus, referring to them would not lead to a 
uniform application of the CCTB.  
Based on this starting point, the main objective of this paper is to derive and concretize a 
proposal for a CCTB following a cash flow-oriented taxation/modified net income 
method which more strongly links tax accounting to the cash-principle. At the same time, 
we thereby aim at intensifying the debate on the CCCTB Directive. 
First, chapter 4.1.2 provides an overview on the CCCTB Directive and outlines the 
arguments for a two-step procedure, namely to start with harmonising the determination 
of the tax base as in the case of a CCTB and to postpone further steps of consolidation as 
well as of formula apportionment. Chapter 4.1.3 explains and concretizes the 
determination of taxable profits in the framework of a cash flow-oriented 
taxation/modified net income method. Subsequently, chapter 4.1.4 compares this 
proposal with the corresponding rules of the CCCTB Directive. By doing so, we illustrate 
in how far recognition and measurement provisions would require further adjustments in 
order to create an effective CCTB. Chapter 4.1.5 encompasses a brief summary of the 
main findings of a quantitative comparison concerning the differences in effective tax 
burdens between taxable profit determination according to a cash flow-oriented 
taxation/modified net income method and according to the corresponding rules of the 
CCCTB Directive. Finally, chapter 4.1.6 concludes. 
4.1.2 Draft Council Directive for a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base 
(CCCTB) in the EU 
4.1.2.1 Overview 
A CCCTB137 should serve the purpose of eliminating existing inefficiencies and 
distortions that are related to cross-border taxation in the Single Market. The European 
                                                 
136  See in detail Spengel and Zöllkau (2012). 
137  If not stated differently, the subsequent explanations and references to precise articles relate to the initial 
2011 DD (European Commission (2011)) and not the revised version of 2016 (European Commission 
(2016e, 2016f)). 
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Commission particularly regards the coexistence of 28 different tax regimes as one of the 
major obstacles. These regimes may cause high administrative burdens and tax 
compliance costs as well as double taxation due to conflicting tax claims between 
Member States (European Commission (2011)). 
The CCCTB aims at eliminating these obstacles to cross-border transactions and at 
harmonizing the corporate tax base in Europe. To that end, it proposes a three-step 
approach: 
(1)  Determination of corporate taxable income under a harmonized set of tax 
accounting regulations (Art. 9-43 DD); 
(2)  Consolidation of the individual corporate tax bases to a single tax base (Art. 54-60 
DD); 
(3)  Allocation of the consolidated tax base to group members located in the different 
Member States by formula apportionment (Art. 86-104 DD). 
Subsequently, member states impose a tax on corporations by applying their national tax 
rates to the share of consolidated profit apportioned to them. This approach explicitly 
does not aim at harmonizing tax rates, as fair competition regarding tax rates is intended 
(European Commission (2011)). 
The benefits of a CCCTB are manifold. First, it reduces tax compliance costs of dealing 
with 28 different national tax systems. Second, it simplifies cross-border loss 
compensation and the deduction of costs of financing due to consolidation. Third, the 
elimination of intercompany profits and losses diminishes transfer pricing problems as 
well as conflicts in case of reorganisations and relocations of companies within the EU 
(Herzig (2010), p. 1061). 
The personal scope of the DD only covers corporations. According to the 2011 DD, the 
CCCTB should be optional (Art. 6 DD), that is all corporations and permanent 
establishments of non-EU corporations which are located in the EU may opt for the 
CCCTB. This choice, however, can only be made jointly by an entire group (all-in all-out 
principle) and is binding for 5 years. The re-launched initiative by means of the 2016 DD, 
by contrast, lays down mandatory rules for groups above a certain size (Art. 2 new DD: 
consolidated group revenue exceeding EUR 750 000 000). In addition, the rules are still 
available, as an option, to entities which are subject to corporate tax in the EU, but do not 
meet the size criteria (European Commission (2016f)).  
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4.1.2.2 Recommendation: two-step procedure (CCTB instead of CCCTB) 
If member states agreed to the DD, their tax systems would face far-reaching changes. It 
is, therefore, questionable whether all member states will give their consent.138 Moreover, 
there still is a lack of clear and reliable impact assessments of a formula apportionment 
concerning the effects of a CCCTB on member states‘ tax revenues.139 Other unresolved 
problems include, in particular, individual questions on consolidation and profit 
apportionment (apportionment factors and administrative aspects) as well as on transition 
(taxation of hidden reserves) and third country issues.140 
Due to these still unresolved difficulties, a two-step procedure as a starting point for 
harmonising taxable profits in Europe is preferable. This stepwise strategy suggests just 
aligning the provisions for the determination of the corporate tax base (CCTB) in a first 
step. Consolidation and apportionment are only to be implemented in a second step at a 
later stage. In the literature (Herzig and Kuhr (2011a), p. 2053; Kußmaul and Niehren 
(2011), p. 349; Spengel and Zöllkau (2012), p. 2; Hey (2012), p. 999; Kahle and Schulz 
(2013), p. 50) and in the political debate (BT-Drucks. 17/5606 of 28 April 2011; BT-
Drucks. 17/5748 of 5 May 2011) such a two-step procedure is largely supported. Lately, 
the European Commission also proposed a staged introduction of a CCCTB in its action 
plan (European Commission (2015a)) and came forward with a revised proposal for a 
CC(C)TB on 25 October 2016 which explicitly includes a two-step procedure (European 
Commission (2016e, 2016f)).  
Even aligning profit determination provisions only might already remove some of the 
obstacles presented: for example, it would increase transparency and at the same time 
decrease compliance costs as well as the risk of double taxation in case of reorganisations 
(von Brocke (2008), p. 1012). Losses occurring in other member states could be 
determined according to uniform provisions. The co-existence of 28 parallel accounts 
would cease to be. In addition, Scheffler and Köstler (2014b) outline further advantages, 
for example concerning exit taxation issues and the cross-border loss compensation of 
foreign subsidiaries and permanent establishments. However, the DD would also need 
further specifications with regard to the provisions to determine taxable profits in order 
                                                 
138 Amongst others Bulgaria, the Netherlands and Sweden critisized the DD’s compliance with the 
principle of subsidiarity; other countries have also already criticized this, see von Brocke and 
Rottenmoser (2011), p. 623. 
139 For first results, see Fuest et al. (2007), p. 627; Devereux and Loretz (2008), p. 1; Bettendorf et al. 
(2010), p. 576 f.; Oestreicher and Koch (2011), p. 64. For an impact assessment of a Common Corporate 
Tax Base (CCTB) or a Common Company Tax Base see Oestreicher et al. (2014), p. 326 ff. 
140 For details, see Spengel and Zöllkau (2012), p. 11 ff. 
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to ensure a consistent application within the EU and, thus, real harmonisation. The 
following section addresses the background of this issue as well as possible solutions.  
4.1.2.3 Determination of taxable profits according to a CCTB 
The DD entails independent regulations on the determination of taxable profits, without 
explicit references to national or international financial accounting standards (e.g. IFRS). 
Thus, it can be considered to be an autonomous tax law. Its consistent interpretation in all 
member states would require the set of rules to be as complete and comprehensive as 
possible. To be more precise, its interpretation must be possible without referring to 
national or supranational law (Spengel and Malke (2008), p. 63). 
The determination of taxable profits according to the 2011 DD141 is based on a 
comparison of taxable income and deductible expenses (Art. 10 DD) and thus, on a profit 
and loss-oriented approach.142 With regard to this, a non-exhaustive list of taxable income 
(Art. 4 par. 8 DD)143 as well as of deductible expenses (Art. 12 DD) is prescribed.144 
Write-offs are additionally considered as other deductible items (Art. 13 DD). 
The DD is not preceded by a general framework on profit determination from which 
answers to unresolved questions on recognition or measurement may be derived, but 
contains individual regulations. However, the determination of taxable profits refers to a 
few general basic principles (Art. 9 DD) that constitute the basis for calculating the tax 
base. They, in particular, include the realization principle (Art. 9 par. 1, 17 and 18 DD) 
as well as the principles of individual valuation and consistency. 
Fundamentally, the proposed concept to determine taxable profits by the DD can be 
accepted, except for several matters of detail. In addition, it seems to be basically 
compatible with the tax systems of the member states.145 Still there remain numerous 
regulatory gaps and room for interpretation that require further specifications. One of the 
underlying problems is that the DD frequently uses undefined legal terms for which it 
provides no point of reference and therefore, these need to be concretized by referring to 
national (civil) laws. For example, according to Art. 18 DD, the accrual of revenues 
(revenue recognition) is based on the criterion of legal enforceability (Kahle and Schulz 
(2013), p. 52). Similarly, provisions (Art. 25 DD) may only be recognized if the criterion 
                                                 
141 For details, see Scheffler and Krebs (2011), p. 14 ff.; Spengel and Zöllkau (2012), p. 19 ff. 
142 Still for many items, tax values and their changes in the past year need to be calculated in an auxiliary 
calculation (“shadow accounting“).  
143 For a list of tax-free income, see Art. 11 DD. 
144 For a list of non-deductible expenses, see Art. 14 DD. 
145 For details, see Spengel and Zöllkau (2012). 
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of probability of a legal obligation is fulfilled. The DD does not further specify these 
criteria and therefore, they would need to be interpreted based on the national (civil) law 
of the member states. However, this procedure bears the risk of different national 
interpretations from member state to member state. Thus, this would be 
counterproductive with regard to the goal of harmonisation (Herzig and Kuhr (2011a), p. 
2058). Consequently, the DD needs to be adjusted in such a way that it enables greater 
disentanglement from national (civil) laws.  
One possible approach to solution would be to focus more strongly on economic criteria. 
In that regard, Florstedt et al. (2015) argue that the economic substance of events and 
transactions could be explored as a guideline for harmonizing the application of a CCTB 
whenever terms or practices are undefined in the proposal. They evaluate the fundamental 
suitability of existing methods to determine the underlying substance, e.g. as included in 
the IFRS, especially with regard to the need for legal certainty. This analysis shows that 
a well-interpreted substance-over-form principle - in cases where legal form shapes 
economic substance - and particularly the so-called management- or business-model-
approach - which is by definition independent from law - potentially provide an 
appropriate level of objectification.  
Another possible approach (that will be pursued in the following) would be to gear the 
profit determination more strongly towards the cash-principle, as this would lead to more 
uniform and objective legal consequences and thus, largely reduce the scope of 
interpretation. The reason for this is that all countries principally treat cash in- and 
outflows the same way (in contrast to legal terms in national (civil) laws). Accrual 
accounting and periodical adjustments would not be disregarded completely but only 
applied as much as needed. In cases where accruals would still be necessary, legal terms 
and principles have to be specified as precisely as possible to make recurrence to national 
civil law obsolete. The idea of a cash flow-oriented taxation/modified net income method 
is not new (Schneider (1997) p. 273-285, 334-338; Kahle (2002), p. 186; Schreiber 
(2002), p. 108; Herzig (2004); Herzig and Hausen (2004), p. 1-10; Schneider (2004), p. 
302-303)146, it could, however, immensely contribute to further developing a suitable law 
on the determination of taxable profits in the member states.  
                                                 
146 For an EU-wide harmonization of the determination of taxable profits, in particular, see Spengel (2003); 
Kahle and Schulz (2013). 
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4.1.3 Outline and assessment of a cash flow-oriented taxation/modified net 
income method 
4.1.3.1 Features of a cash flow-oriented taxation and differentiation from a pure 
cash flow taxation  
In case of a pure cash flow tax147, the tax base is determined based on cash flow surpluses; 
that is the difference between incoming payments and (current and investment) 
expenditures. Consequently, investment expenses would be tax-free due to an immediate 
write-off (Jacobs and Spengel (1996), p. 112), which in turn would replace the periodic 
recognition of expenses due to regular depreciation. A cash flow tax is neutral towards 
investment and financing decisions and would, therefore, imply the absence of any 
economic distortions.148 Moreover, it would entail other administrative advantages, as 
complex measurement and depreciation provisions would not be necessary anymore. At 
the same time, there would be disadvantages, on the one hand concerning (potential) 
negative effects on tax revenues (Jacobs and Spengel (1996), p. 116 f.), and on the other 
hand with respect to political acceptance, as the concept greatly differs from the current 
systems to determine taxable profits in the member states (McLure and Zodrow (1998), 
p. 2; Auerbach et al. (2010), p. 875). 
In this light, one may consider a cash flow-oriented taxation/modified net income method 
(Herzig (2004); Herzig and Hausen (2004), p. 1-10; Hausen (2008); Schneider (1997), 
p. 273-285, 334-338; Kahle (2002), p. 186; Schreiber (2002), p. 108; Schneider (2004), 
p. 302-303). In contrast to a pure cash flow tax, this concept does not exclusively rely on 
payments, but also includes aspects of accrual accounting. Consequently, the realization 
principle is basically retained (e.g. still recognition of assets and consideration of 
depreciation); however, it is more closely oriented towards the payment date. This 
concept aims at circumventing problems of a pure cash flow taxation, in particular the 
randomness of the timing of payments as well as the related volatility of the tax base. 
Furthermore, its objective is to avoid manipulations which may occur due to a deliberate 
period shifting of payments in case of a pure cash flow tax (Herzig and Hausen (2004), 
p. 4 f.). 
                                                 
147 The cash flow tax can be traced back to Brown (1948). 
148 Regarding the following, see Jacobs (2009), p. 116 ff. with further references. 
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4.1.3.2 Evaluation by reference to the objectives of tax accounting 
If profit determination with a stronger cash flow orientation is taken as a starting point 
for a harmonized tax base within the EU, it needs to be in line with the general objectives 
of tax accounting.  
The objective of tax accounting is to secure an equal treatment of different categories of 
income according to the ability to pay principle (Kirchhof (2002), p. 10).149 The 
commonly accepted yardstick of the ability to pay principle is the income derived during 
one period. It is computed for all taxpayers according to uniform, objectified and non-
arbitrary rules which are clearly and certainly defined in the tax code (Jacobs (1971), 
p. 24-27).150 The decision to tax periodic income requires, at the same time, the 
acknowledgement of the realization, the nominal value and the net principles as corner 
stones for the determination of taxable profit (Herzig and Bär (2003), p. 7; Herzig (2005), 
p. 214-215; Homburg and Bolik (2005), p. 2335), which is already incorporated in the 
DD’s principles. Moreover, the design of the tax base is embedded in the common 
economic requirements for tax systems, namely to improve investment conditions and to 
make locations more attractive for businesses (Sachverständigenrat (2003), no. 558 ff.). 
The DD is also shaped by these principles (European Commission (2011), p. 4 
(Explanation)). On the one hand, this is linked to the call for allowing a loss set-off 
without any restrictions (either with regard to time or amount) (Jacobs et al. (2003), 
p. 524). On the other hand, broadening the tax base is compatible with these objectives 
if, at the same time, tax rates decrease (Oestreicher and Spengel (2003b), p. 936), as this 
reduces the effective tax burden which is crucial for location decisions (Devereux and 
Griffith (1998), p. 29; Haufler and Schjelderup (2000), p. 320; Becker et al. (2006), 
p. 741). Concurrently, interest and liquidity effects of profit determination are diminished 
(Oestreicher and Spengel (2003a), p. 85 ff.). The postulate of decision neutrality, 
however, does not provide specific provisions with regard to the determination of the tax 
base. Analogously, the ability to pay principle is by far too vague in order to deduce 
precise rules for the computation of taxable income. This problem already prevails for the 
clear definition of corporate income (Hennrichs (2001), p. 307-328; Treisch (2001), 
p. 316; Wagner (2002), p. 1888; Weber-Grellet (2002), p. 702). In particular, however, 
this relates to the dualism of income computation according to which income is either 
                                                 
149 This idea can also be found in the theses of the so-called Bareis-Komission (1995) and the Brühler 
Empfehlungen (1999). 
150 In case of a stronger cash flow orientation, the ability to pay principle may be considered the ability to 
pay taxes from one’s income, see Herzig (2004), p. 18. 
110 
computed as profits on an accrual basis or as the difference between receipts and expenses 
on a cash basis. 
Different methods of income determination are not in accordance with the postulate of 
decision neutrality and the ability to pay principle. Thus, it has to be assessed whether 
income should be determined on an accrual basis or on a cash basis for all taxpayers. 
Nevertheless, it has to be noted that such a valuation always follows subjective rather 
than objective criteria. On the one hand, the accrual method does not suit all taxpayers 
because of reasons of simplicity and practicability. On the other hand, it is not possible 
to completely disregard accrual accounting in order to preserve capital (Schneider (1997), 
p. 263). Therefore, a feasible compromise could be to use the accrual method as a starting 
point but at the same time to limit periodical adjustments in accounting rules in order to 
provide for a stronger orientation towards cash flows and thus a greater convergence with 
the cash method. This would require a uniform solution that implies differentiation 
neither according to legal form nor to size. The stronger orientation on cash flows would 
lead to simplicity, practicability151 and at the same time to objectivity and non-
arbitrariness when determining taxable income.  
4.1.3.3 Concretization and implementation issues 
A stronger reliance on cash flows for the determination of taxable profits can only be 
achieved pragmatically. Objectivity and non-arbitrariness demand that the principle of 
individual valuation is respected, and moreover, that accounting options and reporting 
leeway/discretion are replaced through binding rules regarding the capitalisation of 
expenses and the valuation of assets and liabilities. An additional requirement consists in 
removing subsidized preferential tax treatments within tax accounting (e.g. special 
depreciations and non-taxable accruals) from the tax base (Scheffler (2001), p. 153). That 
way, only tax rate cuts or measures linked to the tax liability (e.g. grants, investment 
subsidies and tax credits) may be used in order to guide the economy as intended and to 
stimulate it.  
The content and the scope of the realization principle are of significant importance for the 
timing of revenue recognition as well as for the recognition and measurement of assets. 
The realization principle may be retained as a core matching principle of accrual 
accounting. However, for reasons of objectivity and to avoid undefined legal terms, the 
                                                 
151 The goal is to reduce control costs of financial authorities as well as declaration costs of taxpayers, see 
Kahle and Schulz (2013), p. 54. 
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time of realization needs to be more closely linked to the payment date. We illustrate the 
consequences of a strict cash flow orientation with regard to revenue recognition by using 
the example “sale of goods”. Here, the central question is when to realize the profit, in 
particular in cases where the payment date and the market transaction (delivery of goods) 
do not occur at the same time. The example demonstrates the potential consequences of 
a profit determination based exclusively on cash flows, i.e. a profit realization at the 
payment date. 
a.  Payment after delivery (Alternative 1) 
 
 
 Delivery Payment 
 
Seller No accounting entry Cash (Debit) Sales revenue (Credit) 
  Cost of goods sold expense (Debit) 
Inventories (Credit) 
Buyer No accounting entry Merchandise (Debit) Cash (Credit)  
b.  Payment prior to delivery (Alternative 1) 
 
 
 Payment Delivery 
 
Seller Cash (Debit) Sales Revenue (Credit) No accounting entry 
 Cost of goods sold expense (Debit) 
Inventories (Credit) 
 
Buyer Merchandise (Debit) Cash (Credit) No accounting entry 
A point of criticism is that due to the strict cash flow orientation, profits may be realized 
or postponed as desired without being dependent on the actual market transaction.  
Therefore, in order to prevent manipulation through the intentional shift of cash flows 
between periods, a strict cash flow orientation is not a feasible option. The reporting of 
income and expenses, and thus profits, rather requires that, in addition to cash in- and 
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outflows, the related market transactions have occurred.152 Since, however, different 
countries may interpret and assess market transactions differently, it is necessary to define 
the time of transfer independently from national laws. Correspondingly, regulations could 
still make reference to legal terms, these, however, must not be undefined but clearly 
specified.  
The IFRS may be a possible starting point (e.g. IAS 18.14: Criteria on the recognition of 
revenue from sales of goods) for this. They increasingly dominate international tax 
accounting law and can provide a catalogue of norms (Spengel (2004), p. 143 ff.). 
Moreover, the IFRS already played an important role in developing the DD (Commission 
of the European Communities (2003), p. 22). Specifications would need to explicitly 
become part of the set of rules and must not only be stated by making (dynamic) 
references to international accounting norms.153 The following booking records illustrate 
the legal consequences linked to such an approach. 
c.  Payment after delivery (Alternative 2) 
 
 
 Delivery Payment 
 
Seller Receivables (Debit) Inventories (Credit) Cash (Debit) Sales Revenue (Credit) 
  Cost of goods sold expense (Debit) 
Receivables (Credit) 
Buyer Merchandise (Debit) Accounts payable 
(Credit) 
Accounts payable (Debit) Cash (Credit)  
  
                                                 
152 See also Schneider (1997), p. 280. 
153 See Spengel and Malke (2008), p. 88 ff. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) must have the exclusive 
interpretive competence for a CC(C)TB. 
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d.  Payment prior to delivery (Alternative 2)154 
 
 
 Payment Delivery 
 
Seller Cash (Debit) Prepaid revenue (Credit) Prepaid revenue (Debit) Sales Revenue 
(Credit) 
  Cost of goods sold expense (Debit) 
Inventories (Credit) 
Buyer Prepaid expense (Debit) Cash (Credit)  Merchandise (Debit) Prepaid expense 
(Credit) 
The example shows that the personal attribution of goods depends on the transfer of 
beneficial/economic ownership. Furthermore, it becomes apparent that payments prior to 
the time of delivery need to be neutralized as prepaid revenue by the seller until the market 
transaction occurs (Herzig and Hausen (2004), p. 8). Revenue is only recognized when 
the price risk of the goods is transferred to the buyer. The direct result of such a realization 
accounting is the capitalization of inventories, since expenses tied up in inventory such 
as costs of material have not yet resulted in a market transaction.  
The concept of a stronger cash flow-oriented taxation also requires that assets and 
liabilities are recognized on the balance sheet. Here, it is decisive to define these terms 
clearly and independently of national laws. For example, the term asset could be based 
on the definition of the IFRS. Correspondingly, assets could be specified as resources 
controlled by the enterprise as a result of past events and from which future benefits are 
expected to flow to the enterprise (F. 49a). An exception for self-developed intangible 
assets would be necessary. The recognition of research and development costs on the tax 
balance sheet has always been subject to discussion, in particular due to its questionable 
tangibility (Schülke (2010), p. 992). Moreover, a prohibition to capitalize self-developed 
intangible assets and thus, a direct tax deduction of research and development expenses 
would provide an incentive for innovation. Promotion of research and development is 
also already included in the DD (Art. 12 DD).155 
                                                 
154 In case of long-term production, partly revenue recognition according to the production stage may be 
considered. 
155  The new DD of 2016 also includes super-deductions for research and development costs (see Art. 9 par. 
3 new DD). 
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The definition of liabilities or debt should be in correspondence with F. 49b and amongst 
others also include accounts payable. In contrast, one would need to refrain from the 
profit-effective approach with respect to sales-based receivables156 and the recognition of 
provisions (except for some, see below) as well as of deferred items. Concerning deferred 
items, it might be possible to include exceptions for clear-cut or long-term issues (e.g. 
disagio (Herzig and Hausen (2004), p. 9-10), if uncommon on the market or accruals for 
more than five years) to limit the susceptibility to manipulation of a cash flow orientation. 
However, the imparity principle, which becomes manifest in the anticipative 
consideration of losses through partial write-downs and provisions for contingent losses, 
should be renounced, as it impedes an equal treatment of different categories of income. 
Additionally, the principle of prudence serves the protection of creditors’ interests which 
is only important for financial accounting but not for tax accounting (Weber-Grellet 
(1998), p. 1344). In order to guarantee that the treasury equally participates in losses and 
profits, the imparity principle as well as the limited possibility to form tax-free reserves 
(Kahle (2002), p. 186; Schreiber (2002), p. 109; Schneider (2004), p. 303; Kahle (2014), 
p. 17), which serve as ‘loss buffer’, for example, through the set-up of accrued liabilities 
can, in theory, only be abandoned if an unlimited interest bearing loss set-off is introduced 
at the same time. Thus, the improvement of tax loss set-off modalities is a key factor if 
the accrual method shall be restricted. If restrictions of the loss set-off remain, this will 
be inconsistent with the limitations of loss provisions within tax accounting; thus, the 
imparity principle and the principle of prudence would also have to be retained, at least 
partially. 
The following example serves to illustrate the relationship between recognizing 
provisions and perfect loss compensation. We assume that a recultivation obligation with 
a settlement value of 120 Monetary Units (MU) in T = 0 has been incurred and is due at 
the beginning of period T = 4. Periodical surpluses are given and an interest of 10% is 
accrued; the tax rate amounts to 40%. Cash flows before taxes occur in such a way (Table 
18) that periodic cash flows including investment returns just suffice to fulfil the 
recultivation obligation. 
  
                                                 
156 Receivables are recognized with the acquisition and production costs until the receipt of payment (see 
example c)). See Schneider (1997), p. 280. 
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Table 18: Cash flow before taxes 
 T = 1 T = 2 T = 3 T = 4 
Cash flow before taxes 33.06 36.36 40.00 -120.00 
Investment returns 
(10%) 
- 3.31 7.27 - 
Investment amount - 33.06 72.73 120.00 
Reinvestment 33.06 72.73 120.00 0.00 
If we assume a tax rate of 40% and that a provision can be recognized, the consequences 
presented in Table 19 result. In this case, we presuppose an accumulation provision that 
is discounted at 10%. 
Table 19: Cash flow after taxes, with provision 
 T = 1 T = 2 T = 3 T = 4 
Cash flow before taxes 33.06 36.36 40.00 -120.00 
Investment returns 
(10%) 
- 3.31 7.27 - 
Investment amount - 33.06 72.73 120.00 
Allocation to provisions 33.06 39.67 47.27 -120.00 
Amount of provisions 33.06 72.73 120.00 0.00 
Profit 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Tax (40%) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Reinvestment 33.06 72.73 120.00 0.00 
Since no tax payments occur due to the recognition of provisions leading to expenses, 
periodic cash flows including investment returns suffice to fulfil the recultivation 
obligation. This only holds true under the assumption that it is allowed to create an 
accumulation provision at the amount of the settlement value. 
In contrast, if we assume that recognizing provisions should be renounced, cash flow 
consequences (Table 20) strongly depend on whether a loss deduction is possible and 
whether it is interest-bearing.  
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Table 20: Cash flow after taxes, without provision 
 T = 1 T = 2 T = 3 T = 4 
Cash flow before taxes 33.06 36.36 40.00 -120.00 
Investment returns 
(10%) 
- 1.98 4.28 - 
Investment amount - 19.84 42.84 69.41 
Profit 33.06 38.34 44.28 -120.00 
Tax (40%) 
a) No loss carry-
back 
b) Loss carry-back 
c) Interest-bearing 
loss carry-back 
-13.22 -15.34 -17.71  
0.00 
48.00 
50.59 
Reinvestment financing 
deficit 
a) 
b) 
c) 
19.84 42.84 69.41  
 
50.59 
2.59 
0.00 
It becomes apparent that if recognizing provisions is renounced and at the same time loss 
carry-backs are prohibited, a significant funding deficit occurs (50.59 MU = 120 MU – 
69.41 MU). Even allowing a simple loss deduction of 48 MU (= 120 MU * 0.4) cannot 
eliminate this financing deficit completely (remaining financing deficit: 2.59 MU = 120 
MU – 69.41 MU – 48 MU).157 Only in case of a timely unlimited interest-bearing loss 
compensation, there are no disadvantages compared to recognizing provisions158 such 
that the latter could be renounced. This precondition, however, is not fulfilled, as neither 
the DD nor common national law include such unlimited loss compensation rules. For 
example Germany, Sec. 10d EStG only grants a one-year loss carry-back as well as a 
timely unlimited loss carry-forward, and both of these are limited concerning the amount 
and are non-interest-bearing. The DD also only includes an unlimited loss carry-forward, 
but no (interest-bearing) loss carry-back (Art. 43 DD).  
In case of a persistent limitation of tax-related loss offsetting, there are no sound 
arguments against periodization by means of provisions. This, in particular, concerns 
issues leading to tax-related losses, that can no longer be compensated for or are not 
deductible any more at the end of the total period (i.e. at the closure of a firm) and thus, 
are under the threat of being lost. Therefore, it would be necessary to allow for allocation 
                                                 
157 We assume that other taxable profits were generated in T=1-3, that can be offset against the excess loss 
carryback of 4.32 MU (=120 MU – 33.06 MU – 38.34 MU – 44.28 MU). 
158 The advantage results from the interest on taxes paid beyond what is required, which in turn, are again 
subject to taxation. 2.59 MU = 1.67 MU (=13.22 MU *(1.12-1)*(1-0.4) + 0.92 MU (=15.34*(1.12-
1)*(1-0.4))). 
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and accumulation provisions for tax purposes in case of long-term cumulative obligations 
like for example demolition, disposal, set-aside, recultivation and backfilling obligations. 
Additionally, the recognition of pension provisions should be allowed. To avoid the 
problem of undefined legal terms in the context of recognizing provisions, the set of rules 
would need to incorporate precise definitions and concretizations, e.g. on obligations 
coming into force from an economic or from a legal perspective, that again could be based 
on the IFRS.159 Consequently, the point in time when a provision takes effect would need 
to be based on economic criteria that are interpreted uniformly in the entire EU. Short-
term provisions for contingent liabilities (e.g. costs of vacation, guarantee and warranty 
claims or annual financial statement costs) should not be included in a cash flow-oriented 
profit determination, as they are materially less significant (Herzig and Hausen (2004), 
p. 8-9). 
A cash flow-oriented profit determination also has effects on the valuation of assets and 
liabilities. Central valuation standards are historical acquisition costs and costs of 
production, respectively. To treat acquisition and production processes equally, and to 
ensure that the production process remains income-neutral until the time of the market 
transaction, production costs need to be based on full costs including overheads expenses. 
The acquisition and production costs of assets need to be depreciated straight-line over 
the economic useful life for reasons of objectivity. For reasons of simplicity and 
practicability, so-called pool depreciation could also be a potential option (Oestreicher 
and Spengel (2003b), p. 933-934). Accordingly, measurement is carried out according to 
amortized acquisition and production costs rather than fair values.160 Permanent 
impairments due to economic or technical wear entitle to exceptional write-offs. The 
concept of a cash flow-oriented profit determination, however, does not encompass the 
imparity principle. According to this principle, risks and losses are already taken into 
account when they are anticipated at the reporting date but are not yet confirmed at the 
market.161 For this reason, the concept of a cash flow-oriented profit determination does 
not allow exceptional depreciation relating to a mere reduction in value, which would 
result from the imparity principle.162 For the valuation of inventories, simplifications 
(simplified measurement methods) need to be allowed for reasons of practicability 
                                                 
159 According to IAS 37, provisions should be created if the event for which the provision is created is 
likely to occur (more likely than not) and if the amount of the provision can be estimated reliably. 
160 An exception could be made concerning financial instruments. 
161 For details on the imparity principle, see Leffson (1987), p. 339-426. 
162 For the differences between a regular depreciation and a current value depreciation, see e.g. Scheffler 
(2011), p. 249 f. 
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(Schneider (1997), p. 287-294). To avoid reporting leeway, it is necessary to prescribe a 
specific method and not to allow for any reporting options. The weighted average method 
shall be applied in this regard.163 Provisions should be recognized at the present value of 
expenditures required to settle the obligation (based on IAS 37). For this purpose, a 
standardized interest rate should be set to limit potential fluctuations. Future increases in 
prices and costs should not be considered. 
In general, we thus can conclude that the cash flow-oriented taxation/modified net income 
method is subject to a trade-off. In cases where, for reasons of objectivity, it is sensible 
to strictly rely on cash flows, no periodization/accrual accounting takes place. If mere 
cash flows lead to results that are unsatisfying and susceptible to manipulation, 
periodization is maintained (see e.g. prepaid expenses/revenue, inventories, long-term 
provisions). With respect to this, it is necessary to avoid undefined legal terms and to 
incorporate specific definitions and concretizations in the set of rules. These could 
definitely be based on the international accounting standards (Spengel and Oestreicher 
(1998); Spengel (2003), p. 34; Endres et al. (2007), p. 1079). In cases where the concept 
of a cash flow-oriented taxation/modified net income method does not state concrete rules 
(e.g. for depreciation), regulations should be based on the common state practice of the 
EU-28 (Spengel and Zöllkau (2012)) to enhance the political enforceability of the 
proposal. 
In the following section, we compare the concept of a cash flow-oriented 
taxation/modified net income method to the rules of the CC(C)TB DD. We present in 
detail which rules of the proposed concept correspond to the rules of the DD and which 
of the DD’s rules would need to be modified to comply with the concept of a cash flow-
oriented taxation. This comparison will also illustrate in which areas there are undefined 
legal terms in the DD. We show how these can be defined in such a way that they can 
become part of the concept of a cash flow-oriented taxation/modified net income method 
(thereafter only: cash flow-oriented taxation). We compare the proposal of a cash flow-
oriented taxation not only with the original DD of 16 March 2011 (first comparison level), 
but also with the compromise proposal of 14 October 2013 (P-LTU).164 However, we 
only explicitly go into the second level of comparison, if the rules of the DD and the P-
LTU differ. 
                                                 
163 This method is the most widely spread in current state practice, see Spengel and Zöllkau (2012), p. 47. 
164 See Council of the European Union (2013). 
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Even if the recently published DD of 2016 (European Commission (2016e, 2016f))165 has 
basically replaced the original DD of 2011 (European Commission (2011)), our 
subsequent analysis which focuses on the details of the 2011 DD and the P-LTU is, in 
principle, still valid. Although the two versions vary in some detailed regulations, the 
main difference lies in the explicit inclusion of the two-step procedure in the 2016 DD, 
which is also supported by our approach. In addition, the outlined main problem of 
undefined legal terms (see section 4.1.2.3) remains. Therefore, our key results as well as 
the derived actions for recommendation still hold. 
4.1.4 Comparison of the proposal of a cash flow-oriented taxation/modified net 
income method and the Discussion Draft 
4.1.4.1 Individual analysis 
Recognition of revenue and expenditures 
With respect to the concept of a cash flow-oriented taxation, “payment after the delivery 
of a good” and “payment before the delivery of a good” have to be distinguished regarding 
the time of revenue recognition. If a payment takes place after the good is delivered, 
revenue is only recognized at the time of payment. The resulting consequence is that at 
the time of delivery, the seller records receivables in an income-neutral way as the amount 
of acquisition and production costs of the good sold. If the price has already been paid 
before the good is delivered, revenue is only recognized when the price risk is transferred. 
At the time of payment, the seller records a prepaid revenue in an income neutral manner.  
According to the DD, profits are recognised when they are realized (Art. 9 par. 1 DD). In 
accordance with the DD, this is the point in time at which the right to receive arises, i.e. 
when a receivable occurs, and the amount of revenue can be quantified with reasonable 
accuracy (Art. 18 DD). In case of payment after the good is delivered, revenue is already 
recognized at the time of transfer. If payments are made before the good is delivered, the 
seller needs to record a prepaid revenue income-neutrally. Revenue is only recognized 
once the sold good has been transferred.  
In case of payment before delivery, the concept of a cash flow-oriented taxation and the 
DD are in accordance with one another. There are differences, however, if a payment 
takes place after delivery. If we were to follow the proposal of a cash flow-oriented 
                                                 
165  The Allowance for growth and investment (AGI) (Art. 11 new DD) will not be considered in our 
analysis as it would constitute a step towards a consumption-oriented taxation and would not be 
compatible with income taxation. 
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taxation, the realization principle in Art. 18 DD would require adaption. The P-LTU 
expands and substantiates the accrual of revenues (Art. 18 P-LTU), but these changes do 
not move more towards the concept of a cash flow-oriented taxation.  
According to the concept of a cash flow-oriented taxation, accounts payable as well as 
prepaid expenses are recorded income-neutrally, analogously to receivables and prepaid 
revenue. This income-neutral recording is possible through the recognition of assets in 
case of a purchase of goods. Expenditures for assets not subject to regular depreciation 
are recorded at the time of disposal. Expenditures for assets that can be depreciated 
regularly and for raw materials and supplies as well as goods are recorded at the time of 
consumption. The DD and the concept of a cash flow-oriented taxation equal each other 
concerning the recognition of expenditures. 
Assets 
According to the concept of a cash flow-oriented taxation, assets should encompass 
resources controlled by the enterprise as a result of past events and from which future 
benefits are expected to flow to the enterprise (F. 49a IFRS). As the DD does not provide 
a definition of the term asset, this definition could be incorporated into the DD. 
According to the concept of a cash flow-oriented taxation, there should be a general 
obligation to recognize assets. Only for self-developed intangibles, this should be 
prohibited. In so far, this is in line with the DD. 
Assets are attributed to their economic owner in accordance with the concept of a cash 
flow-oriented taxation and the DD (Art. 4 no. 20, Art. 34 par. 1, 3 DD). The economic 
owner is the person who has substantially all the benefits and risks attached to an asset, 
regardless of whether that person is the legal owner. A taxpayer who has the right to 
possess, use and dispose of a fixed asset and bears the risk of its loss or destruction shall 
in any event be considered the economic owner (Art. 4 no. 20 DD). The rules of the DD 
on economic ownership, which are based on IAS 17 (Kahle and Schulz (2011), p. 300-
301), are in line with the concept of a cash flow-oriented taxation. 
The concept of a cash flow-oriented taxation stipulates an initial measurement of assets 
at their acquisition and production costs. Production costs should encompass direct as 
well as indirect costs of producing the asset. Only administrative overheads are not to be 
included in the production costs. According to the DD, assets are valued at their 
acquisition and production costs (Art. 33 par. 1 s. 1 DD) as well. Whether indirect costs 
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have to be taken into account is, however, subject to controversial discussion.166 The P-
LTU does incorporate a definition of acquisition and production costs (Art. 33 par. 1 s. 2 
P-LTU). But it is still unclear which components production costs are made of. The 
definition, however, can be interpreted in such a way that only direct costs have to be 
considered (Scheffler and Köstler (2014a), p. 667). 
The measurement of assets at their acquisition or production costs is in general consistent 
comparing the concept of a cash flow-oriented taxation and the DD. Yet, as up to now, it 
remains unclear what the production costs are composed of according to the DD. 
Therefore, the definition of production costs as included in the concept of a cash flow-
oriented taxation should be used in the DD.  
The concept of a cash flow-oriented taxation allows simplified measurement methods for 
the valuation of inventories. The proposal stipulates no accounting options with regard to 
the method but prescribes a binding rule to limit the scope of discretion. The DD allows 
the valuation of inventories, unfinished and finished goods according to the First-In First-
Out (FIFO) method or the method of the weighted average (Art. 29 par. 1 s. 2 DD). The 
P-LTU proposes to also allow the Last-In First-Out (LIFO) method for the measurement 
of inventories (Art. 21 par. 2 l. a no. ii P-LTU). To adjust the DD to the concept of a cash 
flow-oriented taxation, this option should be abolished and, based on the common state 
practice, the method of the weighted average should be introduced bindingly (Spengel 
and Zöllkau (2012), p. 46 f.). 
The concept of a cash flow-oriented taxation prescribes regular amortisation for fixed 
assets that are depreciable. The rules on depreciation of the DD are the following: long-
life tangible assets and intangible assets are subject to individual depreciation on a 
straight-line basis over 15 years, independently of their actual useful life (Art. 36 par. 1 
DD). Long-life tangibles mean fixed tangible assets with a useful life of 15 years and 
more. Buildings, aircraft, and ships shall be deemed to be long-life fixed tangible assets 
(Art. 4 no. 16 DD). There is an exception concerning buildings. These have to be 
depreciated straight-line over 40 years (Art. 36 par. 1 l. a DD). Short-term tangibles, i.e. 
tangible assets with a useful life of less than 15 years (reverse of Art. 4 no. 16 and Art. 36 
DD), are included in an asset pool, that is subject to an infinite geometrical declining 
                                                 
166 For an interpretation of the DD stating that only direct costs have to be considered for the production 
cost, see Scheffler and Krebs (2011), p. 18; Spengel and Zöllkau (2012), p. 45 f. For an interpretation 
stating that also indirect costs have to be considered for the cost of production, see Kahle and Schulz 
(2011), p. 299. 
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balance depreciation at a depreciation rate of 25 % (Art. 39 par. 1 DD). The set 
amortization periods as well as the pool depreciation rate are only compromise solutions 
and agreements, which could definitely be discussed and modified. Objectively, there is 
no correct depreciation rule. The rules of the DD should, therefore, be adjusted to 
common state practice to enhance the enforceability of the proposal (Spengel and Zöllkau 
(2012), p. 60 ff.). Consequently, there should be no untypically long straight-line 
depreciation for buildings over 40 years but a depreciation over 35 years, which is the 
mean identified when comparing country practices. In contrast to this, pool depreciation 
for tangible assets is less widely spread and is considered as rather generous. Common 
straight-line depreciation should replace this pool depreciation, and should be conducted 
based on the useful life for reasons of simplicity.  
The concept of a cash flow-oriented taxation includes no exceptional depreciation due to 
a mere decrease in value neither for fixed assets nor for current assets. In case of a 
permanent impairment due to economic or technical wear (e.g. loss, destruction), 
however, the concept does envisage exceptional depreciation for fixed and current assets. 
One example is the write-off of a receivable if there is a definite payment default.  
The DD includes an option for exceptional depreciation for fixed assets not subject to 
regular depreciation if its value has permanently decreased (Art. 41 par. 1 DD). For fixed 
assets that are subject to regular depreciation, exceptional depreciation is not possible 
(reverse of Art. 41 par. 1 DD). For inventories, there is an obligation for exceptional 
depreciation regardless of whether the impairment is permanent or not (Art. 29 par. 4, 
Art. 23 par. 2 DD). For receivables, the DD includes a general value adjustment (Art. 27 
par. l. a s. 2 DD). 
To adapt the DD to the concept of a cash flow-oriented taxation, it is necessary to abolish 
the option for exceptional depreciation in case of a permanent impairment for fixed assets 
that are not subject to regular depreciation. Instead, the obligation for exceptional 
depreciation in case of a permanent impairment due to economic or technical wear should 
be introduced. The P-LTU does include an obligation for exceptional depreciation. 
However, it applies regardless of the duration of the impairment, i.e. also in case of a non-
permanent decrease. According to the concept of a cash flow-oriented taxation, 
exceptional depreciation should be limited to permanent impairments. For fixed assets 
that are subject to regular depreciation, there is a devaluation prohibition regardless of the 
duration of the impairment according to the DD. The DD needs to incorporate a 
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devaluation obligation for these assets in case of a permanent impairment due to economic 
or technical wear. Concerning inventories, the DD needs to be changed. It should limit 
the obligation for exceptional depreciation regardless of whether the impairment is 
permanent or non-permanent and only include the obligation of exceptional depreciation 
if there is a permanent impairment due to economic or technical wear. Instead of the 
general value adjustment for receivables, the DD should incorporate an individual value 
adjustment for bad debt.  
According to the concept of a cash flow-oriented taxation, the subsequent measurement 
of financial assets held for trading is carried out based on acquisition costs, and not fair 
value. Therefore, there is no exceptional depreciation and write-up in case of a loss or 
increase in value regardless of the duration. According to the DD, financial assets held 
for trading are valued at their fair value (Art. 22 par. 1 l. e DD) which comprises that 
decreases as well as increases in value need to be recorded. Following the proposal of a 
cash flow-oriented taxation, valuation of financial assets held for trading would need to 
be adjusted to the extent that these financial assets would need to be valued at their 
acquisition costs. Valuating financial assets held for trading at their market value, as 
proposed by the P-LTU (Art. 22 par. 1 l. d P-LTU), does not move the DD closer to the 
concept of a cash flow-oriented taxation.  
Liabilities 
According to the concept of a cash flow-oriented taxation, liabilities are to be defined as 
present obligations of the enterprise arising from past events, the settlement of which is 
expected to result in an outflow from the enterprise of resources embodying economic 
benefits (F. 49b). As the DD does not provide a definition for the term liability, it could 
incorporate this definition. 
The proposal of a cash flow-oriented taxation defines provisions based on IAS 37 as a 
liability of uncertain timing or amount. These are to be recognized when an entity has a 
present obligation as a result of a past event, it is probable that an outflow of resources 
embodying economic benefits will be required to settle the obligation and a reliable 
estimate can be made of the amount of the obligation. According to Art. 25 DD, 
provisions are recognized for legal or probable future legal obligations if the amount 
arising from that obligation can be reliably estimated. This definition principally equals 
the proposal of a cash flow-oriented taxation. Additionally, the undefined legal terms 
included in the DD, as e.g. the legal coming into force of an obligation, should be 
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substantiated and explicitly defined in the DD based on IAS 37 (amongst others, the more-
likely-than-not-criterion). 
The concept of a cash flow-oriented taxation as well as the DD include the recognition of 
provisions for long-term, contingent obligations as well as of distribution and 
accumulation provisions including pension provisions, but not of provisions for good will 
or (operating) expenses. The P-LTU, however, introduces an option for member states 
concerning the recognition of pension provisions, which leads to a deviation from the 
concept of a cash flow-oriented taxation. This option for member states should not be 
granted. 
Provisions for onerous contracts are also not to be recognized according to the concept of 
a cash flow-oriented taxation. Whether provisions for contingent losses from pending 
transactions can be considered according to the DD is questionable.167 If the excess 
liability concerning pending transactions stems from a contract concluded in the past, 
provisions for onerous contracts may be considered and recognized as a subtype of 
provisions for contingent obligations (Scheffler and Köstler (2013), p. 2194). Introducing 
a recognition prohibition for provisions for onerous contracts in the P-LTU (Art. 25 par. 3 
l. a P-LTU) moves the DD closer to the concept of a cash flow-oriented taxation.  
Unlike in the concept of a cash flow-oriented taxation, short-term provisions for 
contingent obligations have to be recognized according to the DD (Art. 19 l. a, b, Art. 25 
par. 1 s. 1 DD). The obligation to recognize short-term provisions for contingent 
obligations should be eliminated in the DD to achieve greater conformity with the concept 
of a cash flow-oriented taxation.  
The concept of a cash flow-oriented taxation measures provisions at the present value of 
the expected future payment obligation. A standardized interest rate should be provided 
and future increases in price and cost should not be taken into account. The DD 
establishes that provisions need to be recognized at the expenditure required to settle the 
present obligation at the end of the tax year, based on reliable estimates (Art. 25 par. 2, 
Art. 26 DD). In measuring provisions, all risks and uncertainties as well as future events 
(e.g. increases in price and cost) need to be considered. Provisions with a minimum term 
of twelve months have to be discounted at the yearly average of the Euribor interest rate. 
As the DD also recognizes provisions at the present value of the expected future payment 
                                                 
167 For a consideration of provisions for onerous contracts, see Herzig and Kuhr, (2011b), p. 312; Kahle 
and Schulz (2011), p. 301 f.; Marx (2011), p. 550; Scheffler and Krebs (2011), p. 22. Doubting, see 
Petutschnig (2011), p. 329. 
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obligation, the measurement methods of the DD and the concept of a cash flow-oriented 
taxation in principal correspond to each other. The interest rate, however, needs to be 
standardized to avoid potential fluctuations and discretion. Based on the common state 
practice, it could be set at 5% (Spengel and Zöllkau (2012), p. 54).168 In addition, future 
increases in price and cost should not be considered. This has already been implemented 
in the P-LTU (Art. 25 par. 3 l. a P-LTU). 
The concept of a cash flow-oriented taxation principally excludes the recognition of 
deferred items. Only long-term deferred items and a disagio - if it is uncommon on the 
market or if the accrual occurs over 5 years - can be recognized. The DD does not 
comprise explicit rules for deferred items. However, one can derive a recognition 
obligation for transitory and anticipative deferred items from the rules on accrual 
accounting of revenue (Art. 18 DD) and deductible expenses (Art. 19 DD). This 
recognition obligation applies to short-term as well as long-term deferred items. To 
achieve compliance with the concept of a cash flow-oriented taxation, the DD should 
incorporate a rule that establishes clearly that only long-term deferred items and the 
disagio - if it is uncommon on the market or the accrual occurs over 5 years - can be 
recognized.  
The concept of a cash flow-oriented taxation accepts that loss deduction in (common 
state) practice is not perfect. The DD also does not include a perfect loss compensation, 
i.e. no (interest-bearing) loss carry-back but only a loss carry-forward that is limited 
concerning amount and time169. This rule could definitely be accepted for reasons of 
practicability.  
4.1.4.2 Evaluation 
Some sections of the DD already consider aspects of a cash flow-oriented taxation. The 
rules of the two concepts are in line concerning the following issues: time of revenue 
recognition when selling goods (payment before delivery), time of revenue recognition 
when purchasing goods, principal obligation of recognizing assets and initial 
measurement of assets at their acquisition or production costs. 
                                                 
168 This is the mean of the relevant countries’ current interest rates. 
169 The P-LTU limits loss carry-forwards to a percentage of the tax base that still needs to be defined 
(Art. 43 par. 2 P-LTU). 
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There are deviations with respect to the time of revenue recognition when selling goods 
(payment after transfer), the extent of the costs of production, the simplified measurement 
methods, the subsequent valuation of financial assets held for trade, and deferred items.  
The DD does not stringently implement the imparity principle. For fixed assets that are 
not subject to regular depreciation and for current assets, it does incorporate the imparity 
principle in the form of an exceptional depreciation in case of a decrease in value. 
However, this does not apply to assets that are subject to regular depreciation. The 
concept of a cash flow-oriented taxation consistently refrains from applying the imparity 
principle. Consequently, there is a difference between the DD and the concept of a cash 
flow-oriented taxation regarding the exceptional depreciation of fixed assets not subject 
to regular depreciation and current assets. The concept of a cash flow-oriented taxation 
only allows an exceptional depreciation for a permanent impairment due to economic or 
technical wear, but no current-value depreciation. There is also a deviation with regard to 
fixed assets that are subject to regular depreciation. The DD as well as the concept of a 
cash flow-oriented taxation do not include an exceptional depreciation due to the imparity 
principle. However, the concept of a cash flow-oriented taxation in this case also allows 
an exceptional depreciation if there is a permanent impairment due to economic or 
technical wear. Concerning the regular depreciation of assets, it is the orientation towards 
the common state practice that leads to deviations between the cash flow-oriented taxation 
and the DD.  
The rules of the concept of a cash flow-oriented taxation relating to the periodization of 
long-term liabilities equal the DD in great part. There are similarities with respect to the 
obligation of recognizing long-term, contingent liabilities and regarding distribution and 
accumulation provisions including pension provisions as well as with regard to the ban 
on recognizing good will provisions, provisions for onerous contracts and for (operating) 
expenditures. They basically also correspond with regard to the measurement of 
provisions and the limited loss deduction. The P-LTU, however, introduces an option for 
the member states to recognize pension provisions, thereby increasing the difference to 
the concept of a cash flow-oriented taxation. There are also deviations with regard to the 
recognition of short-term provisions for contingent liabilities.  
The concept of a cash flow-oriented taxation suggests the clarification of undefined legal 
terms by referring to economic criteria. It uses the IFRS as a starting point. The DD 
provides such an approach for the definition of economic ownership. Thus, the two 
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concepts are in line regarding personal attribution. The DD lacks, however, definitions of 
the terms asset and liability. Thus, the concept requires adaption with respect to these 
terms. The definition of provisions is principally the same, however, the DD needs further 
concretization. 
In conclusion, we find that in some areas the DD is already in line with the principles of 
a cash flow-oriented taxation (e.g. periodization of long-term liabilities). Further adaption 
is necessary, in particular regarding the cash-principle, the abolishment of existing 
accounting options (e.g. for simplified measurement methods) and discretion as well as 
the specification of undefined legal terms (based on the IFRS). These changes and thus a 
greater movement of the DD’s principles towards a more strongly cash-oriented profit 
determination would lead to more clarity and uniformity as well as to less scope for 
opportunistic reporting behavior. This is due to the fact that our concept would induce a 
full detachment of the determination of taxable profits from financial accounts and, thus, 
a transition to a two-book oriented system without any tax sheltering opportunities. 
Therefore, only legal/deterministic deviations between tax and financial accounts (book-
tax differences) may still occur. 
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4.1.5 Quantitative impact assessment of a harmonised tax base according to 
the CCTB as well as the concept of a cash flow-oriented taxation  
The political consensus on a harmonised tax base likely depends on the country specific 
reform consequences on effective tax burdens and tax revenues. To this end, the Centre 
for European Economic Research (ZEW) and the University of Mannheim have 
conducted several studies to examine the quantitative consequences of the CCCTB-DD 
as well as of the concept of a cash flow-oriented taxation (e.g. Spengel et al. (2012); Evers 
et al. (2014a); Evers et al. (2015)). More precisely, the changes in effective tax burdens 
induced by the introduction of a CCTB or a cash flow-oriented taxation respectively have 
been quantified for each of the 28 EU member states for fiscal year 2013 based on the 
European Tax Analyzer which simulates the tax burden of an average European firm over 
a ten-year period. The model firm is calibrated based on financial accounts data taken 
from the AMADEUS database. The approach allows accounting for many important 
regulations stipulated in the DD and by the method of a cash flow-oriented taxation in 
great detail. The most important results/findings are summarized in the following:170  
The quantitative analysis of both reform concepts (see Figure 5) illustrates that profit 
determination according to the 2011 DD as well as individual regulatory components of 
the concept of a cash flow-oriented taxation only cause slight changes in tax burdens. 
Whereas in case of the DD, there is a slight reduction of on average -0.23%, the concept 
of a cash flow-oriented taxation leads to a slight increase in tax burdens of 0.38%. In case 
of both concepts, wide dispersion regarding tax burdens in the EU-28 states remains. The 
changes in the country ranking are also minor.  
                                                 
170  For more details, see Evers et al. (2014a); Evers et al. (2015). 
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Figure 5: Change in effective tax burdens related to the introduction of a cash-flow oriented taxation 
and the DD for the EU-28 
 
The isolated analysis of individual components shows that with regard to the regulations 
on depreciation, overall, a similar effect (increase in tax burden of 0.24% or 0.23%) can 
be observed. In both scenarios, the depreciation regulations exert the greatest influence 
on the total change in tax burden. However, the depreciation procedures according to the 
concept of a cash flow-oriented taxation are more strongly based on the taxation 
regulations of the member states than the ones of the DD. Regarding the valuation of 
inventories, the concept of a cash flow-oriented taxation causes a stronger impact on tax 
burden due to the full cost approach which is less widespread in the EU. However, both 
concepts include the transition towards the average method. Compared to the DD, we 
observe significantly smaller effects with regard to pension obligations for the concept of 
a cash flow-oriented taxation. This is because the fixed interest rate of 5% complies much 
more with the taxation practices of the countries than with the very low Euribor interest 
rate. The prohibition of recognizing warranty provisions is linked to a slighter deviation 
of tax burden in absolute terms. Principally, countries whose national tax law allows the 
recognition of provisions experience an increase in tax burden. The two approaches are 
conceptionally equal regarding dividend exemption. Thus, the quantitative analysis 
shows no differences. On average, both concepts cause a slight reduction in tax burden in 
comparison to national law. 
Overall, we can assume lower tax-related compliance costs as well as better political 
enforceability of the concept of a cash flow-oriented taxation compared to the DD for the 
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following reasons: the on average positive deviation of effective tax burdens, its 
conceptional strengths and its stronger orientation towards the taxation practices of the 
EU member states.  
4.1.6 Summary 
(1)  With regard to the CCCTB-DD, proposed by the European Commission in March 
2011, a two-step procedure as a starting point for harmonizing taxable profits in 
Europe is preferable. This approach has also been adopted by the recently published 
revised proposal for a CC(C)TB (October 2016). This stepwise strategy suggests 
merely aligning the provisions for the determination of the corporate tax base 
(CCTB) in a first step. Consolidation and apportionment are only to be implemented 
in a second step at a later point in time. 
(2)  The proposed CCTB rules are in principle appropriate for harmonizing the tax base 
in Europe. The DD lacks, however, detailed definitions of legal terms as well as a 
clear legal concept for special issues in tax accounting such that there are still 
numerous regulatory gaps as well as room for interpretation. These cannot be 
eliminated by referring to national (civil) laws.  
(3)  A possible solution would be to base the harmonization of tax bases in Europe 
(CCTB) on a cash flow-oriented taxation/modified net income method. This 
concept would gear profit determination more strongly towards the cash-principle 
and limit accrual accounting and periodical adjustments. 
(4)  In some areas, the DD is already in line with the principles of a cash flow-oriented 
taxation (e.g. periodization of long-term liabilities). Further adaption is necessary 
in particular regarding the cash-principle, the abolishment of existing accounting 
options and discretion as well as the specification of undefined legal terms. These 
changes and thus a greater movement of the DD’s principles towards a more 
strongly cash-oriented profit determination would lead to more clarity and 
uniformity and, at the same time, induce a transition to a two-book oriented system 
with less scope for tax sheltering. 
(5)  Changes in tax burdens are likely to be minor. A quantitative analysis of the 
effective tax burdens of corporations in each of the 28 EU member states illustrates 
that profit determination according to the DD as well as individual regulatory 
components of the concept of a cash flow-oriented taxation only cause slight 
changes in tax burdens compared to national law. 
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(6)  Whereas in case of the DD, there is a slight reduction of on average -0.23%, the 
concept of a cash flow-oriented taxation leads to a slight increase in tax burdens of 
0.38%. Regulations on depreciation, the valuation of inventories as well as the 
recognition and measurement of provisions are important factors influencing these 
tax effects. 
(7)  From a conceptional point of view, the cash flow-oriented taxation is superior to 
the DD. Furthermore, its stronger orientation towards the taxation practices of the 
EU member states would imply lower tax-related compliance costs as well as an 
increased political enforceability. 
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4.2 Transparency in Financial Reporting: Is Country-by-Country Reporting 
suitable to combat international profit shifting? 
4.2.1 Introduction 
Tax planning efforts of highly profitable US multinationals such as Google, Apple or 
Amazon and their extremely low effective tax rates on their non-US profits have become 
the subject of intense public debate over the last years.171 The fact that these companies 
pay almost no corporate taxes in the foreign jurisdictions they operate in can most likely 
be attributed to activities aimed at shifting profits to tax havens. To this end, companies 
effectively exploit gaps and loopholes in international tax laws, such that their endeavors 
do not in general classify as illegal. Yet, the acceptability of such activities from a social 
and ethical point of view is widely discussed; some call it ‘aggressive’ even though a 
clear distinction between ‘acceptable’ and ‘aggressive’ tax planning is hard to define. 
Although there have been several attempts to quantify the scale of profit shifting,172 no 
accurate estimate of the exact amount of profits transferred to low tax jurisdictions exists 
to date. There is, however, reason to believe that the problem has been considerably 
overestimated.173 Nevertheless, empirical evidence clearly shows that profit shifting 
within multinationals does indeed take place regardless of the specific industry sector. In 
that respect, several channels have been identified: On the one hand, international tax rate 
differentials are found to be the major driver of profit shifting (Grubert and Mutti (1991); 
Hines and Rice (1994); Huizinga and Laeven (2008); Egger et al. (2010); Dharmapala 
and Riedel (2013); Fuest et al. (2011); Heckemeyer and Overesch (2013)). On the other 
hand, debt financing as well as transfer pricing in general and licensing of Intellectual 
Property (IP) in particular are identified as the most important channels to relocate profits 
(Desai et al. (2004); Buettner at al. (2012); Clausing (2003); Desai et al. (2006); 
Dischinger and Riedel (2011); Karkinsky and Riedel (2012); Lohse and Riedel (2013); 
Dharmapala (2014)). Here, transfer pricing rather than debt financing turns out to be the 
dominant channel for profit shifting (Heckemeyer and Overesch (2013), p. 30). 
                                                 
171  For a detailed discussion see Fuest et al. (2013). 
172  Murphy assumes that tax evasion and tax avoidance costs the EU member states 1 Trillion € a year, see 
Murphy (2012), p. 2; according to Bach, in Germany the yearly revenue loss due to profit shifting 
amounts to ca. 90 Billion €, see Bach (2013), p. 3 ff.; Heckemeyer and Spengel, however, assume the 
revenue loss in Germany to be less than 10 Billion € and therefore much lower, see Heckemeyer and 
Spengel (2008), p. 54; Oxfam calculates a revenue loss of $ 50 Billion for developing countries, see 
Oxfam (2000). 
173  The OECD estimates a global revenue loss of only USD 100-240 Billion at 2014 levels, see OECD 
(2015d). 
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As a countermeasure to this issue, the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and 
Development (OECD) released a global action plan against Base Erosion and Profit 
Shifting (BEPS) in July 2013 (OECD (2013a)). This action plan was adopted by the G-
20 leaders174 and is – in principle – supported by the European Commission (European 
Commission (2013), p. 4). Arguing that a lack of transparency in financial reporting 
facilitates profit shifting (Murphy (2009), p. 4), the OECD action plan also includes – 
among other things – specific actions (Action 11-13) aimed at enhancing the disclosure 
quality of tax-related information. More precisely, the OECD and the European 
Commission have recently released several proposals for a so-called Country-by-Country 
Reporting (CbCR). This concept is based on the disclosure of key business information 
such as profits and taxes paid for each country that a multinational operates in. The 
proponents of CbCR claim that the disclosure of such information might serve the purpose 
of detecting abusive tax arrangements. Furthermore, it is argued that this kind of 
disclosure could build up pressure on companies to pay a fair amount of tax in relation to 
their economic activity in each country. In this paper, we examine whether CbCR actually 
is an appropriate means to achieve these objectives or whether there are other measures 
to more effectively combat international profit shifting.  
Our paper is organized as follows: First, we provide an overview of existing provisions 
and recent developments regarding CbCR (chapter 4.2.2). Second, we discuss the current 
proposals of the OECD and the European Commission for a comprehensive CbCR and 
examine what data source for providing tax disclosure may be most appropriate (chapter 
4.2.3). In addition, we analyze expected costs and benefits linked to country-specific 
reporting (chapter 4.2.4). Third, we derive potential alternatives for reform (chapter 
4.2.5). Finally, we conclude (chapter 4.2.6). 
4.2.2 Existing provisions and recent developments for Country-by-Country 
Reporting 
Until recently, there has not been any binding legislation prescribing a comprehensive 
CbCR for all countries and industry sectors. However, certain regulations requiring 
country-specific information have already been put in place, albeit only for specific 
sectors, namely the extractive (production of oil, natural gas and minerals) and financial 
sectors respectively. These specific CbCR-requirements are mainly outside the scope of 
financial reporting. The most comprehensive rulings concern the extractive industry, not 
                                                 
174  See http://en.g20russia.ru/news/20131129/784497471.html. 
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because of tax reasons, but rather due to a high risk of corruption in this sector. The 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI),175 for instance, an international 
standard which countries may sign up to voluntarily, is basically aimed at reconciling 
company and government payments. Participating countries have the duty to produce a 
public report, but are, however, entitled to decide on the exact form and scope of 
disclosure. In contrast, according to the Dodd-Frank Act, listed companies in the US 
operating in the extractive sector are obliged to publish payments made to governments 
on a country-by-country basis and in a standardized way.176 Similarly, the European 
Union (EU) Accounting and Transparency Directive implemented in July 2013 requires 
EU (listed and large non-listed) companies in the extractive and forestry sectors to 
disclose payments to national governments as part of their annual financial statements.177 
Yet, like the other two initiatives, it does not intend the declaration of country-specific 
profit figures and tax payments. By contrast, the EU Capital Requirements Directive IV 
(“CRD IV”)178, adopted in July 2013, is the first initiative governing country-by-country 
disclosure for financial institutions in the EU. Primarily aimed at the enhancement of 
transparency, this directive stipulates that all concerned companies publicly disclose the 
names of their operations, turnover and the number of employees in every relevant 
country, effective from 2014. Most important, however, are country-specific data on 
profits/losses and tax payments, which still have to be confidentially reported to the 
Commission only.  
Recently, there has been a development towards enhanced transparency through stricter 
and more extensive disclosure requirements for companies in all industry sectors, which 
was mainly triggered by the publication of the OECD action plan on BEPS (OECD 
(2013a)). In particular, actions 11 to 13 of the plan address the collection of firm-level 
data on BEPS and the disclosure of aggressive tax planning arrangements that companies 
may make use of. Moreover, the action plan calls for the disclosure of country-specific 
tax-related information as a part of the transfer pricing documentation (OECD (2013b)). 
Taxpayers would be obliged to report income, taxes paid and certain indicators of 
economic activity to governmental authorities, i.e. CbCR information would not be made 
publicly available. While the Discussion Draft on Transfer Pricing Documentation and 
                                                 
175  http://eiti.org. 
176  See Congress of the United States of America (2010). Similar regulations apply for companies listed at 
the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKEX). 
177  Directive 2013/34/EC. 
178  Directive 2013/36/EU. 
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CbCR (OECD (2014a)) specified this concern by stipulating that CbCR should become a 
compulsory part of a master file of the transfer pricing documentation, the subsequent 
Guidance on Transfer Pricing Documentation and CbCR (OECD (2014b)) implemented 
a three-tiered structure where CbCR constitutes a separate part (besides a master and a 
local file). Later on, the OECD released the Guidance on the Implementation of Transfer 
Pricing Documentation and CbCR (OECD (2015a)) containing more details with regard 
to the scope of application (e.g. affected companies and time period) as well as the CbCR 
Implementation Package (OECD (2015b)) providing precise suggestions for 
implementation into national legislation. Eventually, the Final Report on Transfer Pricing 
and CbCR (OECD (2015c)) summarized the OECD’s proposals.179 These proposals 
should be implemented into national laws applying to fiscal years from 2016 onwards. 
Several countries have already realized such CbCR regulations in their national laws180 
or have put forward specific draft proposals.181 As an additional step towards the 
implementation of a successful comprehensive CbCR, 82 countries have lately signed a 
multilateral competent authority agreement (MCAA)182 which serves as a base for the 
exchange of CbCR information among tax authorities.183  
Likewise, the European Commission has put forward several proposals to promote a 
comprehensive CbCR. First, CbCR was launched as a major element of the Anti-Tax 
Avoidance Package (European Commission (2016a)) in January 2016. This initiative 
primarily resulted from the OECD’s final CbCR proposal and is to a great extent in line 
with the suggested regulations. Furthermore, there has been introduced a draft that obliges 
national tax authorities to automatically exchange confidential CbCR information 
(European Commission (2016b)).184 This directive, stipulating a comprehensive CbCR 
for large EU multinationals, was adopted in May 2016 and should be implemented into 
national laws until 4 June 2017 (European Commission (2016c)). In addition to that, the 
EU released a CbCR Directive (European Commission (2016d)) as amendment to the 
existing Accounting Directive in April 2016 which envisages all large multinational 
companies operating in the EU to publicly disclose a limited CbCR entailing several tax-
related information. Hence, Multinational Enterprises (MNE) operating in the EU would 
                                                 
179  For details on the specific content, please see chapter 4.2.3.1. 
180  These countries include e.g. Spain, Poland, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, Italy, UK, Australia and 
Mexico.  
181  E.g. Ireland, Norway, Belgium, USA, Germany. 
182  See https://www.oecd.org/tax/automatic-exchange/international-framework-for-the-crs/. 
183  Status: 12 May 2016. The US, for example, has instead opted for bilateral agreements. 
184  The Draft Directive on the exchange of tax-related information was an amendment to the Administrative 
Cooperation Directive. 
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be under duty to file two separate reports: One full CbCR only available to tax authorities 
as well as one partial CbCR available to the public.  
4.2.3 Comprehensive Country-by-Country Reporting  
4.2.3.1 Details of the current proposals 
The current OECD proposal provides quite extensive guidelines for a comprehensive 
CbCR concerning all industry sectors.185 They are intended to apply in the participating 
countries for fiscal years starting on 1 January 2016, but the report could be handed in 
one year later (by the end of 2017). The rulings shall be effective on a mandatory base186 
for all large multinational corporations having annual consolidated group revenue of more 
than 750 mn Euro in the preceding fiscal year. It is expected that 90% of all multinational 
groups would therefore be exempted from the CbCR obligations, however, at the same 
time, CbCR would still be filed by groups controlling 90% of corporate revenue (OECD 
(2015a), p. 4).  
The OECD generally suggests CbCR to be part of the transfer pricing documentation. 
More precisely, they envisage a three-tiered approach consisting of a master file intended 
to provide transfer pricing information regarding all involved jurisdictions, a local file 
with country-specific transfer pricing information which is only made available to the 
respective jurisdiction as well as the actual CbCR. The OECD claims that such a CbCR 
would serve tax authorities in assessing the transfer pricing risk as well as in detecting 
profit shifting activities. As far as the structure of the report is concerned, the OECD’s 
model template entails three different tables. Table 1 constitutes the main part of the 
CbCR and contains information on all requested items. Specifically, MNEs would have 
to disclose the following figures on an aggregated basis (not per entity) for each tax 
jurisdiction they are operating in:  
• Revenue (divided by unrelated and related party) 
• Profit (loss) before income taxes 
• Income tax paid (on cash basis) 
• Income tax accrued - current year 
• Stated capital 
• Accumulated earnings 
• Number of employees 
                                                 
185  The current EU proposal is based on these guidelines as well. 
186  Hardeck (2015) argue that the mandatory design of the proposal may be due to the fact that previous 
initiatives which were based on voluntary disclosures turned out not to be successful (see p. 397). 
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• Tangible assets other than cash and cash equivalents  
In general, data on profits and related tax payments in the relevant countries are intended 
to evaluate the appropriateness of the amounts of taxes paid. In addition, several further 
disclosures serve the purpose of examining a company’s real economic activity in a 
country. Most importantly, the template includes income tax paid and income tax accrued 
in the respective jurisdictions. The first comprises profit taxes as well as withholding 
taxes of the group, whereas the latter includes taxes payable, but no deferred taxes or 
provisions for contingent tax liabilities. Overall, this tax reporting might include items 
not necessarily relating to the current period (such as tax prepayments, tax refunds or tax 
arrears).  
Table 2 of the template is aimed at providing additional information on the group structure 
and on the business activities conducted in the involved jurisdictions, and thus on the 
value chain of the MNE. Table 3 offers the reporting MNE the opportunity to provide 
additional explanations.  
In general, it is the ultimate parent entity’s duty to file the transfer pricing and CbCR 
documents and to hand it in to its home jurisdiction’s tax authority. Under certain 
circumstances, e.g. if the parent company’s home country does not prescribe a CbCR or 
if there is no information exchange between the tax authorities, the obligation to file a 
CbCR can also be transferred to a domestic subsidiary.187 In case of non-compliance, the 
levy and collection of penalties is subject to national tax legislation.  
Importantly, all of the CbCR information should only be reported confidentially to the 
tax authorities. This information would then be exchanged and made available to all 
relevant countries. While the EU directive and proposals on CbCR are conceptually very 
similar to the presented OECD approach, the most recent one differs significantly with 
regard to the kind of publication: Unlike the OECD, the EU suggests to additionally make 
certain parts of the CbC report publicly available.188 The information would be published 
in a stand-alone report accessible to the public for at least 5 years on the company’s 
website. 
Although the proposed guidelines can be considered as quite detailed, there is no explicit 
and distinct principle as regards the data source on which CbCR should be based. The 
                                                 
187  For further information, see Lappé and Schmidtke (2015), p. 694.  
188  Not all information items are included in the public CbCR e.g. revenues are reported in total only and 
information on tangible assets or share capital are not contained. 
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only requirement stated is that the same data basis has to be used from year to year in 
order to preserve consistency. Nevertheless, there are various different sources that MNEs 
might refer to: For instance, consolidation reporting packages, separate entity financial 
statements or internal management accounts. In the following, we discuss which data 
source for providing tax disclosure may be most appropriate.  
4.2.3.2 Sources for providing (CbCR) information 
The evaluation (in particular for consolidated and individual financial statements) is 
based on a simple example for intra-group profit shifting of multinationals incorporating 
an IP-Holding company located in a low-tax jurisdiction (see Figure 6).  
Figure 6: Example for international profit shifting 
 
The example assumes a parent company (Parent-Co) in Country P with a 100% holding 
in a subsidiary in high-tax jurisdiction S and an IP-Holding in low-tax jurisdiction IP, 
where the group’s IP (e.g. a patent) is located. The IP is licensed to Subsidiary in Country 
S in exchange for a royalty payment reducing the subsidiary’s profit. Foreign profits and 
dividends are exempt from tax in Country P. Figure 6 displays separately the amount of 
sales, costs and pre-tax profits as well as intra-group transactions and the nominal tax 
rates for each company and country – P, S and IP. If total profits of the group (€ 2.2 
Billion) were taxed at the level of Parent-Co, the tax charge would amount to 
€ 0.66 Billion (= 2.2*0.3). In our example, however, the tax charge is reduced by 
€ 0.48 Billion to € 0.18 Billion. Above all, from the total sales of € 2 Billion from the 
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Subsidiary in Country S, € 1.9 Billion are shifted to IP-Holding, yielding a tax saving of 
€ 0.475 Billion (= (0.3-0.05)*1.9). Considering additionally the tax reduction in Country 
S, the total tax saving amounts to € 0.48 Billion (= 0.1*(0.3-0.25) + 0.475).  
According to prevailing accounting standards (e.g. International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS)), consolidated financial statements disclose tax information in the profit 
and loss statement, the tax reconciliation and the segmental reporting. Building on 
consolidated accounts as a starting point for CbCR, however, has several drawbacks and 
does not seem to be feasible: Most importantly, consolidated financial statements are 
supposed to provide decision-useful information about a group of companies as a single 
economic entity. Therefore, intra-group transactions are consolidated and do not affect 
the overall profit. Profit shifting activities by means of intra-group transactions are, thus, 
not visible in consolidated financial statements. This is due to the netting out of profits 
and expenses within the group (in our example: royalty income of IP-Holding and 
payments of Subsidiary of € 1.9 billion) and the aggregation of total tax payments (see 
Figure 7) (van der Ham and Tomson (2015), p. 844).  
Figure 7: Intra-group profit shifting and consolidated financial accounts 
 
The profit & loss statement therefore only reveals sales (€ 3 billion), costs (€ 0.8 billion) 
and profits (€ 2.2 billion) in aggregated form. The intra-group licensing arrangement is 
disregarded. Tax reconciliations, on the other hand, only disclose the total tax reduction 
(i.e. a low effective tax rate (ETR)) due to operations in low tax jurisdictions (€ 0.48 
billion), but do not specify the underlying profit shifting mechanisms or countries 
involved, as required by a CbCR (in our example the interposition of the IP-Holding). 
Segmental reporting as another part of consolidated accounts does not deliver country-
specific information either. According to the management approach (e.g. IFRS 8), data is 
disclosed on a business-unit level, yet not necessarily on a geographic or even per-country 
basis. In the context of our example, it could be possible that Parent-Co, Subsidiary and 
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IP-Holding all belong to the same business unit and therefore no more detailed 
information would be provided. Hence, in order to reveal single intra-group transactions, 
it would be necessary to examine “de-consolidated” data. This, however, does not serve 
the purposes of reporting on group level. In addition, financial statements contain data 
based on future prospects of the company, while CbCR is intended to detect profit shifting 
behavior in past periods. Therefore, it can be concluded that consolidated financial 
statements do not seem to be the appropriate source for CbCR information. 
Alternatively, one could think of individual financial statements as a starting point for 
CbCR information. Although individual financial statements, as opposed to consolidated 
financial statements, contain unconsolidated data on single company level, such an 
approach would have several drawbacks as well (e.g. OECD (2013b)). First, the exact 
source and direction of intra-group transactions do not become evident on a per-country 
basis. Second, individual financial statements are, in general, prepared according to local 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) and might be quite heterogeneous 
and thus not comparable across countries. Third and most importantly, financial accounts 
neither reflect taxable income nor do they provide reliable estimates for the true value of 
assets. As a general rule, book-tax-differences arise in most countries due to country-
specific tax laws; the exemption from tax of certain types of income - in particular inter-
company dividends and foreign source income - and non-deductible expenses are the 
most prominent examples. In addition, other reasons relating to different interrelations 
between financial accounting and national tax laws (e.g. different tax accounting 
standards and provisions to allocate income and expenses) are decisive for financial 
profits not necessarily to reflect taxable income (Endres et al. (2007); Schön (2005a); 
Spengel and Zöllkau (2012)). Regarding the reflection of the value of assets, in particular 
intangibles, it may be that they are not recorded at all, if self-developed, or only at 
historical costs. According to our example in Figure 7, it might be indeed misleading if 
IP-Holding had created the IP on its own and would display no or a very low value for 
intangibles in its financial accounts on the one hand and would report high taxable profits 
from royalties on the other hand.  
Other existing sources of information would come along with comparable drawbacks. 
Internal management data, for example, is expected to be even more heterogeneous 
among corporations as well as among countries due to a lack of standardization and 
binding reporting guidelines. The reporting practices would, therefore, be highly 
dependent on the internal processes of the MNEs and, thus, not be comparable at all.  
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To conclude, neither consolidated or individual financial statements nor other existing 
data sources can serve as a suitable basis for a comprehensive CbCR. Therefore, it would 
be necessary to define a standardized and harmonized set-up with respect to regulations 
and definitions (determination of income and valuation of assets). Such separate 
mandatory rules could, for example, be based on a harmonization of the determination of 
taxable income. In that regard, the European Commission has put forward a concept for 
a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) (European Commission (2011), 
European Commission (2016e, 2016f)). The proposed Council Directive provides a 
carefully prepared framework for a harmonized determination of corporate taxable 
income. The CCTB rules are, in principle, in line with tax accounting practice in the EU 
and are appropriate for harmonizing the tax base (Spengel and Zöllkau (2012)). This 
could, therefore, be a promising avenue and data source for a comprehensive CbCR 
within the EU. Finally, it has to be decided if and by whom the CbC report should be 
audited.  
4.2.4 Expected costs and benefits 
As a prerequisite for a CbCR to be meaningful at all, the expected benefits of any 
additional disclosure of tax information have to outweigh the expected costs. Yet, to date, 
little is known about the exact costs and benefits related to CbCR. 
4.2.4.1 Costs  
CbCR is suspected to be associated with several direct costs for disclosure.189 In addition, 
implicit costs occur; the volume of such implicit costs is likely to exceed that of direct 
costs for disclosure and depends on whether the disclosure is made public (as envisaged 
by the EU) or only available to tax authorities (as suggested by the OECD).  
First of all, direct costs for disclosure would initially arise for adjusting existing systems 
and processes to the requirements of CbCR. While it is clear that these costs probably 
depend on various factors, such as the complexity of the group structure, there is no 
unanimity among experts as to whether the data collection for CbCR purposes generally 
is particularly burdensome or not. Some (Murphy (2009), p. 21) argue that many existing 
financial reporting systems are already technically able to deliver country-related data or 
that the necessary information even exists and can be derived from financial and internal 
accounts as well as from tax declarations (Kroppen (2013); Rödder and Pinkernell (2013); 
                                                 
189  The following discussion of possible costs of a CbCR is adapted from Devereux (2011), p. 34-38. 
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Heber (2013)). By contrast, others invoke substantial data-related costs contending that 
the established transfer pricing systems would need to be substantially expanded, as 
CbCR requires data that is not necessary for current transfer pricing analysis and is 
therefore not yet existing (e.g. Pinkernell (2014), p. 966). Moreover, since the proposals 
are not specific as regards the data base to be used, affected MNEs first of all need to 
spend resources on figuring out which data source works best for them. Direct costs for 
reporting would also be incurred for each CbC report on a regular basis. Not only would 
it be costly to collect all required information, but also to maintain data consistency across 
countries and across time. For instance, it is likely that multiple data sources are needed 
to gather all CbCR information and coordinating these different sources may be 
cumbersome (Lappé and Schmidtke (2015)). Moreover, conceptual and practical 
differences with regard to specific CbCR items may impose a challenge to consistency. 
As regards firms’ declaration of profit taxes, it is, for example, common in the BRIC 
states to combine profit and sales taxes (Loitz (2015), M5). Data validity will, however, 
be limited if such inconsistencies emerge. Furthermore, direct costs relate to the potential 
necessity to audit the CbC report. Finally, CbCR could become expensive to the extent 
that companies consider it necessary to justify and extensively explain their reports to the 
public (Devereux (2011), p. 32 ff.).  
Next, implicit costs of CbCR would primarily stem from disclosing information to the 
public as envisaged by the EU proposal. Here, CbCR could be associated with 
considerable competitive disadvantages. Publishing commercially sensitive information 
is particularly problematic as country-specific reporting is not mandatory for all 
companies, but is restricted to large MNEs in specific countries. Hence, “small” MNEs 
outside the scope of CbCR may be able to use published data for non-tax reasons, e.g. for 
deriving business secrets (Hardeck (2015), p. 406). In addition, implementing public 
CbCR in the EU only would give rise to severe competitive disadvantages for MNEs 
operating within the EU compared to corporations conducting business exclusively 
outside the EU (Bärsch et al. (2016), p. 976). Thus, CbCR would constitute a considerable 
locational disadvantage for the EU. If it all, public CbCR should therefore only be 
implemented globally without any regional restrictions.  
More generally, disclosing data on tax payments potentially violates tax secrecy, which 
constitutes a guiding principle of tax law in most countries in the world. Even if CbC 
reports weren’t disclosed to the public, but only to tax authorities, tax secrecy could be 
put at risk. As there are substantial international differences with regard to the scope of 
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tax secrecy,190 it may turn out that the confidential treatment of CbCR data by foreign tax 
authorities cannot be ensured. To prevent harm to MNEs’ competitiveness and to assure 
the confidentiality of CbCR data, countries would need to be required to enforce their 
legal standards with regard to tax secrecy (Cockfield and MacArthur (2015)). 
In addition, international tax law is highly complex and public interested parties without 
profound knowledge of the subject or of the MNE’s allocation of functions and risks 
might be unable to appropriately process and interpret the information disclosed. For 
instance, low (or zero) tax payments do not necessarily point to tax aggressiveness or at 
least do not necessarily result from illegal undertakings. Nevertheless, wrong accusations 
against companies could result (Reibel (2015), p. 210).  
Another potential implicit cost of CbCR is associated with the danger of double taxation 
even in the absence of public disclosure: Knowing all tax payments on a country-by-
country basis could make tax authorities, especially those of the increasingly powerful 
BRIC states, raise their own claims towards companies (Schlie and Malke (2013), p. 
2469) and thus give rise to tax-related distributional conflicts (Pinkernell (2014), p. 971). 
Specifically, CbCR data could induce countries to arbitrarily make transfer pricing 
adjustments without any reference to the arm’s length principle. Hence, CbCR could 
ultimately constitute an instrument to extend source taxation, especially by emerging and 
developing countries, and thus impose a threat in particular to firms with a strong export 
focus. In addition, the danger of double taxation not only pertains to the affected 
companies, but it may also come as a cost to tax authorities: For instance, according to 
Ditz and Quilitzsch (2014), the removal of double taxation vis-à-vis the BRIC countries 
often happens at the expense of German tax authorities. However, it also needs to be 
emphasized that the OECD explicitly states that it is the purpose of CbCR to enable the 
mere assessment of transfer pricing risk, rather than allowing for transfer pricing 
adjustments being made on the basis of CbCR data (OECD (2015a), p. 5). Yet, the 
overview on the global allocation of income, economic activity and tax payments may 
ultimately lead to calls for a global formulary apportionment system, which is expected 
to come at the expense of the tax bases of export oriented countries (Reibel (2015)), such 
as Germany. 
                                                 
190  Only some countries, e.g. Finland, Sweden and Norway, require individual and/or corporate tax returns 
to be publicly disclosed. In Japan, public disclosure of individual and corporate tax return data was 
mandatory from 1950-2004 (see Hasegawa et al. (2013), p. 572). 
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4.2.4.2 Benefits 
A major argument brought forward by proponents of CbCR is that companies would be 
urged to pay taxes at an amount that truly reflects the companies’ economic activity and 
its utilization of public infrastructure in a particular country (Deutscher Bundestag (2013), 
p.1; Devereux (2011), p. 7). Indeed, CbCR could be a useful instrument to shed some 
light on MNEs’ value chains and their actual economic circumstances (Fehling (2015)). 
Furthermore, the overview on the allocation of profits and tax payments may be beneficial 
for tax risk analysis and trigger audits where appropriate (Cockfield and MacArthur 
(2015)).  
Yet, this reasoning is merely speculative, in particular since the common tax minimization 
strategies employed by multinationals are mostly based on the exploitation of loopholes 
in domestic and international tax laws and are therefore in itself not illegal. Moreover, the 
argument relating to the aim of assessing the appropriateness of profit allocation cannot 
be based on theoretical foundations, since it is virtually impossible to properly allocate 
profits and costs to single affiliates of a group by means of transfer prices: By setting up 
an integrated group of companies, coordination of transactions via markets is abandoned 
in favor of coordination using intra-organizational hierarchies. The aim is to generate 
economies of integration, for example by means of lower transaction costs, improvement 
of information flows or managerial efficiency. As a result, the profits of an integrated 
group of companies are higher than the aggregate profits earned by its separate entities. 
Since the excess profits accrue at group level, it is theoretically impossible to determine 
the source of these profits as they cannot be attributed to specific and, above all, individual 
transactions either (McLure (1984), p. 94 ff.; Avi-Yonah and Benshalom (2011), p. 379; 
Jacobs et al. (2016), p. 636 f.; Schön (2010), p. 233 ff.; Ault (2013), p. 1200-1201; 
Oestreicher (2016)). Moreover, MNEs’ profits nowadays are substantially driven by 
intangible assets that are hardly locatable and very difficult to value (Oestreicher (2014)). 
Even if one accepts transfer pricing as an appropriate means for profit allocation, various 
experts doubt the OECD’s claim that CbCR information is useful to examine transfer 
pricing or even BEPS-related risks and to assess whether an appropriate amount of taxes 
has been paid (Kroppen and Rasch (2014)). More generally, one could even contend that 
it is not reasonably possible to relate taxes paid and annual profits of a single fiscal year, 
given that the reported items may be impacted by transactions relating to other periods 
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(e.g. loss carryforwards); i.e. high profits and low tax payments do not necessarily need 
to be at odds.  
In addition, it is also questionable to what extent CbCR actually entails additional insights 
and benefits for tax authorities. Tax authorities can be assumed to be already familiar with 
the common (legal) tax planning channels and arrangements used for profit shifting, ever 
since the most prominent examples have been made available to the public (Pinkernell 
(2012), p. 369 ff.; Kleinbard (2011), p. 707 ff.). Furthermore, it is not even clear whether 
tax authorities have sufficient resources to process and utilize CbCR data. It seems to be 
– above all – of high interest of large Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO). 
CbCR, therefore, might only provide hints as regards the question of which companies 
should be audited or examined with increased scrutiny. This might be relevant for 
inbound investments in particular. Then, however, it could be argued that it is not 
necessary to stick to the EU’s proposal and make CbCR publicly accessible, i.e. it would 
be sufficient to make the information available to fiscal authorities only.  
If, however, CbCR information were made available to the public, proponents of CbCR 
also claim that an enlarged information set would be beneficial from a capital market 
point of view. For instance, knowing which countries a multinational operates in could 
potentially enable investors to better assess the companies’ geo-political risk and the 
sustainability of its tax charge (Murphy (2009), p. 14).191 Yet, some empirical evidence 
suggests that capital market participants already face an information overload and do not 
actually consider the full information set available (Lenter et al. (2003), p. 823 ff.; Raedy 
et al. (2011), p. 3).  
There is, however, some empirical evidence indicating a negative relationship between 
enhanced disclosures (transparency) and tax aggressiveness. For instance, Dyreng et al. 
(2016) find that firms which are subject to public scrutiny engage less in tax avoidance, 
indicating that public pressure can exert some influence on MNEs. In a similar vein, 
Herbert et al. (2015) contend that reduced public disclosure is positively correlated with 
international tax avoidance. Hence, this finding may speak in favor of increased 
disclosures as required by CbCR. There even is some evidence for negative reputational 
effects of tax sheltering: Hanlon and Slemrod (2009) find, on average, negative stock 
price reactions when there is news about a firm’s involvement in tax shelters. 
                                                 
191  Investors could for instance see whether the tax charge largely depends on operations located in tax 
haven countries.  
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Yet, the question remains as to whether CbCR is actually suitable to uncover such tax 
shelters and to substantially reduce tax minimization grounded on the utilization of 
beneficial regimes and constructional flaws in international tax law. Overall, public 
pressure resulting from CbCR would be rather expected in case of illegal endeavors, 
which, however, are mostly not the reason for the strikingly low effective tax rates of 
multinationals currently observed. Thus, it also remains uncertain whether CbCR would 
actually exert any persistent influence on customers’ purchase decisions. 
4.2.4.3 Interim conclusion 
To sum up, it can be concluded that the expected benefits of CbCR (at least partially) lack 
a theoretical foundation and, overall, do not seem to outweigh the associated costs. Given 
the particularly high costs associated with public disclosure, CbCR should only be made 
available to tax authorities – as it is proposed by the OECD –, if at all. To keep 
implementation costs as low as possible, there is a need to clearly specify which distinct 
data source has to be used by reporting MNEs. It also has to be made sure that tax secrecy 
is reinforced in all participating countries and that CbCR is not exploited by tax 
authorities as a means to extend source taxation. 
Overall, it appears to be more reasonable to combat tax aggressiveness by different 
means. It is, therefore, up to legislators to remove unintended gaps and loopholes in the 
tax laws. 
4.2.5 Alternatives 
As discussed above, it seems unlikely that legal tax planning activities can be combated 
by means of a CbCR. Rather, it might be more effective to limit the leeway companies 
have with respect to constructing tax minimizing group structures. Empirical evidence 
reveals intra-group financing and transfer pricing as the most prominent channels for 
multinationals’ profit shifting. In a recent meta-analysis, Heckemeyer and Overesch 
(2013) show that transfer pricing is by far the most dominant profit shifting channel. 
While transfer pricing explains 72% of the total share of shifted profits, the share of intra-
group financing amounts to 28% only (Heckemeyer and Overesch (2013), p. 23-26). 
Further empirical evidence shows that enforcing tax rules does indeed reduce tax 
aggressive behavior of multinational companies.  
One example for the tightening of tax rules has been the enforcement of transfer pricing 
rules in the last years. Lohse et al. (2012) aim to generate a measure for the stringency 
and impact of transfer pricing rules showing that the regulations have become stricter 
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over time. Lohse and Riedel (2013) use these insights to demonstrate that such transfer 
pricing regulations significantly reduce profit shifting activities by up to 50% (measured 
by the sensitivity of corporate pre-tax profits to changes in the corporate income tax rate). 
In particular, penalties exert an additional limiting effect on profit shifting behavior. 
Furthermore, they argue that higher administrative costs arising from additional 
documentation requirements can be justified in the light of anticipated benefits. In line 
with that, Beer and Loeprick (2015) find that, on average, estimated profit shifting among 
MNE subsidiaries is reduced by 52% two years after the introduction of mandatory 
documentation requirements. In addition, Luckhaupt et al. (2012) point out the 
importance of a standardized set of transfer pricing rules in order to decrease complexity 
and to actually reduce the leeway for profit shifting.192 
With regard to intra-group financing, various studies have also revealed the effectiveness 
of thin capitalization rules. Buettner et al. (2012) find that thin-capitalization rules 
effectively reduce multinationals’ incentive to make use of internal loans for international 
tax planning. Blouin et al. (2014) obtain similar results concerning the effectiveness of 
thin capitalization rules with respect to their impact on the capital structure of 
multinational firms (reduction of internal debt).  
A promising avenue might therefore be to close gaps and loopholes and to reduce leeway 
in domestic and international tax laws. However, in that case, it would be important to 
ensure that tightened regulations do not lead to double taxation, i.e. these regulations 
would have to be universally accepted by all countries.  
4.2.6 Summary 
(1)  Aggressive tax planning efforts of highly profitable multinational companies (so 
called BEPS) have become the subject of intense public debate in recent years. As 
a response, several international initiatives and parties have called for more 
transparency in tax reporting, especially by means of a Country-by-Country 
Reporting. 
(2)  Certain regulations requiring country-specific information have already been put in 
place for the extractive and financial sectors. Recently, the OECD and the European 
                                                 
192  In particular, they propose an apportionment method for those profits that cannot be allocated by transfer 
pricing. 
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Commission have additionally presented proposals for a comprehensive disclosure 
of country-specific tax-related information for companies in all industry sectors. 
(3)  These proposals envisage CbCR to constitute a separate part of MNEs’ transfer 
pricing documentation. Taxpayers would be obliged to report income, taxes paid 
and certain indicators of economic activity for each jurisdiction they operate in 
separately. While the OECD suggests a confidential disclosure of CbCR 
information to tax authorities, the EU additionally wants to make CbCR – or at least 
parts of it – publicly available. 
(4)  Our findings suggest that neither consolidated or individual financial statements nor 
other existing data sources seem to be an appropriate basis for providing such 
country-specific information. Instead, it would be necessary to define detailed and 
harmonized definitions and regulations to ensure comparability. The concept of a 
CC(C)TB could be a promising avenue in that regard.  
(5)  The discussion on benefits and costs of a CbCR reveals that benefits (at least 
partially) lack a theoretical foundation and, overall, do not seem to outweigh 
associated costs. This holds true, in particular, since current tax planning activities 
are mainly based on the legal exploitation of gaps and loopholes in national and 
international tax law. Overall, it appears to be more reasonable to combat tax 
aggressiveness by means other than CbCR.  
(6)  Alternatively, tax legislators should remove gaps and loopholes in tax laws. 
Specifically, the enforcement of national and international tax rules should be 
considered. This is in accordance with recent empirical evidence demonstrating the 
effectiveness of thin-cap rules and tightened transfer pricing regulations. 
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4.3 Low Interest Environment, Tax Accounts and Business Taxation  
4.3.1 Introduction 
Since the 2008 global financial crisis, the interest rate level has been subject to a 
substantial decrease. While the average yield (measured by the yield on long-term 
government bonds) was at about 4% in summer 2008, it is now close to zero. Similarly, 
the European Central Bank (ECB) has steadily reduced the base rate since October 2008 
(Figure 8).193 
Figure 8: The ECB’s base rate 
 
Corporations and legislators alike have to ask themselves how these low interest rates 
will impact on taxation and whether they are a call for tax-political action. It is therefore 
the aim of this paper to identify and analyze the interdependencies between the current 
phase of low interest rates and the various tax dimensions. In this regard, three major 
subjects can be differentiated, which will be examined in detail subsequently: Firstly, in 
chapter 4.3.2, the direct effects of the interest expense on taxable profits of corporations 
– nationally as well as internationally – are highlighted. Subsequently, chapter 4.3.3 
focuses on interest and liquidity effects of taxation. The impact on tax accounting policy 
in general as well as on a potential harmonization of the corporate tax base in the 
European Union (EU) will be addressed therein. Chapter 4.3.4 considers the 
repercussions caused by the low interest environment on the valuation of provisions under 
German Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) (Handelsgesetzbuch (HGB)) 
and tax accounting (Körperschaftsteuergesetz (KStG); Gewerbesteuergesetz (GewStG)) 
as well as the resulting book-tax differences. Based on this assessment, potential reform 
actions will be identified. The paper closes with a conclusion in chapter 4.3.5. 
                                                 
193  Source: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/monetary/rates/html/index.en.html, last update: March 2016. 
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4.3.2 Direct Effects of the Interest Expense 
During a continuous period of low interest rates, debt financing generally becomes less 
costly in a historical comparison (Wobbe and Gutzmann (2015), p. 491). This directly 
affects the interest payments made by corporations to creditors and leads to a lower 
overall interest expense for an average corporation, resulting in an improved liquidity.194 
Due to the decrease in deductible expenses, the taxable profit will increase accordingly, 
inducing a higher corporate income tax (CIT) burden. Consequently, a low interest rate 
environment improves the financial performance of an average corporation and thus 
results in a higher CIT burden. 
In Germany, decreasing interest rates additionally influence the trade tax burden 
(Gewerbesteuer (GewSt)). According to Sec. 8 no. 1a GewStG, a quarter of charges 
related to debt financing is added back onto the trade tax base. Lower interest rates will 
thus lead to a decrease in this add-back (25% of the interest expense) and ultimately to a 
lower trade tax burden. 
The total effect on taxable profits and the overall tax burden of corporations in Germany 
can be illustrated based on the following simplified example (Figure 9), assuming a 
reduction in net interest expense of 100 monetary units (MU). 
Figure 9: Example to illustrate the direct effects of the decreased interest expense on the total tax 
burden of a corporation in Germany 
 
Based on the assumption that a German corporation’s net interest expense in the low 
interest environment will be reduced by 100 MU, a higher CIT (incl. solidarity surcharge 
[SolZ]) and trade tax burden of 29.83 MU (=15.83 + 14 ) will result.195 At the same time, 
                                                 
194  This assumes that the interest expense of an average corporation (e.g. no banks) exceeds its interest 
income. For further details regarding a representative European corporation for the EU-28 based on the 
Amadeus-database see European Commission (2015b), p. 67. 
195  For simplicity, a trade tax factor of 400% will be assumed. Further taxes will not be considered in the 
example. 
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the interest expenses added back onto the trade tax base will be reduced by 25 MU, 
lowering the overall tax burden by 3.5 MU. In total, a reduction in the net interest expense 
of 100 MU results in an increase in the tax burden of 26.33 MU. 
In addition to the direct effects on the after-tax profit, the interest rate will also affect the 
applicability of restrictions regarding the deductibility of interest. According to the 
German earnings stripping rule (Sec. 4h EStG i.c.w. Sec. 8a KStG), interest expenses 
exceeding taxable interest income are only deductible at up to 30% of Earnings before 
Interest, Taxes, Depreciation and Amortization (EBITDA) (Jacobs et al. (2016), p. 280). 
Additionally, the German regulation grants an exemption limit of EUR 3 mn for net 
interest expenses. At an (historical) interest rate of 5%, this resulted in a maximum value 
of (net) liabilities of EUR 60 mn. A lower interest rate of 2% increased this amount to 
EUR 150 mn. Evidently, in a low interest environment, restrictions on interest 
deductibility are applicable in fewer cases and are, thus, less important.  
Nevertheless, low interest rates will not only influence domestic taxation, but also entail 
implications for the tax planning of multinationals. As outlined above, profits as well as 
tax burdens will generally increase in the respective country of residence. At the same 
time, interest on intracompany debt will decrease, as the interest levied on such loans has 
to be comparable to transactions between independent parties based on the arm’s length 
principle (BMF letter dated 23 February 1983, p. 218; Jacobs et al. (2016), p. 712 f.). The 
prevailing incentive to fund subsidiaries in high-tax countries with debt capital, as the 
deduction of interest is most effective where tax rates are high, will be decreased 
accordingly (Jacobs et al. (2016), p. 946 f.). Financing and preferential tax regimes, such 
as an allowance for corporate equity as currently in place in Belgium and Italy, enabling 
corporations to deduct a notional interest on equity, generally become less favorable. The 
ability to engage in tax planning using traditional tax planning instruments (debt financing 
in particular) will thus be restrained and profit shifting from high- to low-tax countries 
becomes more difficult. Hence, the tax burden in the country of residence is of increasing 
relevance for location and investment decisions.196 It remains to be seen if other business 
models, such as leasing197 and licensing,198 will gain in importance in the future. 
                                                 
196  Regarding the interdependency of location decision and local tax burden see Devereux and Griffith 
(2003); Feld and Heckemeyer (2011). 
197  For further details see Jacobs et al. (2016), p. 1265ff, 989 f. 
198  For further details see Jacobs et al. (2016), p. 1110 ff. 
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4.3.3 Interest and Liquidity Effects 
In general, corporations have an incentive to use tax accounting policies to distribute their 
profits, and thus their tax bases, over several years in an optimal way such that the present 
value of tax payments is minimized. The most important instruments to do so are tax 
accounting options as well as reporting leeway.199 In the German tax code such legal 
options include depreciation and amortization schedules as well as inventory valuation.200 
Leeway is not explicitly regulated, de facto resulting from vague legal terms and unclear 
legal situations respectively, both requiring judgement and interpretation. An example of 
this is the (subjective) estimation of a machine’s useful life. 
Generally, tax accounting policies create a temporary advantage through tax deferral as 
well as a greater liquidity in early periods, but do not lead to sustainable tax savings. Over 
the entire life of a corporation, the tax in- and decreases will usually offset each other. 
The following example (Table 21) is intended to clarify the potential interest and liquidity 
effects in tax accounts: 
A-GmbH (a German Ltd.) acquires a machine with a useful life of four years for EUR 
100 k on 01/01/t1. For tax purposes, A-GmbH has the option to conduct a special 
depreciation in accordance with Sec. 7g EStG in the year of acquisition (20% of the 
acquisition costs in addition to the regular depreciation). The uniform tax rate amounts 
to 50% for the entire time horizon. Excluding this record, a pre-tax profit of EUR 200 k 
has been recorded. 
                                                 
199  For further details see Scheffler (2013), p. 218 f. Since the German Accounting Law Modernization Act 
has entered into force in 2010, this incentive has been even further amplified, as it is possible, for the 
first time, to exercise tax accounting options independently from financial accounts (abolishment of the 
reverse authoritative principle); see Scheffler (2013), p. 228 f. 
200  For further details see Hayn et al. (2009), p. 12 f.: According to Sec. 7 EStG, there is, for example, the 
right to choose between straight-line, declining balance and performance-related depreciation. 
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Table 21: Example for interest and liquidity effects in tax accounts 
 
This example demonstrates that, due to the additional special amortization of EUR 20 k 
in t1, the taxable profit will be reduced and the tax burden in the first period decreases by 
EUR 10 k (=0.5*EUR 20 k). Considering the entire useful life of the machine, the tax 
saving is offset by a constant increase in taxes payable of EUR 3.34 k per year from t2 
through t4, due to the annual reduction in depreciation allowance of EUR 6.66 k. The 
taxpayer obtains, due to the greater availability of funds in the first period, a liquidity 
advantage of EUR 10 k. A potential interest advantage arises from the (additional) 
opportunity to invest this amount. However, this effect decreases with falling (market) 
interest rates. 
The interest advantage, as highlighted above, will be lower than in the past due to the 
decrease in the interest rate level. Hence, temporary periodization effects lose in 
importance (Anzinger (2016a), p. 1767). To sum up, it can be concluded that the 
demonstrated means of tax accounting policy fundamentally become less relevant when 
interest rates are low. Thus, the outlined tax sheltering incentives (see chapter 3) become 
less pronounced. 
The fact that periodization effects take a backseat (due to the low interest rate level) 
impacts in addition on the chances of success of a harmonization of the corporate tax base 
in the EU. Since the European Commission (EC) presented a first draft directive (DD) for 
a „Common (Consolidated) Corporate Tax Base (CC(C)TB)“ in 2011 (European 
Commission (2011)), the concept consistently reappeared on the political agenda.201 The 
current discussion is mainly focused on the first step; an EU-wide harmonization of the 
tax base and the corresponding norms. This has also been expressed by the recently 
                                                 
201  See latest EU action plan dated 06/17/2015, European Commission (2015a).  
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published revised DD for a CC(C)TB (European Commission (2016e, 2016f)). 
Fundamentally, the proposed concept to determine taxable profits, except for several 
matters of detail that still need to be resolved,202 can be accepted, as it seems to be 
compatible with the tax systems of the member states.203 Fiscal consequences for the 
member states can thus be expected to be low. A current quantitative assessment of the 
effective tax burdens of corporations in all 28 EU-member states, using the European Tax 
Analyzer (ten-period-consideration), shows that the profit determination in accordance 
with the 2011 DD would trigger only small changes in tax burdens compared to current 
domestic legislations (see Figure 10: EU-wide: -0.23%, Germany: -0.38%).204 The most 
significant periodization differences persist with regard to depreciation allowances, 
inventory valuation as well as recognition and valuation of provisions. 
Figure 10: Change in effective tax burden related to the introduction of the DD and isolated impact 
of single regulations 
 
As these periodization differences become less important in the current low interest rate 
environment, the tax effects of an introduction of a CC(C)TB would be further reduced. 
This could in turn lead to an improved acceptance in the member states and thus to a 
higher political enforceability, provided that a CC(C)TB, in addition to an increase in 
transparency of corporate taxation in the EU, promises further advantages (Scheffler and 
Köstler (2014b)). 
                                                 
202  See chapter 4.1; Evers et al. (2015). 
203  For further details see Spengel and Zöllkau (2012). 
204  For further details see Evers et al. (2015), p. 369 ff. 
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4.3.4 Discounting of Liabilities in Financial and Tax Accounts 
4.3.4.1 Status Quo 
The low interest rate environment influences the discounting of balance sheet provisions 
in accordance with GAAP and tax law as well as the resulting book-tax differences. While 
provisions have to be depreciated at a fixed rate independent of the current market 
environment according to tax law, i.e. provisions with a term to maturity of more than 
one year at 5.5% (Sec. 6 par. 1 no. 3a EStG) and pension provisions at 6% 
(Sec. 6a par. 3 EStG), the actuarial interest rate according to HGB is floating, based on 
the market interest rate. Pursuant to Sec. 253 par. 2 HGB, provisions with a term to 
maturity of more than one year have to be discounted at the appropriate, i.e. the interest 
rate for similar maturities, average market interest rate over the past seven years. Pension 
provisions and retirement benefits can be discounted at the average market interest rate, 
assuming a standardized term to maturity of 15 years. Recently, the German federal 
cabinet decided on a change in the valuation of pension provisions on 27 January 2016, 
extending the calculation of the average to the last 10 years.205 The regulation is supposed 
to take effect for business years ending after 31 December 2015, but can optionally be 
applied retrospectively for the business year 2015. The following figure (Figure 11)206 
depicts the development of the actuarial interest rate since 2008. Due to the averaging 
involved in the computation, the low actuarial interest rate has a delayed effect on German 
financial accounts. Since 2012, this discount rate has been subject to a notable decrease, 
and currently amounts to 1.69% (term to maturity of one year) as well as 4.11% (new 
version: 10-year-average) and 3.42% (old version: 7-year-average) respectively for 
pension provisions. 
                                                 
205  See Gesetz zur Umsetzung der Wohnimmobilienkreditrichtlinie und zur Änderung handelsrechtlicher 
Vorschriften dated 03/11/2016, BGBl I 2016, p. 396; for further details see Zwirner (2016), p.1. 
206  Source: 
https://www.bundesbank.de/Navigation/DE/Statistiken/Zeitreihen_Datenbanken/Geld_und_Kapitalma
erkte/geld_und_kapitalmaerkte_node.html, last update: September 2016. 
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Figure 11: Actuarial interest rate according to Sec. 253 par. 2 HGB 
 
While the plummeting interest rates do not have an effect on the present value of liabilities 
in tax accounts, they cause an increase in value for liabilities in financial accounts. The 
related expenditures have to be considered in the profit and loss statement, ultimately 
reducing the net income (and potentially lowering the equity ratio) (Wobbe and 
Gutzmann (2015), p. 490). At the same time, the disparate valuation in financial and tax 
accounts leads to an increase in book-tax differences (liabilities in financial accounts > 
liabilities in tax accounts) and therefore the emergence of deferred tax assets. The 
recognition of this balance sheet item is, in accordance with Sec. 274 HGB, optional. 
Exercising the option has a positive effect on the annual profit according to financial 
accounts, as deferred tax revenues will be recorded (compensation for the greater tax 
revenue and expense respectively). However, Sec. 268 par. 8 HGB includes a payout 
block equal to the amount of net recognized deferred tax assets (Geberth (2015), p. 18). 
The following figure (Figure 12) depicts the interdependencies between discounting for 
tax and financial accounting purposes in a low interest environment using a simplified 
example (excess liabilities in financial accounts due to discounting: 100 MU; tax rate: 
30%). It demonstrates that the expense, resulting from the increased settlement value in 
financial accounts, directly influences net income (-100 MU). At the same time, deferred 
tax revenue (30 MU) – provided that the option to capitalize deferred tax assets is 
exercised – offsets the reduction in profits at least partially (net impact: -70 MU). This 
profit is, however, as mentioned above, subject to a payout block. 
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Figure 12: Interdependencies between discounting for financial and tax account purposes in a low 
interest rate environment 
 
The demonstrated interdependencies have to be evaluated critically for several reasons. 
Firstly, it has to be mentioned that the low interest rate environment – due to the fixed 
discounting for tax accounts – only entails very limited liquidity effects. The changes in 
value of financial balance sheet items are not recorded on the tax balance sheet and thus 
the tax burdens of corporations are not reduced (Wobbe and Gutzmann (2015), p. 490; 
Anzinger (2016a), p. 1772). Hence, the taxation of profits will be too high as compared 
to distributable profits, which are reduced due to the increased book value of provisions. 
Furthermore, the potentially increased value of deferred tax assets can introduce 
problems. If these turn out not to be realizable in future periods (e.g. due to insufficient 
profits), the firm’s equity is threatened (Ehrmann and Kühnapfel, FAZ 04.01.2016; 
Kröner and Beckenhaub (2008), p. 13 and 20f; Prinz and Keller (2016b), p. 1033ff). In 
conclusion, the actuarial interest rate for tax purposes of 5.5% and 6% respectively can 
be considered as significantly too high relative to the current market environment. Factual 
obligations – for long term provisions in particular – are thus not represented in 
correspondence to their actual economic substance and, due to undervaluation, a risk of 
hidden charges on the tax balance sheet exists (Prinz and Keller (2016a), p. 313).207 
                                                 
207  Geberth (2015), p. 18: The measurement of pension provisions according to IFRS is, for example, often 
about 100% higher than the obligation according to tax accounts. 
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From a conceptual and economic point of view, a reduction in the actuarial interest rate 
would be necessary. This could, however, be opposed to fiscal-political interests: Geberth 
(2015), for example, estimates that a reduction in the actuarial interest rate for pension 
provisions by 1 percentage point (to 5%) would increase book values by about 15%, i.e. 
EUR 41 bn. This in turn would lead to a onetime reduction in tax revenue of about EUR 
10 bn,208 which would be difficult to enforce politically. 
4.3.4.2 Reform Considerations 
In the following, considerations regarding potential reforms, aimed at accounting for an 
appropriate actuarial interest rate for tax purposes, while at the same time also being 
practicable and fiscal-politically acceptable, will be presented. Furthermore, these 
proposals seek to reduce the demonstrated book-tax differences as well as the related 
problems resulting from the disparate discounting regulations. 
In view of an appropriate actuarial interest rate for tax purposes, the first question that 
needs to be answered is whether this interest rate should be of fixed or of floating nature. 
It can be held in favor of a fixed interest rate, as it is currently part of the German tax 
code, that it is associated with planning and legal certainty for corporations. Additionally, 
a fixed interest rate is coherent with respect to the principle of continuity of the taxable 
profit and guarantees formal comparability and absence of arbitrariness by introducing a 
(materially) homogeneous determination of profits for subsequent fiscal years (Herzig 
(2004), p. 25 f.). In contrast, a floating interest rate would rather meet the economic 
calculation of values, allowing for opportunity costs and the alternate use of funds 
respectively to be recorded, as the flexible interest rate would reflect the current market 
environment. Furthermore, experience and practice have shown that the actuarial interest 
rate for tax purposes does not necessarily have to be fixed but can well be floating, e.g. 
based on the borrowing rate. In 1960, for example, the discount rate for pension 
provisions was increased from 3.5% (since 1955) to 5.5% (“Steueränderungsgesetz 
1960”) (Law of 30 July 1960, p. 617) and later to 6% (“zweites Haushaltsstrukturgesetz 
1981”) (Law of 22 December 1982, p. 1523). Similarly, the EC’s proposed CC(C)TB-
DD includes a variable interest rate for long-term provisions, based on the 12M-Euribor 
average (2015: 1.68%) (European Commission (2011), Art. 25 par. 2 l. b). Thus, it can 
be concluded that it is certainly possible to implement a floating actuarial interest rate for 
                                                 
208  This calculation is based on an average corporate income tax rate of less than 30%. 
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tax purposes (as already applied for financial accounting purposes) and that this is, 
considering the current market environment, even necessary. 
Furthermore, it has to be considered which interest rate, i.e. debit or credit interest rate, 
should be used as a basis for the actuarial interest rate. According to the explanatory 
memorandum to the 1960 tax code amendment, the recognition of pension provisions 
involves tax and financial advantages; as corporations have the ability, by recognizing 
pension provisions, to employ temporary funds for investments that could have otherwise 
not been undertaken or only by a drawdown of loans (internal financing) (BT-Drucks. 
III/1811, p. 9). Consequently, the current reasoning is rather based on the assumption of 
capital substitution. Proceeding from this viewpoint, a debit interest rate that, for example, 
is oriented at the yield of long-term commercial bonds would be appropriate. In contrast, 
the reasoning related to financial accounting rather assumes capital accumulation. This is 
based on the argumentation that capital tied up in provisions is available for additional 
investments, leading to realizable revenues (IDW (2009), p. 82). Therefore, the interest 
rate should at least amount to the return the respective corporation could realize with the 
capital bound in provisions in the long-term. Oftentimes, these tied funds are held at high 
liquidity to finance employee pensions. Based on this view, a credit interest rate, i.e. the 
interest rate on long-term investments at the capital market, would be appropriate.209 
As capital substitution and accumulation usually occur simultaneously in a corporation, 
a mixed interest rate, based on debit and credit interest rates, would be appropriate to 
discount provisions.210 The current actuarial interest rate for financial purposes already 
includes such a mixed interest rate (Anzinger (2016b), p. 1830). It is presently based on 
a zero-coupon-Euro interest-rate swap curve plus a markup for corporate bonds of all 
maturities with high-class credit ratings denoted in Euro (Sec. 2 RückAbzinsV).211 The 
actuarial interest rate for tax purposes could conceptually well be oriented at the floating 
rate for financial purposes. Similarly, a multi-period view of 10 years for pension 
provisions and a 7-year-view for all other provisions (Sec. 253 par. 2 HGB) would be 
appropriate for the tax actuarial interest rate to eliminate revenue fluctuations that are not 
                                                 
209  For more on capital substitution and capital accumulation for pension provisions, see Spengel (1995), 
p. 187 f. 
210  This approach was basically also followed in the explanatory memorandum to the 1960 tax code 
amendment, see BT-Drucks. III/1811, 9; Prinz and Keller (2016b), p. 1033 ff. 
211  Advantages of a zero-coupon-Euro interest-rate swap curve are i.e. the range of maturities, low 
influences due to fluctuations in demand, the liquidity of the markets as well as the validity for the 
whole eurozone. A calculation of the yield curve exclusively based on corporate bonds with high-class 
credit ratings denoted in Euro especially with long-term maturities would entail major uncertainties, see 
IDW (2009), p. 82. 
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rooted in a corporation’s business (IDW (2009), p. 82). It can therefore be drawn as an 
interim conclusion that the alignment of the tax actuarial interest rate to the financial 
actuarial interest rate would be reasonable.212 This furthermore entails the advantage of 
reducing book-tax differences. 
To improve the fiscal-political enforceability of such an alignment, regulations for 
transitional and onetime effects related to the current value of provisions in tax accounts 
would need to be established. It may be conceivable to gradually reduce the tax actuarial 
interest rate to match the corresponding interest rate under GAAP (e.g. 0.5% or 1% per 
year) instead of performing an over-night-transition. Table 22 demonstrates such a 
stepwise implementation using the example of pension provisions. 
Table 22: Stepwise alignment of the actuarial interest rate for tax accounting purposes to the discount 
rate of financial accounting 
 
Based on Geberth (2015), an assumed reduction in the discount rate for tax purposes of 
1% in Germany would trigger a decline in corporate profits of approx. EUR 40 bn and of 
EUR 10 bn in tax revenues. These consequences would not be acceptable for neither 
corporations nor tax authorities. A high, onetime revenue reduction can, in some cases, 
result in (after-tax) losses that, due to the minimum taxation (Sec. 10d par. 2 EStG), are 
only of limited use in future periods or, in case of a change in ownership, can get lost 
(Sec. 8c KStG). The fiscal authority will not be willing to accept such exceptionally high 
onetime losses, even if additional revenues in the future, due to the lower actuarial interest 
rate, are likely to have an offsetting effect. 
The fiscal impact, i.e. the profit and revenue effects related to the current book value of 
pension provisions, could therefore be stretched over a longer time horizon by introducing 
further transitional regulations. This would, for example, be possible by recording a 
prepaid expense, i.e. a profit increasing item, in tax accounts that would be reversed over 
                                                 
212  This corresponds with the opinion of the Arbeitskreises Bilanzrecht Hochschullehrer 
Rechtswissenschaft; see Giersberg, FAZ, 02/15/16. 
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10 years as an expense.213 In doing so, the determination of the exact timeframe would be 
a political decision. In case of an increase in the actuarial interest rate in the future, an 
analogous procedure would be appropriate. 
4.3.5 Summary 
(1)  Due to the low interest levels, corporations' net interest expenses are decreasing, 
increasing pre-tax profits as well as tax burdens. 
(2)  Furthermore, international tax planning using traditional channels (debt financing 
in particular) as well as tax accounting policies lose in importance. 
(4)  The reduced relevance of periodization effects leads, in addition, to a potentially 
higher political enforceability of an EU-wide harmonization of the corporate tax 
base. 
(5)  Given that the actuarial interest rate for tax accounts is kept fixed at the current 
level, book-tax differences will increase. This (potentially) leads to an increase in 
the amount of deferred tax assets. From a conceptual and economic point of view, 
a reduction in the actuarial tax interest rate would be necessary. 
(6)  A gradual alignment of the tax actuarial interest rate to the moving average actuarial 
interest rate for financial accounting purposes can be justified. In this case, onetime 
effects (profit and tax revenue effects) can be mitigated by stretching the transition 
period. The determination of the timeframe in this context is a political decision. In 
case of a future increase in the actuarial interest rate, an analogous procedure would 
be appropriate. 
                                                 
213  See for the reversed application: profit-decreasing reserve in the course of the „Steuerentlastungsgesetz 
1999/2000/2002“ to the first-time discounting of provisions. 
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5 Conclusions 
(1)  The general book-tax conformity (BTC) discussion has triggered a huge body of 
tax accounting literature, especially in the US. We have identified two major 
interrelated strands dealing with the association between book-tax conformity and 
opportunistic reporting behavior, which have been surveyed in chapter 2: The first 
one examines whether book-tax differences actually are indicative of aggressive 
reporting. In the second strand, it is analyzed which particular drivers impact on 
book-tax differences (BTD) and on earnings management (EM)/tax sheltering (TS), 
respectively.  
(2) As a first step, the systematic literature review reveals great heterogeneity in 
measures applied. While the majority of studies use a rough estimate of the book-
tax gap, other investigations exploit more precise proxies or use measures for BTC 
by means of cross-country studies. Moreover, only a minority of investigations is 
based on actual tax return data, while most studies have to rely on measures of tax 
variables estimated from financial accounts. Similarly, there are numerous variables 
used to capture EM and/or TS.  
(3)  In a second step, we employ meta regression analysis (MRA) as an innovative tool 
in the empirical accounting literature to derive a consensus estimate in terms of the 
sign and statistical significance level on the association between BTD/BTC and 
opportunistic reporting behavior (first strand of literature). Our MRA results point 
to a statistically significant and positive association between BTD and EM/TS, 
indicating that BTD are indeed indicative of both EM and TS, and even more so of 
EM. This association is, however, less pronounced for studies that only capture 
BTD roughly instead of using more precise proxies. Moreover, examining actual 
BTD computed from tax returns instead of only approximating them from financial 
statements strongly increases the effects. Even though we cannot draw a definite 
conclusion with regard to BTC, our results as well as the alleged inverse correlation 
between BTC and BTD suggest a negative association between BTC and EM/TS. 
We interpret this as a first indicator for higher conformity being indeed effective in 
reducing aggressive reporting.  
(4) For the second strand of literature, we derive insights on the direction and 
significance of the major drivers of BTD. We provide evidence for a positive impact 
of profitability, the NOL dummy, leverage, PPE, capital intensity, R&D expenses, 
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accruals and foreign operations on BTD by using the Stouffer combined test. 
Therefore, we conclude that these variables are positively related to increased levels 
of EM and/or TS and should certainly be taken into account in future studies on this 
topic. Our results are not entirely unambiguous with regard to intangibles, equity 
income in earnings, Big 4 dummy, and institutional ownership. In terms of size and 
liquidity, we conclude that our results are indicative of a negative association with 
EM/TS, given that we consistently find negative results in relation to more precise 
BTD measures. Hence, it can be concluded that it is essential to choose an 
appropriate BTD measure for the respective research question at hand.  
(5) Building on the insights provided in chapter 2, we conduct an own empirical 
analysis (chapter 3) to contribute to the ongoing book-tax conformity debate. 
Firstly, we take into account that our MRA results have shown that efforts taken to 
accurately determine BTD seem to be worthwhile when it comes to the explanatory 
power for opportunistic reporting. Therefore, our study builds on a unique dataset 
of linked individual financial statements and actual tax return data for 150 
incorporated firms in a panel including the years 2008 to 2012. Secondly, our MRA 
results can only provide a first hint that higher conformity is indeed effective in 
reducing aggressive reporting. To substantiate this finding, we examine how a real 
change in book-tax conformity affects firms’ reporting behavior. To this end, we 
exploit the Accounting Law Modernization Act as a quasi-natural experiment 
which implied a decrease in book-tax conformity in Germany in 2010. In particular, 
this reform allows firms to exercise tax accounting options independently from 
financial accounting. 
(6)  In our empirical analysis, we directly exploit the 2010 Reform Act in a difference-
in-differences regression approach. Our results show that companies actually use 
the newly introduced reporting leeway to manage taxable income downwards 
despite of additional documentation costs. More precisely, we find that profitable 
companies which have a clear tax sheltering incentive exhibit comparably higher 
(positive) book-tax differences subsequent to the decrease in conformity. This is 
especially attributable to companies exploiting favorable tax depreciation rules. 
Moreover, we find larger opportunistic tax reporting responses for small companies 
with less complex and predominantly domestic group structures. Finally, we 
observe that a decrease in book-tax conformity induces a decrease in the general 
persistence of taxable income, but at the same time gives rise to higher financial 
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earnings persistence. This corroborates our finding that the increase in book-tax 
differences is due to tax sheltering rather than earnings management.  
(7) In terms of the core research question of this dissertation and the policy 
contribution, our results show that the discretion for opportunistic reporting in a low 
conformity system is indeed exploited despite additional documentation 
requirements. This finding supports the position of proponents of increased book-
tax conformity and is consistent with the results of chapter 2 which indicate that 
book-tax conformity is indeed effective in reducing opportunistic reporting. At the 
same time, we show that detaching financial and taxable income increases the 
persistence of financial income, thus suggesting an increased information content 
of financial earnings in a two-book system. This finding is in line with the 
arguments put forward by the opponents of increased conformity, who maintain 
that both accounting lines provide divergent information content parts of which are 
lost in case of an alignment. Thus, we would propose to either fully align financial 
and tax accounts (one-book system) which might possibly come along with a loss 
of information or to induce a two-book system without any (tax) accounting options 
and discretion to effectively curb opportunistic reporting behavior. 
(8) The implementation of the first step of a Common (Consolidated) Corporate Tax 
Base (CC(C)TB), i.e. a harmonization of the determination of taxable profits in 
Europe, would induce such a full detachment of tax accounting from financial 
accounts and, thus, a transition to a two-book system in all European countries. The 
proposed CCTB rules lack, however, detailed definitions of legal terms such that 
there are still numerous regulatory gaps as well as discretion in reporting which 
cannot be eliminated by referring to national (civil) laws. As discussed, this would 
leave room for tax sheltering and, therefore, not comply with our recommendation. 
A possible solution would be to base the harmonization of the tax base in Europe 
on a cash flow-oriented taxation/modified net income method (chapter 4.1). This 
concept would gear the profit determination more strongly towards the cash-
principle and limit accrual accounting and periodical adjustments as far as possible. 
In some areas, the CCTB rules are already in line with the principles of a cash flow-
oriented taxation (e.g. periodization of long-term liabilities). Further adaption is 
necessary, in particular regarding the cash-principle, the abolishment of existing 
accounting options and discretion as well as the specification of undefined legal 
terms. These changes and thus a greater movement towards a more strongly cash-
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oriented profit determination would lead to more clarity and uniformity as well as 
to less scope for opportunistic reporting behavior. Furthermore, its stronger 
orientation towards the taxation practices of the European member states would 
imply lower tax-related compliance costs as well as a better political enforceability. 
Material taxation consequences are, in addition, likely to be minor. 
 (9) In order to further increase transparency in tax reporting in Europe and to limit Base 
Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS), the Organization for Economic Co-Operation 
and Development (OECD) and the European Commission have put forward several 
proposals for a Country-by-Country Reporting (CbCR). Our findings (chapter 4.2) 
suggest that neither consolidated or individual financial statements nor other 
existing data sources seem to be an appropriate basis for providing such country-
specific information. Instead, it would be necessary to define detailed and 
harmonized regulations to ensure comparability. The outlined concept of a 
CC(C)TB (chapter 4.1) could be a promising avenue in that regard as well. The 
discussion on benefits and costs of a CbCR reveals that benefits (partially) lack a 
theoretical foundation and, overall, do not seem to outweigh associated costs. We, 
therefore, contend that CbCR does not seem to be a convincing measure to prevent 
multinationals from profit shifting. Instead, it appears to be more reasonable to 
combat tax aggressiveness by removing gaps and loopholes in national and 
international tax laws and by enforcing, for example, thin-cap rules and transfer 
pricing regulations.  
(10) Several market conditions, including the persistent low interest environment, 
further impact on the various tax (accounting) dimensions (chapter 4.3). First, due 
to the low interest levels, corporations' net interest expenses are decreasing, 
increasing pre-tax profits as well as tax burdens. Furthermore, international tax 
planning strategies using traditional profit shifting channels as well as tax sheltering 
policies lose in importance. The reduced relevance of periodization effects leads, in 
addition, to a potentially higher political enforceability of a CC(C)TB in Europe. 
Given that the actuarial interest rate for tax accounts is kept fixed at the current 
level in Germany, book-tax differences will increase. From a conceptual and 
economic point of view, a reduction in the actuarial tax interest rate would be 
necessary. In Germany, a gradual alignment of the tax actuarial interest rate to the 
moving average actuarial interest rate for financial accounting purposes could be 
justified. 
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Appendix 
Table A- 1: Journal abbreviations 
Abbreviation Journal title  
AIA Advances in Accounting, incorporating Advances in International Accounting 
AJPT Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory 
CUBR China-USA Business Review 
CAR Contemporary Accounting Research 
EAR European Accounting Review 
IBR International Business Research 
IJAES International Journal of Accounting and Economics Studies 
IJAAPE International Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Performance Evaluation 
IJBM International Journal of Business and Management 
IJEF International Journal of Economics and Finance 
JAE Journal of Accounting and Economics 
JAF Journal of Accounting and Finance 
JAR Journal of Accounting Research 
JAAF Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance 
JBF Journal of Banking and Finance 
JBFA Journal of Business Finance & Accounting 
JFE Journal of Financial Economics 
JIFMA Journal of International Financial Management & Accounting 
JATA Journal of the American Taxation Association 
RAR Research in Accounting Regulation 
RAST Review of Accounting Studies 
TAR The Accounting Review 
IJA The International Journal of Accounting 
REST The Review of Economics and Statistics 
WP Working Paper 
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Table A- 2: Overview of authoritative principle pre- and post-BilMoG 
 
Note: This table provides an overview of the impact of the (reverse) authoritative principle with regard to potential 
deviations between financial and tax accounting, pre- and post-reform.  
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Table A- 3: Overview of accounting items with BTD pre- and post-BilMoG 
Assets 
 
198 
 
199 
 
*Deviation: implied divergence or convergence of book and tax income? ( - : no change/no clear tendency) 
 
 
200 
Liabilities 
 
201 
 
202 
 
* Deviation: implied divergence or convergence of book and tax income? ( - : no change/no clear 
tendency)Note: This table lists (possible) deviations between financial and tax accounting at the level of 
single balance sheet items, pre- and post-reform. 
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Table A- 4: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable   Pooled  
(2008-2012) 
Pre-BilMoG 
(2008-2009) 
Post-BilMoG 
(2010-2012) 
BTD  -0.001 -0.006 0.003  
 (0.082) (0.071) (0.092) 
Profitability  0.847 0.844 0.849  
 (0.360) (0.363) (0.358) 
PPE  0.142 0.147 0.137  
 (0.199) (0.201) (0.197) 
Inventories  0.113 0.109 0.118  
 (0.169) (0.162) (0.176) 
Financials  0.224 0.225 0.223  
 (0.322) (0.322) (0.321) 
Provisions  0.167 0.170 0.165  
 (0.190) (0.191) (0.189) 
Leverage  20.005 16.327 23.656  
 (115.731) (85.228) (139.645) 
Reorganization  0.188 0.214 0.163  
 (0.391) (0.411) (0.370) 
Size  17.410 17.400 17.419  
 (1.967) (1.942) (1.994) 
Liquidity  126.377 226.554 27.933 
  (2592.468) (3678.415) (181.622) 
Note: This table displays the mean of the variables used in the regression analysis for the full sample (1) or a sample split for 
the years 2008-2009 pre-reform (2) and the years 2010-1012 post-reform (3) respectively. Standard errors are shown in 
parentheses.  
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Table A- 5: Correlation Matrix 
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